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A Theory of Feelings Anger and Forgiveness Philosophizing Madness from Nietzsche to Derrida"My Madness Saved Me"10 Good Questions about Life and Death12 Modern Philosophers50 Reasons People Give for Believing in a GodA Cabinet of Philosophical CuriositiesA Case for IronyA Companion to BioethicsA Companion to Buddhist PhilosophyA Companion to FoucaultA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to GenethicsA Companion to HumeA Companion to KantA Companion to Phenomenology and ExistentialismA Companion to PragmatismA Companion to the Philosophy of ActionA Companion to the Philosophy of BiologyA Companion to the Philosophy of LiteratureA Conceptual History of PsychologyA Critical Overview of Biological FunctionsA Critique of Naturalistic Philosophies of MindA Cursing Brain?A Delicate BalanceA Farewell to AlmsA Fragile LifeA Frightening LoveA Future for PresentismA Guide to the Good LifeA History of PsychiatryA History of the MindA Life Worth LivingA Manual of Experimental PhilosophyA Map of the MindA Metaphysics of PsychopathologyA Mind So RareA Minimal LibertarianismA Natural History of Human MoralityA Natural History of Human ThinkingA Natural History of VisionA Parliament of MindsA Philosopher Looks at The Sense of HumorA Philosophical DiseaseA Philosophy for the Science of Well-BeingA Philosophy of BoredomA Philosophy of Cinematic ArtA Philosophy of CultureA Philosophy of EmptinessA Philosophy of FearA Philosophy of PainA Physicalist ManifestoA Place for ConsciousnessA Question of TrustA Research Agenda for DSM-VA Revolution of the MindA Sentimentalist Theory of the MindA Stroll With William JamesA Tapestry of ValuesA Tear is an Intellectual ThingA Theory of FreedomA Thousand MachinesA Universe of ConsciousnessA Very Bad WizardA Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the CurtainA Virtue EpistemologyA World Full of GodsA World Without ValuesAbout FaceAbout the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the SelfAction and ResponsibilityAction in ContextAction Theory, Rationality and CompulsionAction, Contemplation, and HappinessAction, Emotion and WillAdam SmithAdaptive DynamicsAddictionAddictionAddiction and ResponsibilityAddiction and Self-ControlAddiction Is a ChoiceAdvances in Identity Theory and ResearchAftermathAfterwarAgainst AdaptationAgainst AutonomyAgainst BioethicsAgainst HappinessAgainst HealthAgainst MarriageAgency and ActionAgency and AnswerabilityAgency and EmbodimentAgency and ResponsibilityAgency, Freedom, and Moral ResponsibilityAl-JununAlain BadiouAlain BadiouAlasdair MacIntyreAlien Landscapes?Altered EgosAmbivalenceAn Anthology of Psychiatric EthicsAn Ethics for TodayAn Intellectual History of CannibalismAn Interpretation of DesireAn Introduction to EthicsAn Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy An Introduction to Philosophy of EducationAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of MindAn Introduction to the Philosophy of PsychologyAn Introductory Philosophy of MedicineAn Odd Kind of FameAnalytic FreudAnalytic Philosophy in AmericaAncient AngerAncient Models of MindAncient Philosophy of the SelfAngerAnimal LessonsAnimal MindsAnimals Like UsAnnihilationAnother PlanetAnswers for AristotleAnti-ExternalismAnti-Individualism and KnowledgeAntigone’s ClaimAntipsychiatryAre We Hardwired?Are Women Human?Arguing about DisabilityArguing About Human NatureAristotle and the Philosophy of FriendshipAristotle on Practical WisdomAristotle's ChildrenAristotle's Ethics and Moral ResponsibilityAristotle's WayAristotle, Emotions, and EducationArt & MoralityArt After Conceptual ArtArt in Three DimensionsArt, Self and KnowledgeArtificial ConsciousnessArtificial HappinessAspects of PsychologismAsylum to ActionAt the Existentialist CaféAtonement and ForgivenessAttention is Cognitive UnisonAutobiography as PhilosophyAutonomyAutonomy and Mental DisorderAutonomy and the Challenges to LiberalismBabies by DesignBackslidingBadiouBadiou's DeleuzeBadiou, Balibar, Ranciere: Rethinking EmancipationBare Facts And Naked TruthsBasic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free WillBattlestar Galactica and PhilosophyBe Like the FoxBeautyBecoming a SubjectBecoming HumanBefore ConsciousnessBehavingBehavioral Genetics in the Postgenomic EraBeing AmoralBeing HumanBeing Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory Being No OneBeing Realistic about ReasonsBeing ReducedBeing YourselfBelief's Own EthicsBending Over BackwardsBerlin Childhood around 1900Bernard WilliamsBertrand RussellBest ExplanationsBetter than BothBetter Than WellBetween Two WorldsBeyond HealthBeyond Hegel and NietzscheBeyond KuhnBeyond LossBeyond MelancholyBeyond Moral JudgmentBeyond PostmodernismBeyond ReductionBeyond SchizophreniaBeyond the DSM StoryBioethicsBioethics and the BrainBioethics in the ClinicBiological Complexity and Integrative PluralismBiology Is TechnologyBiosBipolar ExpeditionsBlackwell Companion to the Philosophy of EducationBlindsight & The Nature of ConsciousnessBlues - Philosophy for EveryoneBlushBob Dylan and PhilosophyBody ConsciousnessBody Image And Body SchemaBody ImagesBody LanguageBody MattersBody WorkBody-Subjects and Disordered MindsBoundBoundaries of the MindBoyleBrain Evolution and CognitionBrain FictionBrain, Mind, and Human Behavior in Contemporary Cognitive ScienceBrain-WiseBrainchildrenBrains, Buddhas, and BelievingBrainstormingBrave New WorldsBreakdown of WillBrief Child Therapy Homework PlannerBrief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and FaithBrief Therapy Homework PlannerBritain on the CouchBritish Idealism and the Concept of the SelfBrute RationalityBuffy the Vampire Slayer and PhilosophyBut Is It Art?Camus and SartreCartesian LinguisticsCartographies of the MindCarving Nature at Its JointsCase Studies in Biomedical Research EthicsCassandra's DaughterCato's TearsCausation and CounterfactualsCauses, Laws, and Free WillChanging Conceptions of the Child from the Renaissance to Post-ModernityChanging the SubjectChaosophyCharacter and Moral Psychology Character as Moral FictionCharles DarwinCharles S. Peirce's PhenomenologyCherishmentChildhood and the Philosophy of EducationChildrenChildren, Families, and Health Care Decision MakingChoices and ConflictChoosing Not to ChooseChristmas - Philosophy for EveryoneCinema, Philosophy, BergmanCinematic MythmakingCity and Soul in Plato's RepublicClassifying MadnessClear and Queer ThinkingClinical EthicsClinical Psychiatry in Imperial GermanyCodependent ForevermoreCoffee - Philosophy for EveryoneCognition and the BrainCognition of Value in Aristotle's EthicsCognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, ReflectionCognitive BiologyCognitive FictionsCognitive Neuroscience of EmotionCognitive Systems and the Extended MindCognitive Systems and the Extended Mind Cognitive Theories of Mental IllnessCoherence in Thought and ActionCollected Papers, Volume 1Collected Papers, Volume 2College SexComedy IncarnateCommitmentCommunicative Action and Rational ChoiceCompassionate Moral RealismCompetence, Condemnation, and CommitmentConcealment And ExposureConcepts and Causes in the Philosophy of DiseaseConceptual Analysis and Philosophical NaturalismConceptual Art and PaintingConceptual Issues in Evolutionary BiologyConfessionsConfucianismConnected, or What It Means to Live in the Network SocietyConquest of AbundanceConscience and ConvenienceConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousness ConsciousnessConsciousness and Fundamental RealityConsciousness and Its Place in NatureConsciousness and LanguageConsciousness and Mental LifeConsciousness and MindConsciousness and the NovelConsciousness and the SelfConsciousness EmergingConsciousness EvolvingConsciousness ExplainedConsciousness in ActionConsciousness RecoveredConsciousness RevisitedConsciousness, Color, and ContentConsole and ClassifyConstructing the WorldConstructive AnalysisContemporary Debates In Applied EthicsContemporary Debates in Moral TheoryContemporary Debates in Philosophy of BiologyContemporary Debates in Philosophy of MindContemporary Debates in Political PhilosophyContemporary Debates in Social PhilosophyContemporary Perspectives on Natural LawContested Knowledge: Social Theory TodayContesting PsychiatryContext and the AttitudesContinental Philosophy of ScienceControlControlling Our DestiniesConversations About Psychology and Sexual OrientationCopernicus, Darwin and FreudCrazy for YouCreating a Life of Meaning and CompassionCreating ConsilienceCreating HysteriaCreating Mental IllnessCreating Scientific ConceptsCreating the American JunkieCreation, Rationality and AutonomyCreatures Like Us?Crime and CulpabilityCrime, Punishment, and Mental IllnessCrimes of ReasonCritical New Perspectives on Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity DisorderCritical PsychiatryCritical PsychologyCritical ResistanceCritical Thinking About PsychologyCritical VisionsCross and KhoraCruel CompassionCTRL [SPACE]Cultural Psychology of the SelfCultural Theory: An IntroductionCulture and Psychiatric DiagnosisCulture and Subjective Well-BeingCulture of DeathCultures of NeurastheniaCurious EmotionsCurrent Controversies in Experimental PhilosophyCurrent Controversies in Values and ScienceCustom and Reason in HumeCustomers and Patrons of the Mad-TradeCutting God in Half - And Putting the Pieces Together AgainCylons in AmericaDamaged IdentitiesDamasio's Error and Descartes' TruthDangerous EmotionsDaniel DennettDaniel DennettDark AgesDarwin and DesignDarwin's Dangerous IdeaDarwin's LegacyDarwin, God and the Meaning of LifeDarwinian PsychiatryDarwinian ReductionismDarwinizing CultureDating: Philosophy for EveryoneDeathDeathDeath and CharacterDeath and CompassionDeath and the AfterlifeDebating DesignDebating HumanismDecision Making, Personhood and DementiaDecomposing the WillDeconstructing PsychotherapyDeconstruction and DemocracyDeeper Than DarwinDeeper than ReasonDefending Science - within ReasonDefining Psychopathology in the 21st CenturyDegrees of BeliefDeleuze and the Concepts of CinemaDelusion and Self-DeceptionDelusions and Other Irrational BeliefsDelusions and the Madness of the MassesDementiaDemons, Dreamers, and MadmenDennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative SelfDennett’s PhilosophyDepression Is a ChoiceDepression, Emotion and the SelfDepthDerrida, Deleuze, PsychoanalysisDescartesDescartes and the Passionate MindDescartes' CogitoDescartes's Changing MindDescartes's Concept of MindDescribing Inner Experience?Descriptions and PrescriptionsDesembodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974)Desire and AffectDesire, Love, and IdentityDesire, Practical Reason, and the GoodDeveloping the VirtuesDiagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental DisordersDialectics of the SelfDid My Neurons Make Me Do It?Difference and IdentityDigital SoulDimensional Models of Personality DisordersDisability, Difference, DiscriminationDisjunctivismDisorders of VolitionDisorientation and Moral LifeDispatches from the Freud WarsDisrupted LivesDistractionDisturbed ConsciousnessDivided Minds and Successive SelvesDo Apes Read Minds?Do Fish Feel Pain?Do We Still Need Doctors?Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?Does the Woman Exist?Doing without ConceptsDon't be FooledDon't Believe Everything You ThinkDonald DavidsonDonald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the MentalDoubting Darwin?Down GirlDreaming and Other Involuntary MentationDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV SourcebookDSM-IV-TR CasebookDworkin and His CriticsDying to KnowDynamics in ActionDysthymia and the Spectrum of Chronic DepressionsEccentricsEducational MetamorphosesEffective IntentionsElbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth WantingEmbodied Minds in ActionEmbodied RhetoricsEmbodied Selves and Divided MindsEmbryos under the MicroscopeEmergencies in Mental Health PracticeEmerging Conceptual, Ethical and Policy Issues in BionanotechnologyEmotionEmotion and ConsciousnessEmotion and PsycheEmotion ExperienceEmotion RegulationEmotion, Evolution, And RationalityEmotional IntelligenceEmotional ReasonEmotional ReasonEmotional TruthEmotions in Humans and ArtifactsEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions in the Moral LifeEmotions, Value, and AgencyEmpathyEmpathy and AgencyEmpathy and Moral DevelopmentEmpathy and MoralityEmpathy in the Context of PhilosophyEmpirical Ethics in PsychiatryEnactivist InterventionsEnchanted LoomsEngaging BuddhismEngineering the Human GermlineEnjoymentEnvyEpicureanismEpistemic LuckEpistemologyEpistemology and EmotionsEpistemology and the Psychology of Human JudgmentEros and the GoodErotic MoralityEssays in Social NeuroscienceEssays in the Metaphysics of Mind Essays on Derek Parfit's On What MattersEssays on Free Will and Moral ResponsibilityEssays on Nonconceptual ContentEssays on Philosophical CounselingEssays on Reference, Language, and MindEssays on the Concept of Mind in Early-Modern PhilosophyEssential Sources in the Scientific Study of ConsciousnessEsssential Philosophy of PsychiatryEternal Sunshine of the Spotless MindEthical Conflicts in PsychologyEthical Issues in Forensic Mental Health ResearchEthical Issues in Human CloningEthical TheoryEthicsEthicsEthics and the A PrioriEthics and the Metaphysics of MedicineEthics and Values in PsychotherapyEthics Done RightEthics ExpertiseEthics in Plain EnglishEthics in PracticeEthics in Psychiatric ResearchEthics of PsychiatryEthics without OntologyEuropean Review of Philosophy. Vol. 5Everyday IrrationalityEvil in Modern ThoughtEvolutionEvolution and the Human MindEvolution's RainbowEvolutionary Origins of MoralityEvolutionary PsychologyExamined LifeExamined LivesExistential AmericaExistentialismExistentialism and Romantic LoveExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental PhilosophyExperimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and NaturalismExperiments in EthicsExplaining ConsciousnessExplaining the BrainExplaining the Computational MindExplanatory PluralismExploding the Gene MythExploring HappinessExploring the SelfExpression and the InnerExpressions of JudgmentExtraordinary Science and PsychiatryFaces of IntentionFact and ValueFact and Value in EmotionFacts and ValuesFacts, Values, and NormsFads and Fallacies in the Social SciencesFaith and Wisdom in ScienceFatherhoodFear of KnowledgeFearless SpeechFeeling Pain and Being in PainFeelings and EmotionsFeelings of BeingFellow-Feeling and the Moral LifeFeminism and Its DiscontentsFeminism and Philosophy of ScienceFeminist Ethics and Social and Political PhilosophyFeminist Interpretations of Rene DescartesFeminist TheoryField Notes from ElsewhereFinding Consciousness in the BrainFingerprints of GodFlesh in the Age of ReasonFolk Psychological NarrativesFolk Psychology Re-AssessedForces of HabitForgivenessForgiveness and LoveForgiveness and RetributionFoucault 2.0Foucault and PhilosophyFoucault NowFoucault, Psychology and the Analytics of PowerFoundational Issues in Human Brain MappingFoundations of Ethical Practice, Research, and Teaching in PsychologyFour Views on Free WillFrank Ramsey (1903-1930)Free WillFree WillFree WillFree WillFree Will and Action ExplanationFree Will and LuckFree Will And Moral ResponsibilityFree Will as an Open Scientific ProblemFree Will, Agency, and Meaning in LifeFree: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free WillFreedomFreedom and DeterminismFreedom And NeurobiologyFreedom and ResponsibiltyFreedom and ValueFreedom EvolvesFreedom RegainedFreedom vs. InterventionFreedom, Fame, Lying, and BetrayalFreudFreud and the Question of PseudoscienceFreud As PhilosopherFreud's AnswerFreud, the Reluctant PhilosopherFriedrich NietzscheFrom Chance to ChoiceFrom Clinic to ClassroomFrom Complexity to LifeFrom Enlightenment to ReceptivityFrom Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the HumanitiesFrom Morality to Mental HealthFrom Passions to EmotionsFrom Philosophy to PsychotherapyFrom Valuing to ValueFrontiers of ConsciousnessFrontiers of JusticeFurnishing the MindGalileo in PittsburghGenderGender and Mental HealthGender in the MirrorGender TroubleGenesGenes, Women, EqualityGenetic Nature/CultureGenetic ProspectsGenetic ProspectsGenetic SecretsGenocide's AftermathGenomes and What to Make of ThemGerman Idealism and the JewGerman PhilosophyGetting HookedGilles DeleuzeGlobal PhilosophyGluttonyGod and Phenomenal ConsciousnessGoffman's LegacyGoing Amiss in Experimental ResearchGoodness & AdviceGrassroots SpiritualityGrave MattersGrave MattersGreedGreek Models of Mind and SelfGut ReactionsHabilitation, Health, and AgencyHabits of MindHallucinationHandbook of BioethicsHandbook of EmotionsHappinessHappinessHappinessHappinessHappiness and EducationHappiness and the Good LifeHappiness Is OverratedHappiness, Death, and the Remainder of LifeHard LuckHarmful ThoughtsHaving the World in ViewHealing PsychiatryHealing the Soul in the Age of the BrainHealth, Illness and DiseaseHealth, Science, and Ordinary LanguageHegelHeidegger and a Metaphysics of FeelingHeidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of BeingHermann von Helmholtz's MechanismHermeneutics As PoliticsHeterophobiaHeterosyncraciesHeuristics and BiasesHeuristics and the LawHidden ResourcesHidden SelvesHiding from HumanityHigh Art LiteHistorical OntologyHistory of Psychiatry and Medical PsychologyHistory, Historicity And ScienceHobbesHomosexualitiesHope and Dread in PsychoanalysisHot ThoughtHow Can I Be Trusted?How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?How Children Learn the Meanings of WordsHow Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?How Do We Know Who We Are?How Emotions WorkHow Emotions WorkHow History Made the MindHow Images ThinkHow is Nature Possible?How Propaganda WorksHow Science WorksHow Scientific Practices MatterHow Scientists Explain DiseaseHow The Body Shapes The MindHow the Body Shapes the Way We ThinkHow the Mind Explains BehaviorHow the Mind Uses the BrainHow to Be a StoicHow to Make Opportunity EqualHow to Solve the Mind-Body Problemhow to stop timeHow to Think More About SexHow We HopeHow We ReasonHuman CloningHuman Development, Language and the Future of MankindHuman EnhancementHuman Evolution, Reproduction, and MoralityHuman GoodnessHuman Identity and BioethicsHuman NatureHuman NatureHuman Nature and the Limits of ScienceHuman-Built WorldHumanismHumanism, What's That?HumanityHumans, Animals, MachinesHumeHumeHume on Motivation and VirtueHume's True ScepticismHume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary PsychologyHusserlHystoriesI Am Dynamite!I of the VortexI Was WrongIdeas that MatterIdentifying the MindIdentity and Agency in Cultural WorldsIgnorance and ImaginationIllnessImagination and Its PathologiesImagination and the Meaningful BrainImagining NumbersImmortal RemainsImproving Nature?In Defense of an Evolutionary Concept of HealthIn Defense of SentimentalityIn Love With LifeIn Praise of Athletic BeautyIn Praise of DesireIn Praise of Natural PhilosophyIn Praise of the WhipIn Pursuit of HappinessIn Search of HappinessIn the Name of GodIn the Name of IdentityIn the Space of ReasonsIn the SwarmIn Two MindsInclusive EthicsIncompatibilism's AllureIndividual Differences in Conscious ExperienceInfinity and PerspectiveInformation ArtsInformed Consent in Medical ResearchIngmar Bergman, Cinematic PhilosopherInhuman ThoughtsInner PresenceInsanityIntegrating Psychotherapy and PharmacotherapyIntegrity and the Fragile SelfIntelligent VirtueIntentionIntentionality, Deliberation and AutonomyIntentions and IntentionalityIntentions and IntentionalityInterpreting MindsInterpreting NietzscheIntroducing Greek PhilosophyIntrospection and ConsciousnessIntrospection VindicatedIntuition, Imagination, and Philosophical MethodologyIntuitionismInvestigating the Psychological WorldIrrationalityIrrationalityIs Academic Feminism Dead?Is It Me or My Meds?Is Long-Term Therapy Unethical?Is Oedipus Online?Is Science Neurotic?Is Science Value Free?Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?Is There a Duty to Die?Issues in Philosophical CounselingJacques LacanJacques RancièreJacques RanciereJean-Paul SartreJohn McDowellJohn SearleJohn Searle's Ideas About Social RealityJohn Stuart MillJohn Stuart Mill and the Writing of CharacterJoint AttentionJokesJonathan EdwardsJudging and UnderstandingJustice for ChildrenJustice in RobesJustice, Luck, and KnowledgeKantKant and MiltonKant and the Fate of AutonomyKant and the Limits of AutonomyKant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral ActionKant on Freedom, Law, and HappinessKant on Moral AutonomyKant's Anatomy of EvilKant's Anatomy of the Intelligent MindKant's Theory of VirtueKarl JaspersKarl PopperKarl Popper, Science and EnlightenmentKey Concepts in PhilosophyKierkegaardKierkegaard as PhenomenologistKierkegaard's Concept of DespairKierkegaard's MuseKinds of MindsKinds, Things, and StuffKnowing EmotionsKnowing, Knowledge and BeliefsKnowledge MonopoliesKnowledge, Belief, and CharacterKnowledge, Possibility, and ConsciousnessLacanLack of CharacterLack of CharacterLanguageLanguage in ContextLanguage, Consciousness, CultureLanguage, Culture, and MindLanguage, Vision, and MusicLaw and the BrainLaw, Liberty, and PsychiatryLaws, Mind, and Free WillLeaving YouLectures on the History of Political PhilosophyLevelling the Playing FieldLiberal Education in a Knowledge SocietyLiberatory PsychiatryLife and ActionLife at the Texas State Lunatic Asylum, 1857-1997Life Is Not a Game of PerfectLife of the MindLife's FormLife, Death, & MeaningLife, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of UtilityLife, Sex, and IdeasLight in the Dark RoomLike a Splinter in Your MindLiving and Dying WellLiving NarrativeLiving Outside Mental IllnessLiving with DarwinLiving With One’s PastLockeLocke LockeLogic and the Art of Memory Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and LiteratureLooking for SpinozaLooking for The StrangerLost in DialogueLost SoulsLOT 2LoveLoveLove's ConfusionsLove's VisionLove, Friendship, and the SelfLove, Sex & TragedyLuckyLudwig WittgensteinLustLyingMachine ConsciousnessMad for FoucaultMad TravelersMade with WordsMadness And Death In PhilosophyMadness and DemocracyMadness at HomeMadness Is CivilizationMaking Natural KnowledgeMaking Sense of EvolutionMaking Sense of Freedom and ResponsibilityMaking the DSM-5Making the Social WorldMaking TruthMale Female EmailMan, Beast, and ZombieMandated Reporting of Suspected Child AbuseManiaManic Depression and CreativityMapping the Edges and the In-betweenMapping the Future of BiologyMarcus AureliusMaster PassionsMatters of the MindMe++Meaning and Moral OrderMeaning and Value in a Secular AgeMeaning in LifeMeaning in Life and Why It MattersMeaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and MindMeanings of ArtMeasuring HappinessMeasuring PsychopathologyMedia MadnessMedical Enhancement and PosthumanityMedical NihilismMedicine and Philosophy in Classical AntiquityMedicine of the PersonMedicine, Mental Health, Religion, Science and Well-BeingMeditations on Self-Discipline and FailureMelancholy And the Care of the SoulMelancholy and the Otherness of GodMementoMemory and NarrativeMental ActionsMental CausationMental Causation and OntologyMental HealthMental Health At The CrossroadsMental Health Policy in BritainMerit, Meaning, and Human BondageMerleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of PhilosophyMetacognition and Theory of MindMetacreationMetaethical SubjectivismMetaethicsMetal and FleshMetaphors of MemoryMetapoliticsMethods in MindMichel FoucaultMidlifeMill's UtilitarianismMindMindMindMind and ConsciousnessMind and CosmosMind and MechanismMind GamesMind in a Physical WorldMind in Everyday Life and Cognitive ScienceMind in LifeMind the BodyMind TimeMind's LandscapeMind, Brain and the Elusive SoulMind, Brain, and Free WillMind, Reason and ImaginationMinding MindsMindreadersMindreading AnimalsMinds and PersonsMinds, Brains, and LawMinds, Ethics, and ConditionalsMindshapingMindsightMindworldsMirror, MirrorMixed FeelingsMockingbird YearsModels of the SelfModern Social ImaginariesModern Theories of JusticeModernity and SubjectivityModernity and TechnologyMoody Minds DistemperedMoral BrainsMoral DimensionsMoral FailureMoral ImaginationMoral LiteracyMoral MachinesMoral ParticularismMoral PsychologyMoral Psychology and Human AgencyMoral Psychology, Volume 1Moral Psychology, Volume 2Moral Psychology, Volume 3Moral Psychology: Volume IVMoral RepairMoral Responsibility and Alternative PossibilitiesMoral TribesMoral Value and Human DiversityMorality and Self-InterestMorality in a Natural WorldMorality, Moral Luck and ResponsibilityMotherhoodMotive and RightnessMoving Beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New PsychiatryMultiple Analogies in Science and PhilosophyMultiple Identities & False MemoriesMusic, Madness, and the Unworking of LanguageMy Brain Made Me Do ItMy Double UnveiledMy WayNarrativeNarrative and IdentityNarrative MedicineNarrative PsychiatryNarrative Theory and the Cognitive SciencesNatural Ethical FactsNatural Kinds and Conceptual ChangeNatural MindsNatural-Born CybogsNaturalism and the First-Person PerspectiveNaturalism and the Human ConditionNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalism in the Philosophy of HealthNaturalized BioethicsNaturalizing the MindNatureNature and NarrativeNear Death ExperienceNeither Bad nor MadNeither Victim nor SurvivorNeuro-Philosophy and the Healthy MindNeuroethicsNeuroethicsNeuroexistentialismNeurological Foundations of Cognitive Neuroscience Neurophilosophy at WorkNeurophilosophy of Free WillNeuropoliticsNeuropsychoanalysis in PracticeNeuroscience and PhilosophyNew Essays on the Explanation of ActionNew Philosophy for a New MediaNew Versions of VictimsNew Waves in Philosophy of ActionNietzscheNietzsche and Buddhist PhilosophyNietzsche on Ethics and PoliticsNietzsche's TherapyNietzsche, Culture and EducationNietzsche: The Man and His PhilosophyNihil UnboundNoir AnxietyNormative EthicsNormativityNorms of NatureNotebooks 1951-1959Notes Toward a Performative Theory of AssemblyNothing So AbsurdOblivionOn AnxietyOn ApologyOn Being AuthenticOn Being AuthenticOn BeliefOn BetrayalOn BullshitOn DelusionOn DesireOn EmotionsOn HashishOn Human NatureOn Human RightsOn Loving Our EnemiesOn Nature and LanguageOn PersonalityOn ReflectionOn Romantic LoveOn the EmotionsOn the Freud WatchOn the Government of the LivingOn the Human ConditionOn the InternetOn the Meaning of LifeOn the Philosophy of LawOn the Pragmatics of CommunicationOn the Punitive SocietyOn TruthOn Virtue EthicsOn What MattersOn What We Owe to Each OtherOne Hundred DaysOnflowOnly a Promise of HappinessOntology of ConsciousnessOpen MindedOpen Your EyesOrgans without BodiesOther MindsOur Last Great IllusionOur Own MindsOur Posthuman FutureOur StoriesOut of Its MindOut of Our HeadsOxford Guide to the MindOxford Handbook of Psychiatric EthicsOxford Studies in Experimental PhilosophyOxford Studies in Normative EthicsOxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 7Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of PsychiatryPanic DisorderPanpsychismPanpsychism in the WestPartialityPassionate EnginesPassionate EnginesPathologies of BeliefPathologies of ReasonPatient Autonomy and the Ethics of ResponsibilityPC, M.D.Perceiving the WorldPerception & CognitionPerception and Basic BeliefsPerception, Hallucination, and IllusionPerceptual ExperiencePerfecting VirtuePerplexities of ConsciousnessPersistencePersonal AutonomyPersonal Autonomy in SocietyPersonal IdentityPersonal Identity and EthicsPersonal Identity and Fractured SelvesPersonhood and Health CarePersonsPersons and BodiesPersons, Humanity, and the Definition of DeathPersons, Souls and DeathPerspectives on ImitationPerspectives on PragmatismPessimismPhenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal KnowledgePhenomenal ConsciousnessPhenomenal IntentionalityPhenomenologyPhenomenology and ExistentialismPhenomenology and Philosophy of MindPhenomenology of IllnessPhilosophersPhilosophers on MusicPhilosophers without GodsPhilosophical CounselingPhilosophical Counselling and the UnconsciousPhilosophical DevicesPhilosophical Foundations of NeurosciencePhilosophical History and the Problem of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Issues in PharmaceuticsPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in PsychiatryPhilosophical Issues in Psychiatry IIPhilosophical MethodologyPhilosophical MidwiferyPhilosophical Myths of the FallPhilosophical Perspectives on DepictionPhilosophical Perspectives on Technology and PsychiatryPhilosophical PracticePhilosophical Reflections on DisabilityPhilosophizing About Sex Philosophizing the EverydayPhilosophy and HappinessPhilosophy and LivingPhilosophy and PsychiatryPhilosophy and PsychotherapyPhilosophy and Science FictionPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the EmotionsPhilosophy and the Interpretation of Pop CulturePhilosophy and the Moving ImagePhilosophy and the NeurosciencesPhilosophy and This Actual WorldPhilosophy As FictionPhilosophy BitesPhilosophy Bites BackPhilosophy for Counselling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy for LifePhilosophy in a New CenturyPhilosophy in an Age of SciencePhilosophy in Children's LiteraturePhilosophy in the Roman EmpirePhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of ActionPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BiologyPhilosophy of BodyPhilosophy of Film and Motion PicturesPhilosophy of LovePhilosophy of Love, Sex, and MarriagePhilosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage: An IntroductionPhilosophy of MedicinePhilosophy of MindPhilosophy of Mind and CognitionPhilosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple PersonalityPhilosophy of PsychologyPhilosophy of Public HealthPhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of Technology: The Technological ConditionPhilosophy of the Social SciencesPhilosophy on TapPhilosophy PracticePhilosophy the Day after TomorrowPhilosophy Within Its Proper BoundsPhilosophy's Role in Counseling and PsychotherapyPhilosophy, Neuroscience and ConsciousnessPhilosophy, Politics, DemocracyPhotography and PhilosophyPhysical RealizationPhysicalism and Its DiscontentsPhysicalism and Mental CausationPhysicalism, or Something Near EnoughPhysician-Assisted DyingPillar of SaltPin-up GrrrlsPlant MindsPlatoPlatoPlato, Not Prozac!Platonic Ethics, Old and NewPleasurePluralistic CasuistryPolarities of ExperiencesPolitical EmotionsPopper, Objectivity and the Growth of KnowledgePornPorn StudiesPornography, Sex, and FeminismPortrait of the Psychiatrist as a Young ManPositive NihilismPostcolonial DisordersPostpsychiatryPosttraumatic Stress DisorderPower and the SelfPower SplitPractical Autonomy and BioethicsPractical ConflictsPractical Identity and Narrative AgencyPractical PhilosophyPractical RulesPractical Tortoise RaisingPractically ProfoundPracticing Feminist Ethics in PsychologyPragmatic BioethicsPragmatismPragmatism, Old And NewPraise and BlamePredicative MindsPreferences and Well-BeingPrescriptions for the MindPresocraticsPrimary and Secondary QualitiesPrimates and PhilosophersPrimitive ColorsPrivacyPrivileged AccessProblems in MindProblems of RationalityProzac As a Way of LifeProzac BacklashProzac on the CouchPsyche and EthosPsyche and SomaPsychiatric Aspects of Justification, Excuse and Mitigation in Anglo-American Criminal Law Psychiatric Cultures ComparedPsychiatric Diagnosis and ClassificationPsychiatric EthicsPsychiatric HegemonyPsychiatric PowerPsychiatric SlaveryPsychiatry and Philosophy of SciencePsychiatry and ReligionPsychiatry as a Human SciencePsychiatry as Cognitive NeurosciencePsychiatry in SocietyPsychiatry in the New MilleniumPsychiatry in the Scientific ImagePsychiatry, Psychoanalysis, And The New Biology Of MindPsycho-Physical Dualism TodayPsychoanalysis and Narrative MedicinePsychoanalysis and the Philosophy of SciencePsychological Concepts and Biological PsychiatryPsychology and PhilosophyPsychology and the Question of AgencyPsychology's Interpretive TurnPsychology, Psychotherapy, Psychoanalysis, and the Politics of Human RelationshipsPsychotherapy and ConfidentialityPsychotherapy As PraxisPublic PhilosophyPunishmentPure ImmanencePurple HazePursuing MeaningQuality of Life and Human DifferenceQueer PhilosophyQuestions for FreudQuestions for FreudQuine and Davidson on Language, Thought and RealityRaceRace in Contemporary MedicineRadiant CoolRadical AlterityRadical ExternalismRadical HopeRational and Social AgencyRational CausationRational Choice in an Uncertain WorldRationality + Consciousness = Free WillRationality and 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With The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious, Paul Katsafanas focuses attention on Friedrich Nietzsche's remark that "'psychology shall be recognized as the queen of the sciences'" because "psychology 'is once again the path to the fundamental problems'" (1). Fascinated by Nietzsche's claim, Katsafanas asks: "What are these 'fundamental problems' that psychology helps us to answer? How exactly does psychology bear on philosophy?" (1). The problems running through and engaged by Nietzsche's philosophical thought, Katsafanas observes, give the reader clues to understand his elevated claims for psychology. Certainly, one important recurrent theme in Nietzsche's work, as his readers can attest, is ethics; however, "the central task of ethics," Katsafanas writes, is to determine "what it is to live well" (1). Nietzsche, according to this reading, "wants to understand how ethical claims are justified, how evaluative and normative claims structure human life, what possibilities and dangers lurk in them, and, more generally, what the possibilities for human flourishing are" (1). The question, then, is: "How might psychology be relevant for these problems?" (1). If the tradition of moral philosophy holds, Katsafanas asserts, that "the central task of ethics is to specify what it is to flourish, to live well," then what it means for human beings not merely to exist but to flourish requires an examination of "human nature" which is "inextricably intertwined" with such topics as "the good life" and "goodness more generally" (1). Hence, ethical theory must grow out of an accurate explanation of human nature.
To be sure, the tradition has embraced the idea that an understanding of human flourishing requires an understanding of human nature. The ethical thought of the ancients—Plato and Aristotle, for instance—emphasizes the importance of an understanding of human nature; this is also true for the "British sentimentalist tradition" and here Katsafanas names Shaftesbury, Hutchenson, and Hume (1). These thinkers all agree that human nature must be examined because "morality rests on "other directed emotions" (1). Plato initiates his discussion of "the good life" through an examination of "the tripartite structure of the soul," while Aristotle considers "the distinctive function of human beings" to determine "what it is to live well" (1). David Hume proposes "to 'examine' human nature 'in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behavior'" (1-2). Since Nietzsche wants to develop "an accurate picture of human nature and use it to specify a conception of human flourishing," Katsafanas places him squarely in this tradition (2). Psychology, then, is relevant to an understanding of fundamental human problems because ethical theory requires an understanding of human flourishing and human nature.
Nietzsche's claim "that psychology shall once again be the path to the fundamental problems" suggests that while psychology once was a way of addressing ethical problems, this is no longer the case (2). Nietzsche, Katsafanas argues, holds this view for two reasons. First, Nietzsche argues that psychology has been forced to serve morality (2). In Beyond Good Evil, for example, Katsafanas observes that, according to Nietzsche, if one wants to "'explain how the most abstruse metaphysical claims of a philosopher really came about,'" one should "'ask first: at what morality does all this … aim?'"; and further on in the same text, he writes: "'All psychology so far has got stuck in moral prejudices and fears; it has not dared to descend into the depths'" (2). Hence, Katsafanas understands Nietzsche to be calling for "greater honesty about human psychology"; instead of allowing "our convictions and intuitions about morality shape our reflections on human nature," we must attempt "an unprejudiced account, letting it take us where it will" (2). If this means that an accurate account of human nature and human flourishing contradicts our longheld ethical and moral principles, then we must revise or give up our cherished ethical theories.
Second, Nietzsche holds the view that "eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers" have given up grounding "morality in an account of human nature" (2). While "Plato, Aristotle, and the British sentimentalists" are mistaken "because they had inadequate, morality-laden conceptions of human nature, Kant and Bentham are far worse" for both reject any attempt to base their ethical or moral theories on an account of human nature (2). As an example, Katsafanas cites Kant's Groundwork:
The basis of [moral] obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conception of pure reason … Thus not only are moral laws with their principles essentially distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part. When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws a priori to him as a rational being. (Groundwork 4:389)
Kant, then, distinguishes empirical knowledge, derived from experience, from moral philosophy that attempts to ground ethics in an account of a priori principles derived from human reason. In other words, and this is the important point, since Kant grounds ethics in an account of a priori principles, he does not attempt to derive ethics from an understanding of human nature; for Kant, any discussion of human nature would belong to philosophical anthropology.
Kant's influence in this regard is also evidenced in the work of such contemporary thinkers as Barbara Herman, Michael Smith, and Russ Shafer-Landau. For Herman morality is not found in an account of human nature, but "'… requires an a priori foundation'" that only originates in "'the principles of pure practical reason: the Moral Law. … the ground of obligation must <be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason>'"; hence, "'the Moral Law applies to human beings with necessity'" (2). Similarly, Smith claims that almost everyone agrees: "'moral knowledge is relatively a priori'" (3). Shafer-Landau echoes these sentiments, insisting that "'ethical evidence is different in kind from the sort we find in the natural sciences'" (3). However, since these individuals—Herman, Smith, and Shafer-Landau—follow Kant in assuming "that ethics is unconstrained by facts about human nature," they conclude "that Plato, Aristotle and the sentimentalists" are mistaken in assuming that ethical inquiry requires an understanding of human nature (3). While others—and here Katsafanas is thinking of Frances Kamm and Derek Parfit—may not reject human nature out right, they "tend to ignore" any discussion of it (3). Since Kamm and Parfit accept the Kantian distinction between science which deals with empirical fact and ethics which necessarily, according to this line of interpretation, draws its principles from a priori principles, a discussion of human nature is unnecessary. Parfit, for example, argues that "'there is a deep distinction between all natural facts and irreducibly normative reason—involving facts'"; if Parfit is correct, Katsafanas claims, an account of "human nature" would be superfluous (3).
According to Katsafanas, Nietzsche, however, rejects these approaches to ethics. While Nietzsche's interpretation of human nature may not "answer the fundamental problems of ethics," Katsafanas believes that "it will be a significant step in that direction" (4). Hence, to understand Nietzsche's elevated claims for psychology Katsafanas intends "to explicate and assess Nietzsche's account of human nature" (4). Still, any account of human nature will require an examination of many other topics that are presently understood "under the rubric of moral psychology" (4). By "moral psychology," Katsafanas means "the study of human nature, especially the aspects of human nature that are relevant for assessing the justificatory status of normative claims and determining what happens when people act on the basis of these claims" (4). Here Katsafanas follows Parfit's distinction between human beings and other animals. While other animals neither comprehend, nor respond to reasons and while they cannot control the future of their own lives or the life of the planet, humans "'can understand and respond to reasons. These abilities have given us great knowledge, and power to control the future of life on Earth'" (4). In other words, humans are capable of a different kind of agency for "we can self-consciously reflect on the considerations in favor of various courses of action, consider how these courses of action relate to the values, commitments, and projects that we embrace, and … actuate ourselves on the basis of these self-conscious thoughts" (4). "Moral psychology," then, examines "the processes and capacities involved in this kind of action" (4). While he does not provide the reader with an exhaustive list, Katsafanas identifies the six following topics that moral philosophy must address, and, he notes, these are precisely the issues that concern Nietzsche:
(1) Reflective vs. unreflective action: in light of the fact that some human action involves the deployment of self-conscious thought and deliberation, whereas other action does not, we can ask whether there is a significant difference between reflective and unreflective action. Is reflection merely superadded to a stream of behavior, or does it make a philosophically significant difference?
(2) The action / mere behavior distinction: relatedly, might there be a significant distinction between genuine or full-fledged action and its lesser relative, mere behavior? …
(3) Valuing and making evaluative judgments: How do evaluative judgments manifest themselves and impact actions? More generally, what's involved in having a value? Does valuing something differ from merely desiring it, and if so how?
(4) Motivation: more generally, we need to investigate the structure of human motivation: How do drives, desires, urges, whims, emotions, feelings, thoughts, habits, character traits, and so on interact in the production of action?
(5) Freedom: What sense can be given to the notion of freedom or autonomy? … Is there a coherent conception of freedom?
(6) Responsibility: we typically distinguish between events for which we are responsible and those for which we are not. How is this distinction to be drawn? Does it line up with any of the aforementioned distinctions? … (4-5)
Thus, when Nietzsche claims that psychology will once again allow us to understand the fundamental human problems, he means that psychology "will reorient our approach to these topics" (6).
One line of scholarship holds that Nietzsche rejects any theoretical discussion of ethical problems and does not develop his own positive account; even if he does sometimes offer a positive account, these passages often contain contradictions or contradict other passages in his work. Katsafanas, however, rejects this reading and he contends "that these appearances are deceptive"; indeed, a close reading of Nietzsche's moral philosophy will reveal a positive ethical teaching "that is insightful and challenging"; however, as he himself admits, his approach to Nietzsche's moral philosophy faces an "interpretive obstacle" involving how one understands the conception of 'system' in Nietzsche's work (7). Some of Nietzsche's readers have assumed that since Nietzsche rejects any system whatsoever, he "lacks any positive account of moral psychology" (7). Katsafanas, however, demurs; instead, he turns to Bernard Reginster, who argues that when Nietzsche rails against philosophical systems the object of his critique is the systematic philosophies of Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling. Nietzsche rejects the attempts of these "post-Kantian" thinkers who attempted "to develop an all-encompassing account of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics by deducing or deriving it from a single starting point …"; Katsafanas though intends "to demonstrate" that Nietzsche "does not reject … sustained inquiry into a connected set of topics" (7). According to Katsafanas, then, Nietzsche's "accounts of the conscious / unconscious distinction, human motivation, the will, agency, self, and freedom are inextricably intertwined"; indeed, any discussion of anyone of these topics without considering the others will lead to "a hodgepodge of dubious and seemingly inconsistent assertions" (7). Katsafanas' goal "is to untangle these threads, revealing the force of Nietzsche's account and critically assessing its philosophical import" (7). Hence, Katsafanas intends to develop an accurate reading of Nietzsche's positive ethical thought by selecting and "piecing … together" his thoughts on specific topics, such as the unconscious, consciousness, drives, values, the will, freedom, and the self—all topics emerging from his moral psychology (7).
In this respect, Katsafanas' reading of Nietzsche's work and his 'piecing together' a coherent understanding of Nietzsche's ethics reminds one of Karl Jasper's interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy. "The Interpretative study of Nietzsche's thinking," Jasper writes "always requires the gathering together of all utterances that relate to a given topic."  Additionally, to his credit, Katsafanas does not read or interpret Nietzsche through his unpublished notes. Although he does occasionally refer to the notes, Katsafanas supports his interpretation of the Nietzschean self through a careful and thoughtful reading of the published works.
Katsafanas not only summarizes his discussion of Nietzsche's conception of agency, but he also wants to explain "how it differs from and improves upon the Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian alternatives" (13). Katsafanas lists four advantages of the Nietzschean account of agency:
1) Nietzsche's account is "more psychologically realistic" since it fits "with empirical results about human psychology and action." (13)
2) Nietzsche's account explains "the ways in which unconscious processes play a signal role in human action." (13)
3) Nietzsche's account "avoids philosophical problems concerning the locus of agency, without committing itself to an exaggerated role for reflective thought. (13)
4) Nietzsche's account "frees itself from the often unnoticed moral assumptions that infect so many previous attempts to offer philosophical psychologies." (13)
Katsafanas notes that most philosophers have emphasized the importance of consciousness. Beginning with Descartes who states: "there cannot 'be any thought in us of which … we are not conscious,'" Katsafanas offers the reader a brief overview of the way in which consciousness has been treated by various thinkers in the history of philosophy (14). He points to John Locke, for example, who writes: "'consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other things'"; hence, Katsafanas holds, "consciousness" for Locke, "determines our identity" (14). Hegel elevates consciousness even more, arguing that "[w]orld history" attains its zenith "with the emergence of self-conscious creatures who self-consciously recognize the nature of self-consciousness"; thus, thinkers "from Descartes to Hegel" have emphasized the importance of consciousness in one way or another (14). Kierkegaard, Katsafanas claims, captures this way of understanding consciousness, when he writes: "'Generally speaking, consciousness—that is, self-consciousness—is decisive with regard to the self. The more consciousness, the more self; the more consciousness, the more will; the more will, the more self""(14).
Nietzsche's understanding of consciousness is opposed to the view found here for he holds that consciousness is "intermittent, unimportant, dangerous, superficial, and falsifying" (14). First, according to Katsafanas, Nietzsche approves of Leibniz's claim that consciousness is intermittent. In the Gay Science, for example, he writes:
Leibniz's incomparable insight … that consciousness is merely an accidens of representation [Vorstellung] and not its necessary and essential attribute; that, in other words, what we call consciousness constitutes only one state of our spiritual and psychic world … and not by any means the whole of it. (15)
Again, in the Gay Science, Nietzsche criticizes the "'ridiculous overestimation' of consciousness; … consciousness is only something with various 'intermittences' and gaps" (15).
Furthermore, while many thinkers have argued that "'consciousness constitutes the essence of man, what is enduring, eternal, ultimate, and most primary in him! …,'" Nietzsche, in contrast to thinkers like Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard, maintains "that consciousness is 'basically superfluous,' for 'all of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in the mirror; and still today, the predominant part of our lives actually unfolds without this mirroring'" (15). Indeed, "'states of consciousness … are (as every psychologist knows) trivial matters of fifth rate importance'" (15). And again in the Gay Science, Nietzsche writes, consciousness can even be "'a danger to the organism'" (15). Consciousness is not a sign of the superiority of human beings; instead, "it is a potentially damaging regression" (16). According to Katsafanas, then, for Nietzsche "all conscious states are merely articulations or expressions of underlying unconscious processes. Every conscious mental state is 'only a certain behavior of the drives towards one another,' and 'thinking is only a relation between these drives'" (15). Nietzsche even sees "'… the development of consciousness, <spirit,> as a symptom of precisely the relative imperfection of the organism … we deny that anything can be made perfect as long as it is still being made conscious'" (15).
Katsafanas's third and final point is that for Nietzsche "consciousness is necessarily superficial and falsifying" (16). We are only conscious of "a surface-and sign-world, a world generalized and made common" (16). Consciousness simplifies everything; indeed, in one note, Nietzsche calls it a "'simplifying apparatus'"; thus, "consciousness 'involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialzation, and generalization'" (16). This point is related to the previous one for consciousness is a danger precisely because it is superficial; attention to the surface may lead to important details being ignored—details that, being ignored, could endanger the organism. At the same time, if action is not instinctual or automatic, and if an action were mediated by conscious thought, then organisms with consciousness would tend to be slower to react; this, too, might endanger them.
Katsafanas provides a brief history of the concept of the unconscious, distinguishing two models of the unconscious. According to the first model, the unconscious underlies consciousness and the former provides material for the latter. He notes that while most readers may assume the unconscious first appeared with the writings of Sigmund Freud, there were others who were concerned with it prior to Freud, although, he claims, these thinkers were not always referring to the same exact thing with the term. Here, he refers to Eduard von Hartmann, Hermann von Helmholtz, and the Romantics. Hartmann, for example, employs the term 'unconscious' "to explain teleology by uniting representation and will"; while Helmholtz applies the term "to explain mental inferences that do not enter awareness" (17).
Nietzsche, however, attributes "the discovery of the unconscious" to Leibniz, who in his New Essays on Human Understanding considers waves pounding on the beach. Leibniz assumes that when, we hear a wave crashing on a beach, we hear one sound; however, if one drop of water were to fall on the beach, we would not notice any sound, i.e., we would not be conscious of it; yet, the wave crashing on the beach that we hear clearly is constituted of many droplets of water. The sound of each individual droplet falling alone on the beach would be "too weak" to be perceived "consciously"; however, the wave and the sound that it makes, which we hear quite clearly, is constituted by the individual droplets of water (17). The individual droplets of water, each one too weak to be perceived by itself are examples of what "Leibniz calls … petites perceptions … they are not accompanied by apperception (or reflexive awareness)"; from this example, Katsafanas understands "conscious perceptions" to be "composites of individually inaccessible petites perceptions" (17). "As Leibniz puts it, we have innumerable 'inconspicuous <perceptions>' that escape awareness because they are 'either too minute and too numerous or else too unvarying … But when they are combined with others they do nevertheless have their effect and make themselves felt, at least confusedly, within the whole'" (17-18). From this reading of Leibniz, Katsafanas, concludes: "Conscious thinking is an agglomeration of minute unconscious states" (18).
Others were also influenced by Leibniz's understanding of the unconscious, and here Katsafanas names Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-87), Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869), Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-94), Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-75), and Afrikan Spir (1837-90) all of whom Nietzsche had read. Fechner, for example, understands "the transition from unconscious states to conscious states by appealing to an increase in the intensity of the mental state. Once the state passes a certain 'threshold' of intensity, it becomes conscious" (18). Hence, the difference between unconscious states and conscious states is a matter of degree or intensity. Carus and Helmholtz hold that conscious "perception must appeal not just to the agglomeration of minute unconscious states, but also to unconscious inferences: our minds employ unconscious inferences to construct conscious experience from sensory data" (18). Thus, Helmholtz writes,
… the organs of sense do indeed give us information about external effects produced on them, but convey those effects to our consciousness in a totally different form, so that the character of a sensuous perception depends not so much on the properties of the object perceived as on those of the organ by which we receive the information. (18)
Helmholtz, then, goes beyond Leibniz's account for "the initial unconscious sensations are not merely agglomerated, but transformed, to generate a conscious perception"; indeed, Helmoltz even maintains that the spatial ordering of objects "is not given to us directly by retinal stimuli" in "visual perception"; rather, the subject infers them; hence, "the 'character' of the conscious state differs from that of the unconscious state" (18) Similarly, Lange holds that "our perceptions of three-dimensional objects are generated by the combination of two two-dimensional retinal stimuli"; hence, they are not given to the subject by the object, but are attributed to the object by the subject. And Spir argues that "'Physiology … teaches us that our sensations are completely separate from outer things, do not resemble them at all and are completely incommensurable with them'" (19). While Leibniz, Fechner, Helmholtz, Lange, and Spir all understand the unconscious differently, they all hold "the basic idea that the unconscious states are combined or otherwise transformed in order to generate conscious states" (19).
There is, however, another competing model of the unconscious—one that attains its zenith in the work of Sigmund Freud. Katsafanas emphasizes that he is referring to "the popular understanding of Freud," according to which "the self" is constituted by "two or more distinct and warring systems, each with its own ends. The unconscious is another mind, possessing its own dark goals and hidden strategies for achieving them" (19). Katsafanas names Jean Paul Sartre as an example of this way of understanding Freud. This model differs in several ways from the previous model. In the first model, the unconscious and consciousness belong to the same mind. "unconscious states generate or explain" conscious states (21). In this second model, however, there are two minds, as it were, competing with one another; "unconscious states compose a distinct and potentially competing realm of thought" (21). "Both traditions agree that unconscious states are not introspectively accessible, but they disagree about why this is so" (21). As an example of the first model, Leibniz and Fechner might say that unconscious states are too weak for the individual to become conscious of them. As an example of the second model, however, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) holds that the unconscious state is "more authentic or genuine than the conscious" for he notes, "'man cannot persist long in a conscious state, he must throw himself back in the unconscious, for his roots live there'" (20). In other words, the unconscious is a separate sphere or realm from the conscious. Linking the unconscious to "madness, dreams, and genius," Schelling holds that "the unconscious has a form of rationality or logic that differs from the conscious" (20). Carus claims that "the unconscious … is 'tireless': it operates without interruption and never ceases. It is immediate: unconscious processes require 'no practice,' for 'all is done and achieved easily and immediately'"; and it functions according to "Humean relations of association rather than rational judgements" (20). Hartmann agrees that the unconscious is "tireless" but he extends Carus' position, adding that the unconscious is also "non-sensory and atemporal"; indeed, "consciousness … is 'merely an intermittent epiphenomenon,' which arises only in defective cases wherein the activity of the unconscious is blocked or hindered" (20).
While Goethe, Schelling, Carus, and Hartmann concur that in one way or another "the relations among unconscious mental states differ from those among conscious states," Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) maintain that "the structure of individual unconscious states differs from" the structure of individual "conscious states" (20). Herder, for instance, argues "that language and consciousness are inextricably linked: a certain form of awareness, which he calls Besonnenheit, can only exist in linguistic states"; thus, "unconscious states … have a non-linguistic structure" (Kastsafanas 20). Schopenhauer agrees and expands Herder's work on the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious "arguing that conscious states alone have conceptual structure" (20). Additionally, Schopenhauer rejects Kant's conception of consciousness that "all cognition involves the deployment of concepts" (27). For example, Kant writes "'the cognition of every, at least human, understanding is a cognition through concepts'"; indeed, "'thinking is cognition through concepts'" (27). Schopenhauer, however, demurs. "'Kant's great mistake … [was that] he did not properly separate perceptual knowledge from abstract knowledge; from this there arose a terrible confusion'" (27). In other words, Schopenhauer agrees with Kant's conception of "abstract knowledge", but he disagrees with Kant's view of perceptual knowledge; "abstract knowledge is conceptually articulated in the way that Kant describes, whereas perception is nonconceptual. … indeed, abstract knowledge is generated by rendering the nonconceptual content of perceptual states conceptual" (27). Since "the unconscious" has "different relations and structure than the conscious" those holding this view believe that there may be "conflict between them" (20). "If the unconscious differs so dramatically from the conscious," Katsafanas asks, "how could they fail to be in tension?" (20).
The difficulty in Nietzsche's conception of the conscious / unconscious divide, however, is that he does not take one side or the other; instead, he synthesizes "these ideas, forming them into a more powerful model of the mind" (21). To this end, Nietzsche rejects "the Ego"; hence, he rejects the notion of a faculty psychology such as Descartes' that holds a conception of a cogito, a thinking thing, or "'intelligent substance'" in which "'imagining'" or "'perceiving' reside" (22). The Ego is a mistake of grammar; it "…is a fictional concept; nothing corresponds to it" (22). Still, there are appropriate ways to understand consciousness. For instance, Nietzsche argues that if one has a satisfactory understanding of "psychology and physics" one must reject the traditional understanding of the "the Ego"; still, one may "conceive of the Ego in a new way" (22). Hence in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche proposes "'soul as subject-multiplicity [Subjeckts-Vielheit]' and 'soul as social structure of the drives and affects'" (22). In other words, Nietzsche denies that there is a faculty, i.e., "Consciousness, which stands apart from our conscious mental states; rather there is only the host of conscious mental states" (23). In short, there is no ego, intellectual substance, or 'self' that underlies unconscious and conscious states; these unconscious states, conscious states, drives, affects, values, and motives, all constitute consciousness. Furthermore, this means that we will not find some sort of 'true self' by stripping away all social, cultural, political, or economic determinations; stripping away these determinations will not reveal some underlying substratum; rather, doing so will reveal nothing.
Typically, scholars thinking about agency hold that human motives do not determine the way in which an individual chooses to act; rather, an agent considers presented motives, weighs them to determine which motive is most efficacious to the individual agent's goals, and then decides "freely and rationally, which motives to act upon" (135). In the Republic, for example, Plato develops a city in speech to provide a paradigm of the soul, according to which "reason" can control and direct human "appetite and spirit" (135). Similarly, in De Libero Arbitrio, Augustine argues that individuals are responsible for their own actions because they can choose a course of action for themselves and this ability to choose is found in the will. And Kant argues that "the will 'can indeed be affected but not determined by impulses … Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined by sensible impulses'" (135). This way of understanding the will, Katsafanas calls "our standard, assumed model of agency" (135).
Many interpreters have assumed that Nietzsche develops a conception of the will that is "the exact opposite" of this model of willing; Katsafanas, however, demurs, arguing that "Nietzsche is offering a careful and nuanced critique of the standard model, denying certain aspects of it while preserving others"; thus, Nietzsche's account is to be preferred because he gives us a more developed, subtle, and "sophisticated" interpretation of agency (136). Katsafanas distinguishes two ways of depicting the will in terms of inclination and choice (160). The first, he calls the "triggering model," according to which "… motivational states incline or tempt the agent to pursue various courses of action" but they do not cause an act; rather, an act is caused when an agent "deliberates" and chooses a course of action (160). "Thus, the will has a triggering role; it can endorse a desire which thereby becomes causally efficacious" (160).
The second model, Katsafanas calls the vector model. "On the vector model, the will is simply one source of motivation among many others. It can reinforce other motives, by placing its motivational weight behind them"; one's decision to act in a specific way, i.e. to will, generates "one more motive" that predisposes one to act in this or that particular way (160). However, the will does not produce or "trigger" the agent's action; it is merely another motive among others. As Katsafanas writes: "… this motive is not uniquely efficacious"; rather, "the individual's action is determined by the vector of motives, including the will" (160). Thus, "the will can reshape existing motives, finding new ways of fulfilling them or new interpretations of what would satisfy them" (160). The will, however, does not determine the requisite action freely and rationally. As one motive among others, the will is subject to the influence of the other motives; still, the will "reshapes and redirects this stream, but does not generate it ex nihilo" (160). Katsafanas argues that "Nietzsche … rejects the triggering model of the will" and with it rejects parts of the Kantian conception of the will that claims: "Acts of the will are distinct from causation by motives; the will can suspend motives and decide, freely and rationally, which to act upon" (160 and 159).
From this understanding of the will, Katsafanas draws two conclusions concerning the will:
First, the will is continuously acted upon by the agent's drives and affects, and therefore does not operate independently of them: drives and affects are continuously leading us to act and react in various ways, influencing our perceptions of the world, our reflective thoughts, and the course of our deliberation. (161)
Second, the will does not enjoy a unique capacity to determine the agent's actions; rather, the agent's actions are determined by a set of motivational forces that includes the will, drives, and affects. The conscious states are forces, too, but they are only one part—perhaps a very small part—of the total set of forces. (161)
Thus, Nietzsche does not reject the notion of the will as some interpreters have claimed; rather, and this is the important point, he replaces the triggering model of the will with the vector model of the will. For this reason, Katsafanas refers to Nietzsche's conception of will as "willing without a will" (135-63).
Katsafanas notes that philosophers concerned with action distinguish "the movements issuing from an agent: mere behavior, action, and autonomous (or free) action" (168). Action and autonomous action are the difference between handing over one's wallet to an armed robber, or when one is responding by habit or custom and donating to a good cause; when one acts under threat or acts according to habit or custom, one may be "acting … but … may not be acting freely" (168). If one thinks of the difference between "sneezing, coughing, falling asleep, and blinking, on the one hand, and reading, conducting conversations, getting married, and deciding to go to Bermuda, on the other," one will understand the difference between "mere behaviors and genuine actions" (169). Katsafanas maps this distinction between mere behaviors and genuine actions onto Nietzsche's distinction between the self that is not unified and the unified self. According to Katsafanas, while "conscious thoughts and the capacity for choice are … influenced by drives," conscious thoughts are not the same as drives; "they are distinct from drives"; hence, "…the potential for disunity" lies in this difference between conscious thought, one the one hand, and drives, affects, and motivations, on the other (195). "Nietzsche" Katsafanas writes, "claims that having conflicting drives and 'value standards' often leads to disunity" (190). By disunity, Katsafanas means a condition in which "an agent" who is acting in a particular way, would not act in this way if he or she came "to know more about the drives and affects that are causing" him or her to act in this particular manner (191). Thus, Katsafanas says:
Nietzschean unity is at least a necessary condition for agential activity. Unity seems to offer a characterization of the conditions under which an agent can be said to be in control of her action. The agent acts, approves of the act, and further knowledge of the action would not undermine this approval. To speak metaphorically, the agent's whole being is behind the action. (195).
Only when the agent is unified can one speak of being in control of one's own actions, i.e., of genuine actions. "Selfhood," then, for Nietzsche is "an aspirational term: we are not selves merely in virtue of being human"; rather, "selfhood "is something that the individual must achieve (197-98). In short, "the self has to be created, not discovered" (217). Since being human does not automatically make one a 'self', and since there is no self separate from "the drives," according to Nietzsche, "the self … is just a 'relation' or 'social structure of drives and affects'" (166).
Katsafanas is to be commended for this careful and thoughtful analysis of Nietzsche's conception of the self. The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious is a well-written, tightly argued work that will benefit Nietzsche scholars; however, it is also to be recommended to those readers who have an interest in ethical and moral theory, the history of ideas, the history of philosophy, and the history of psychology. Katsafanas not only engages the Western philosophical tradition of thinking about the unconscious, consciousness, drives, affects, the will, values, and the self, but he takes on contemporary ethicists and Nietzsche scholars as well, sometimes agreeing with them, sometimes arguing against them to provide his readers a welcome contribution to Nietzsche scholarship.
 Katsafanas cites Beyond Good and Evil, 6.
 Katsafanas cites Beyond Good and Evil, 23.
 Katsafanas cites Hermann von Helmholtz "On Goethe's Scientific Researchers," in Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, trans. E. Atkinson (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1853 / 1893) 47-7, italics added by Katsafanas.
 Katsafanas refers to Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (NY: Oxford University Press, 1993) 91-96.
 Katsafanas refers to Angus Nicholls, "The Scientific Unconscious," in Angus Nicholls and Marin Leibscher, eds., Thinking the Unconscious (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 108. Nicholls quotes Goethe's letter to Reimer, August 5, 1810.
 Katsafanas refers to Andrew Bowie, "The Philosophical Significance of Schelling's Conception of the Unconscious," in Angus Nicholls and Marin Leibscher, eds., Thinking the Unconscious (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 57-86.
 Katsafanas cites Carl Gustav Carus, "Psyche: On the Development of the Soul, ed. David Hillman (Dallas, TX: Spring Publications, 1846 / 1989) 57.
 Matthew Bell, "Carl Gustav Carus and the Science of the Unconscious," in Angus Nicholls and Marin Leibscher, eds., Thinking the Unconscious (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 156-72.
 Katsafanas refers to Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, 3 vols., trans. W. Coupland (London: Trübner and Co., 1869 / 1884) 81.
 Katsafanas refers to Johann Gottfried von Herder, Philosophical Writings, ed. Michael Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1772 / 2000) 82-88.
 Katsafanas cites Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1781 and 1787 / 1998) A 68 / B93.
 Katsafanas cites Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1781 and 1787 / 1998) A 69 / B94.
 Katsafanas cites Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 2 vols., trans. E. F. J. Payne (NY: Dover Publications, 1969) I, 437.
 Katsafanas cites René Descartes, Meditation VI, Section 10 in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 volumes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Vol. II. 50-62.
 Katsafanas cites Beyond Good and Evil 36.
 Katsafanas refers to Plato, Republic in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1977).
 Katsafanas refers to Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio / On the Free Choice of the Will, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 387-395 / 1993).
 Katsafanas cites Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1797 / 1996) 6: 213-14.
 Katsafanas cites Beyond Good and Evil 224.
 Recall that the subtitle of Nietzsche's last book, Ecce Homo is "Wie man wird, was man ist" [how one becomes, what one is].
 Katsafanas cites Beyond Good and Evil 12.
© 2017 J. Fred Humphrey
J. Fred Humphrey, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University