Humanity’s age-old complicated relationship with good and evil takes a quantitative turn in Laurent Bègue’s psychological account of ethics, entitled The Psychology of Good and Evil. Originally published in French in 2011 and translated into English by Jodie André in 2016, the book draws on a rich sample of research in social psychology, and provides a fascinating overview as to how the ethical theories of ancient philosophers may still play out in everyday behaviors. 

Bègue notes how ethics has always presented a hard set of questions: how do we actually engage with the real world around us? Figuring out whether ‘human nature is fundamentally good’, and what it then means to be good, are questions that people have strong opinions about. These questions link our beliefs to our choices and behaviors.  As a result of the complexity of this discussion, the book encompasses a lot of material.  It veers away from a philosophical account of ethics, and favors a normative approach that centers on how humans interact and engage in ways that can reflect ideas of good and evil. 

Bègue presents an engaging discourse that gives as quantitative analysis of qualitative questions.  It is a kind of ‘science of good and evil’, he explains in the ‘Preface’ (20016, p. xiii).   Bègue divides the book into twelve separate discussions, including sections such as ‘Very Social, Therefore Very Normal?’, ‘Internalizing Norms’, and ‘Moral Judgment of Victims’.  I was particularly fascinated by Bègue’s analysis of empathy, and how ‘too much empathy…can diminish a truly compassionate response’ (p. 125), a finding that I have seen discussed elsewhere in the normative applications of relief work and human rights strategies.  Other sections such as ‘The Rhetoric of Immanent Justice’ and ‘Divine punishment’ tackle the challenges of theorizing about pain and suffering as a kind of sense-making that can often make difficult personal situations fit into general narratives of purpose. Having research that supports these findings is invaluable, and Bègue seems careful to offer comparative findings without forcing his own opinion on the matter, which is refreshing.

As a philosopher, I was sometimes left with feeling that the findings could have been expanded. For instance, in the chapter entitled ‘The Mimcry of Ethics’, Bègue discusses how ethical norms are often modelled via others.   In looking at modelling and violence, he writes that ‘For example, our friends’ friends, even if we do not know them, can exert an influence over us in domains ranging from electoral choices to eating disorders’ (p. 81).  This fascinating correlation was, however not followed with an explanation of why this might be the case.  The breadth of material introduced a large number of correlative ethical relations, but I wished in some instances also to see more causative explanation.  However, Bègue does note at the beginning of the book that its purpose is not to explain or theorize about ethics but to present the connection between our beliefs and social interactions, which he does in detail. 

Bègue’s book provides careful social psychological research that reflects on questions that are often discussed theoretically rather than normatively. I found it an informative and insightful read.  However, while I understand that Bègue’s purpose was not to give a moral theory of his own, I wondered if the book could at times have done with a narrowed focus and greater detail in unpacking some of the correlational findings. That being said, I thoroughly recommend this book.  I do hope that more is written on this research, as it presents a fascinating account of the social and psychological reasons for why humans behave ethically that I think a lot of moral theory has been missing. 

© 2017 Anna Westin

Anna Westin, PhD candidate and visiting lecturer, Arts and Humanities, St. Mary’s University, Twickenham, London