The rather bold claim on the jacket
that this book will be of interest to anyone
working in either ethics or the philosophy of mind really is true, although
they might not think so.  Not only is
the book not likely to appeal to so-called continental philosophers, neither is
it likely to be read with enthusiasm by any old-fashioned analytic
philosophers.  Perhaps the latter would
be mollified if it were labeled ‘theoretical psychology’ instead of
philosophy.  More seriously, the
methodological approach that Morton takes, while being as inclusive as
possible, explicitly excludes eliminativists (because they reject the everyday
mental terms of folk psychology) and treats as extreme the views of ‘realists’
such as Jerry Fodor and Stephen Stich and ‘conventionalists’ such as the later
Wittgenstein.  It would be a great shame
however if this orientation put off eliminativists, who are actually argued
with in the text (see p. 32) rather than simply assumed to be wrong, or
Wittgensteinains, who will enjoy the discussion and examples of the ‘fragility’
of the concept of belief in Chapter 3. 

The terms of the book are
broad.  By ‘folk psychology’ Morton
means "the body of knowledge, opinions and routines that we use in
conceptualizing and anticipating one another’s actions." (p. vii)  By ‘ethics’ he means "all situations in
which it makes a difference to each agent what each other agent does." (p.
148)  His central claim is, roughly,
that the former exists in part because of the latter, that we want to be
understood and so we make ourselves intelligible.  If I am robbing a bank (which counts as an ethical situation in
Morton’s sense) then I want the tellers to understand that I want money and
that I am threatening them.  So it is
advantageous to me to behave in ways that lead them to be afraid and, more to
the point, to pony up the cash.  Similarly,
it is useful for them to realize that they are in danger, so it is advantageous
for them to react appropriately to my gestures and words, making it clear to me
that they understand and are complying with my demands.  Hence, it seems reasonable to believe,
‘ethics’ prods us towards mutually comprehensible, or simply cooperative (if
that is the word), forms of behavior. 

Folk psychology then is not so much
a means of predicting other people’s behavior, as has traditionally been
thought.  At least it is not only
this.  Sometimes we cannot do that, as
when we drive in some foreign cities. 
It is then more a matter of making ourselves understood by others, so
that they can react to us (get out of our way) and we can get what we want
(through the city safely).   

This is what Morton calls the
‘boring’ part of the book, but it is not so uncontroversial as all that.  For instance, in Chapter 3 Morton offers
eight "subversive stories" designed to test our intuitions about
belief (about, that is, what counts as a belief).  Belief is, Morton implies, a concept that we have to work to make
useful to us and whose meaning is by no means clear or fixed.  There is an almost postmodern feel to this
claim but, like every other thesis in the main part of the text, it is
carefully and clearly defended with logical argument and, whenever relevant,
scholarly references (to game theory and psychology as well as to
philosophy).  The five main chapters are
all about the connection between ‘ethics’ and folk psychology, showing how this
connection can be seen running through questions of belief, explanation, simulation,
and so on.  Morton offers not a complete
theory of the mind but a very plausible picture of one thread in our
psychology. 

After these chapters come four
"explorations" that are notably more speculative.  Here Morton considers such issues as how
different cultures could develop different folk psychologies or strategies for
more successful interaction.  He also
says some striking things about moral progress.  On p. 187 he says that: "Some systems of values … might
allow us smoother ways through moral dilemmas … or help us to imagine lives
that are, simply, better."  One
wonders what the word "simply" might mean here.  Some systems of values will not value
finding a smooth way through what, in their terms, ought to be a moral dilemma. 
This is an openly speculative part of the book, however, and it is not
without interest, especially to virtue ethicists concerned about the links
between our understanding of ourselves and our ideas about what characteristics
are virtues and what are vices.

Morton’s background in mathematics
shows clearly through his colorful and literate prose and his argument will be
hard for students to follow at times. 
But it contains something that should interest almost any philosopher interested
in the border territory between philosophy and psychology. 

©
2003 Duncan Richter

Duncan Richter is an
Associate Professor at the Virginia Military Institute in the Department of
Psychology and Philosophy.  He is the
author of Ethics
After Anscombe: Post "Modern Moral Philosophy"  (Kluwer, 2000) and several papers on ethics
and Wittgenstein.

Categories: Philosophical, Ethics