Most of us are taught, beginning in
grade school, that science is necessarily impartial and objective because it
is… well, because science is scientific. We learn that the pursuit of new scientific knowledge is an
empirical one, and incorporates or derives from data or theories already widely
accepted by the scientific community. 
Our instructors lecture us on the basic scientific method, which does
not willingly permit personal whim or admit emotional bias.

So it
may come as a surprise to many that a sizable contingent of the academic
community questions whether science is, or can be, truly empirical – – i.e., objective.

The central theme of Brown’ book
can be summarized as follows: rival
groups are at war to dominate the scientific enterprise, and as goes
science, so goes the human condition. 
The winner will determine not only the future of science but will set
the political and social agendas for the world as well.

James Brown, Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Toronto, details in this very readable book the
Great Divide between the humanities and science, and between constructivist and
empirically oriented camps. However,
Brown explains, these camps can’t be correctly or completely defined in a
straightforward manner. Even among
scientists there are significantly different understandings of what science is,
what it is about, what it can achieve, how it can achieve those goals, and
whether it should remain pure (so to speak) or be subject to current
notions of the public good. There are
liberal scientists and conservative ones, liberal constructivists and those
“friendly” to the orthodox model of science. 
(See for example Brown’s chart on p. 26.)

(It
would be convenient if the combatants could be grouped into two clearly
demarked camps but in fact, as Brown points out, there are pro-science and
anti-science factions, and politically left-leaning and politically
right-leaning contingents.)

Most of us understand the
naturalistic view of science, but since many readers will have only vague
notions about constructivism, a short summary is in order. In contrast to the orthodox worldview of
science (as described in the first paragraph of this review), constructivism
takes the position that all human knowledge is necessarily influenced by, or
even created by, social and cultural forces. 
For the most radical constructivist, there is no “world out there”. For the moderate constructivist, there may
be a world out there, but it will be forever unknown and unknowable to us,
because of the limitations imposed by our senses, our cognitive apparatus, and
the very nature of our human consciousness.

Constructivism (or occasionally
“constructionism”) is often associated with postmodernism, a term that loosely
refers to the writings of and positions espoused by people such as Michel Foucault,
Jacques
Lacan, Edmund
Husserl, Herbert
Marcuse, Ludwig
Wittgenstein (once himself a student of the very practical philosopher,
Bertrand Russell), Jacques Derrida,
Martin
Heidegger, and even Karl Marx. (Also note an excellent, short bio
of Wittgenstein by Daniel Dennett.) 

Jean-Francois Lyotard, referred to
by Brown as “one of the most prominent postmodern commentators, is described in
Who Rules as follows: “Science
for him is just a game with arbitrary rules, and truth is nothing more than
what a group of speakers says it is” (p. 75). 

Brown explains that “three ideas
are central to postmodernism: one is
the anti-rationality stance; a second is the rejection of objective
truth; and the third is localism (p. 76, italics are Brown’s).

One of the first proponents of this
kind of view in relation to scientific disciplines (specifically psychology)
was Lev Vygotsky, a Soviet philosopher and writer of the 1930’s. Even the titles of his works illustrate his
political position: Consciousness
as a Problem In The Psychology Of Behavior (1925); The Historical
Meaning Of The Crisis In Psychology (1927); and The Problem Of The
Cultural Development Of The Child (1929).

We all
know that the discoveries and developments of science can be put to good use,
not-so-good use, and bad use. Thus, a
more profound debate between constructivists and empiricists is the seemingly
insurmountable problem of not being able to predict whether a particular
application of scientific knowledge is good or bad. For example, from the vantage point of our own times, was the use
of the atomic bomb better or worse for the world? When Victorian-era missionaries were busy in equatorial countries
treating people with diseases that had previously been fatal, they couldn’t
have known that the change they helped bring about in the ecological balance of
these groups would later substantially contribute to other forms of disease and
death.

For
those who are quite comfortable with the standard approach in science, Who
Rules exposes a very unpleasant underbelly of science, in which scientists
can be influenced by personal or political motivations. Some readers might conclude that scientists
— at least some of them — are ready and willing to sell out the truth
for what they think science should say about humanity, or in order to
influence science to produce what it should provide for the world. “Almost everyone acknowledges that there are
values at work in science. The real
debate is over their role and extent” (p. 197).

According
to Brown we find ourselves struggling not so much about what science can
be and do, but with the question of what science should be and do. Should it have a “social agenda” that
provides limits on what can be studied, and what knowledge can be released to
the public? This is a position clearly
supported by Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin, and others with strong
political leanings. (E.g., see
Segestrale’s Defenders
of the Truth.)

Whether
or not the author has his own position is not obvious in the beginning few
chapters, and even throughout most of the book: Brown deftly manages to keep a balanced position that considers
the strengths and weaknesses of both mainstream science and its foes.

But
near the end of the book Brown writes, “Who should rule? The people, of course”
(p. 206). While Brown doesn’t deny that
there is a reality — “Scientific objectivity is both possible and
actual” (p. 207) — nonetheless, his position assumes the appropriateness of a
strong societal influence on science. 
E.g., we’re all on this planet together, the general public has both the
ability and the right to decide what science can and should accomplish, and
science as an endeavor has an obligation, however abstract, to pursue “socially
constructive action” (Brown’s phrase).

Thus,
according to Brown, in order to balance objective science with socially
progressive needs, financial and other obligatory relationships that would
inappropriately influence scientists should be eliminated. Writes Brown, “Perhaps the greatest threat
to science …. is the commercialization of knowledge” (p. 210). For example, when a pharmaceutical company
pays for the research that subsequently confirms the efficacy of its new drug,
that relationship might constitute an undue influence. By keeping private interests at bay, the
public can better hold science accountable. 
“Scientists owe it to them [the public] to keep knowledge free for all”
(p. 212).

Even
while acknowledging the validity of Brown’s observations, there are, no doubt,
many who will continue to harbor visions of a pure science, in which the
search for truth is paramount and is not controlled by either financial or
societal pressures.

 

© 2002 Keith Harris
 

Keith Harris,
Ph.D.  is a clinical psychologist and supervisor of Victor Valley
Behavioral Health Center in San Bernardino county, California. His interests
include clinical supervision, the empirical basis for psychotherapy research
(and its design), human decision-making processes, and the shaping of human
nature by evolutionary forces.

Categories: Philosophical, General

Keywords: Most of us are taught, beginning in grade school, that science is necessarily impartial and objective because it is€¦ well, because science is scientific.   We learn that the pursuit of new scientific knowledge is an empirical one, and incorporates or der
Tags: Science (General), Psychology