In the book, Searle attempts to provide an
analysis of the most pressing philosophical issues concerning human
deliberation. How is intentional action caused? Are we really free? Why do we
often end up doing something that we know is bad for us? What is it for us to
be rational? The various aspects of practical reason are discussed in a very
pleasant and accessible style that would appeal not only to philosophers and
philosophy students, but also to philosophically informed readers who are
interested in the way in which the neurobiological processes occurring in the
brain can give rise to the conscious experience of freedom.

Rationality in Action is composed of nine chapters. In the first chapter, Searle
introduces the view he wants to challenge in the rest of the book, the
Classical Model of Rationality. Searle lists six set-assumptions of this view
(all of which he wants to reject). Let me mention just one here, the most
central. The Classical Model of Rationality holds that every intentional action
has a sufficient cause. Causes of intentional actions are typically thought to
be belief and desire pairs. Searle, instead, thinks that there are no
sufficient causes for rational action. Searle’s main thesis in the book is that
there is a gap between the motivating
belief and desire pair and the action. The gap is the real protagonist of the
rest of the story and is responsible for our feeling free when we deliberate.

In chapter two, Searle sums up the main features of his theory of
intentionality, which provides the necessary background knowledge in order to
understand the assumptions in the arguments that follow. Chapter three is
dedicated to the elucidation of the gap. Searle defines the gap and argues for
its existence. Moreover, he offers some reasons to believe that a coherent
account of agency, deliberation and freedom requires a substantial account of
the self, conscious and persistent through time. Chapter four is where the
logical structure of reasons for action is explained. In this context the
author highlights the alleged difference between explaining intentional and
non-intentional phenomena. He claims that, since it is constitutive of
intentional phenomena to be subject to constraints of rationality, then the
explanation of intentional phenomena introduces normative notions such as
rationality and justification. According to Searle, this does not mean that
there cannot be a causal explanation of intentional phenomena. On the contrary,
normative explanations of the occurrence of intentional phenomena must be also
causal. Chapter five is concerned with special reasons for action (such as
altruism) and provides an account of the difference between the rationality of
‘clever chimpanzees’ and human rationality. According to Searle, the
distinctive features of human rational deliberation seem to be the capacity to
be aware of motivating factors that are not desires and the weight of long-term
prudential considerations. These are made possible by the institution of
language. In chapter six Searle continues his defence of the existence and
centrality of desire-independent reasons for action in human deliberation.

Chapter seven is dedicated to weakness of will, a philosophical
problem that Searle wants to demystify. He offers a detailed discussion of
Davidson’s sceptical position and argues instead that there is nothing puzzling
in the phenomenon of weakness of will, once we accept the existence of the gap
and the fact that belief and desire pairs are not sufficient causes for
intentional action. Chapter eight analyses in some detail the structure of
practical reason.

Finally, Searle faces in the last chapter what most philosophers
consider the hard problem of freedom of the will. How can we reconcile the deterministic
picture of reality that science has given us with the everyday experience of
freedom? Searle reviews some of the classical philosophical positions (e.g.
compatibilism) and finds them ultimately unsatisfactory. He then describes two
possible frameworks for the solution of the problem. Either we suppose that the
gap exists in the causal relations between events at the level of conscious
deliberation but not at the neurobiological level (epiphenomenalism) or we
suppose that there is non-deterministic causation at the neurobiological level
too. Neither of these options seems to convince the author.

Searle has written an ambitious book, where several difficult
philosophical issues are dealt with by introducing a general view of mental
causation. The picture that emerges is powerful and coherent, but not enough
has been done to justify the many controversial assumptions that are necessary
for its plausibility. Let me offer one example. Why should we believe that a
belief and desire pair is never a sufficient cause for intentional action?
Searle replies: Because we experience the gap. But this does not seem a good
enough reason. The experience of the gap might be due to the fact that one pair
among the many beliefs and desires that we have is the causally efficacious
one. We could have done otherwise if another combination of our beliefs and
desires had motivated us to act. It is true that we feel it is us who decides which beliefs and desires
become causally efficacious, but this choice we seem to have can be
re-described in terms of second-order beliefs and desires. For instance, I
could say that I desired that my desire that p was causally efficacious, and
the second-order desire was what made me ‘choose’ the first-order one. There
are problems with this account, such as the threat of regress, but it is a
possibility in the logical space, a possibility that Searle does not even
consider. If we could describe the experience of the gap in terms of beliefs
and desires, then we would not need any special kind of causation to account
for intentional action.

In general, it is not at all clear that metaphysical assumptions can
be drawn from the phenomenology of deliberation alone. If we accept the view
that a belief and desire pair is causally sufficient for intentional action,
then neither Searle’s account of the self as unified conscious entity
persistent through time nor his solution to the problem of the weakness of the
will seem supported. If Searle had offered a convincing account of the notion
of non-deterministic causation invoked in the last chapter, then we would be
prepared to believe that intentional action might not have sufficient causes.
But the last chapter is somehow disappointing as it leaves the issue of
non-deterministic causation almost untouched.

The book is an informative read, and an interesting contribution to
an ongoing debate, but a satisfactory account of deliberation in naturalistic
terms is yet to come.

© 2003 Lisa
Bortolotti

Lisa Bortolotti
studied philosophy in Bologna (Italy), London and Oxford (UK) before starting
her PhD at the Australian National University in Canberra. Her main interests
are in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, rationality, mental
illness and animal cognition.

Categories: Philosophical