Consisting of nine previously published
articles in philosophy journals and law reviews, Meir Dan-Cohen has produced an
interesting collection of ideas concerning the importance of a robust
conception of self in our deliberations concerning the normativity of law and
its role in our construction of social institutions and practices.

At the centre of these essays, Dan-Cohen
attempts to seek a unity of thought based on a Kantian conception of self
concerning the normative implications of our liberal practices (and the moral
and legal theory which justifies its foundations). On his view, the Kantian conception of the noumenal self, for the
most part, has been deserted by contemporary normative Kantians and liberal
Kantians, and Dan-Cohen seeks to elucidate a coherent conception of the self
which can replace it in the arenas of law and morality. To do this requires a shift on conception of
self away from Kant’s noumenal self towards a socially constructed self which
results from the ‘largely unintended by-product of individual actions and
collective practices including those of the law and morality, whose primary
orientation is not the creation of a self but the accomplishment of some
individual or collective goals.’ (2)

In Dan-Cohen’s substitution of Kantian
conceptions of self, he seeks to draw attention to the role of various
normative engagements in the shaping and response to a pre-existing self. On such a view, there would be three
substantive advantages to the implementation of such a new conception of
self. First, we would move from
metaphysically underwriting freedom of choice towards a contingency of meaning
and indeterminacy concerning fundamental liberal values. Second, we would seek our normative emphasis
from personal autonomy towards human dignity. 
Third, it would eliminate any metaphysical distinctions and make moral,
political and legal considerations inseparable. At the heart of the matter, Dan-Cohen believes his view results
in an insider’s critique of liberalism.

The volume is divided into three
parts. The first part deals with
problems concerning the nature of legal communication, especially law’s claim
to normative authority. The ideals of
the rule of law, coercion and obedience, and whether the aim of legal discourse
is exclusively moral truth are central themes discussed. The second part deals with the basic values
underpinning liberalism. By far the
most interesting and stimulating part of the book, Dan Cohen argues for the
central importance of considerations of individual identity and human dignity
over traditional liberal concern with preference-based choice and experiential
harm. The third part deals with the
practical implications of our normative practices in constitutional democracies
with the conception of the socially constructed self advanced by Dan-Cohen. He
attempts to show that our considered judgments on ownership, responsibility,
and freedom of expression will be fundamentally altered when we take into
account the constitutive role that moral and legal practices play in our
formation of personal and collective identities.

Dan-Cohen’s attempt to analytical and
normative jurisprudential considerations and political theory with continental
philosophical and postmodernist notions of self is skilfully done and
thought-provoking. While Dan-Cohen’s
critique of contemporary liberal principles and practices is no doubt an
interesting examination, its ultimate success and influence will require
further investigation and debate – both in its view of the correct form of
liberalism and the correct interpretation of a Kantian approach to morality,
politics, and law. Harmful Thoughts is
indeed a significant contribution that many will find original, challenging,
and commendable.

© 2003 Adrien M.
Viens

Adrian M. Viens, Department of Philosophy,
Oxford University

Categories: Philosophical, Ethics