This is a lovely little book, perfectly suited for an introductory course in philosophy or for the general reader. In eleven self-contained chapters, George Graham covers many of the basic issues in philosophy of mind and psychology, and a good bit more besides. Indeed, the breadth of the book is one of its more attractive features. In addition to covering such standard topics as consciousness, the problem of other minds, and the materialism-dualism debate, Graham’s discussion includes after-death experiences, the nature of the divine mind, weakness of the will, free will, the moral importance of consciousness, and the philosophical implications of psychopathologies. On the plus side, such an wide-ranging approach make the book more attractive to those new to the field than other introductions to the philosophy of mind. On the minus side, it many instructors will find Graham’s discussion too broad, and, at the same time, incomplete. There is little discussion of the nature of computing, nothing on the simulation v. theory-theory debate, internalism and externalism about content, or non-reductive materialism.

I turn now to two areas of concern I had with Graham’s discussion. One issue which could have been treated with more care is the distinction between intentional content and qualitative content or qualia. In an otherwise solid discussion of the problem of other minds, Graham fails to distinguish “the problem of other propositional attitudes” from “the problem of other phenomenal states“. He argues that we are justified in ascribing mental states to others because doing so provides the best explanation of their behavior. This may be a good account of why we are justified in ascribing propositional attitudes to others (e.g., “Amy is thinking about buying a red house”, but it is far from clear that it provides a satisfactory explanation of why we think that other people have qualitative states (e.g. “Amy is seeing something that is red”). I would also have liked more discussion on the issue of the self-ascription of mental states. What justifies the self-ascription of mental states? It seems implausible to suppose that we self-ascribe mental states in order to account for our own behavior. The failure to clearly distinguish issues of consciousness from issues of content also impairs the discussion of the last chapter. The ostensible topic here is the worry that consciousness is epiphenomenal, but at least some of Graham’s discussion seems to be about whether content is epiphenomenal. Graham asks whether being afraid is epiphenomenal. It certainly doesn’t seem to be epiphenomenal: “Little Sammy ran away in tears because he feared that his parents would fight” (p. 235) But is the issue here one of the causal impotence of fear qualia, or is it a problem about the causal power of the intentional content of one’s fear? It seems to me that Graham’s discussion would be stronger if these two questions had been clearly distinguished.

Graham’s discussion of animal consciousness and its ethical implications is fascinating, but also problematic. Graham takes issue with Peter Singer’s claim that moral judgment involves unbiased imaginative projection into the lives of those whose lives might be affected by the judgment in question. Thus, Singer holds that in order to decide between saving a barnyard hen and a mentally handicapped human infant, one should project oneself into the perspective of these two beings, and decide, according to objective criteria, which being has a superior form of conscious life. Graham musters two objections against Singer’s proposal. The first is an epistemic worry. He argues that we are incapable of projecting ourselves into the experiences of creatures that are radically unlike us. Graham’s second objection is a metaphysical one: we cannot get a perspective on the conscious lives of (the vast majority of) animals because they lack a perspective on their own lives, they lack self-comprehending reflexivity (218). Although I have qualms about the force of both objections, it is the second objection that strikes me as most problematic. Singer’s claim concerns consciousness, not self-consciousness. Even though few non-human animals seem to posses sophisticated forms of self-consciousness, many animals seem to experiences conscious states of various kinds, including emotional states. It seems possible to get a sense of what a creature’s experience is like even if the creature in question lacks any robust sense of self-awareness.

Graham’s book is clear, well-written, and liberally sprinkled with engaging examples. It would be a fine, albeit rather idiosyncratic, entry-point into philosophy of mind.

You might want to keep a dictionary handy while reading this review!

Timothy Bayne is a graduate student in the PhD program in Philosophy at the University of Arizona.

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Categories: Philosophical, General

Keywords: metaphysics