Stephen Toulmin, the noted academic
probably most well-known for his work in the history and philosophy of science
and medical ethics, begins his book by announcing that disciplines such as
philosophy and economics (amongst other humanities and social sciences) have ‘inherited
a family of problems about the idea of Rationality and its relations to those
of necessity and certainty.  But they tend to ignore the more practical,
complementary idea of reasonableness, or the possibility of living, as in
pre-modern times, without any absolute necessities or certainties’.  In his
ambitious project of attempting to trace the origins of our use and abuse of
reason and how we may reform our ways, Toulmin provides a very accessible and
attention-grabbing viewpoint on an issue of import to academics and
non-academic alike.

The first four chapters are devoted to
providing a historical examination and perspective on the concepts of
rationality, how rival views of reason competed in the early modern period, and
how it is that we find ourselves in a situation where the potential for reason
to improve our lives and thinking has been weighed down by a serious imbalance
in our pursuit for knowledge.

He traces a significant aspect of this
problem towards the movement of a standard view of rationality whereby
particular methods or ways of thinking employed were thought to be able to turn
any area of inquiry into a hard science – disciplines that were able to provide
determinate answers with necessity and certainty.  However, Toulmin argues,
where we got into trouble was a lack of critical examination of the legitimacy
of the methods and ideas we largely took for granted.

While I believe Toulmin is right to
analyze and criticize our conception of rationality, it may seem odd to some
readers that he is questioning rationality from a perspective of reason – a
perspective one might think rationality owes a great deal of loyalty to!  In
some respects, to even question rationality at all is almost to reinforce this
loyalty in so far as the answers we seek will be provided in large part by the
vary institution we seek to question and investigate.

However, Toulmin’s tact is different and
somewhat novel.  It is not that he seeks to question the very usefulness or
validity of rationality and reason per se, but merely the best form
given our human nature and activities.  He believes to avoid past errors and to
move beyond other challenges to the concept of rationality, we will do better
to present a narrative account with a personal perspective; a perspective that
stands on its own and has no particular basis in any discipline.  And given Toulmin’s
interesting and multifaceted background and experience (e.g., studying under
scholarly giants such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Isaiah Berlin), it is quite the perspective
from which to start.

There is a need, Toulmin maintains, to
confront our uncertain and unpredictable world with a more humane and compassionate
form of reason.  A form of reason that does not seek the false security of
dogmatic ideologies or intangible theories, but one that ‘accepts the
variability and complexity that is human nature as an essential beginning for
all intellectual inquiry’.

By refiguring our approach to these
issues, Toulmin believes it is possible to develop a more balanced view of
reason that seeks a plurality of methods and tools in different disciplines for
investigating its problems.  Instead of attempting to develop a standard view
capable of encompassing different areas of inquiry, we do better to let
disciplines to go their own way.

While one might see the advantages of
disciplines developing and adapting their own methods and tools of inquiry, it
could seem problematic for many how this would affect our overall search for
knowledge.  Are we to adopt discipline-relative standards of correctness
whereby what constitutes truth or objectivity or knowledge in one discipline
will vary according to particular contingencies?  On Toulmin’s view, we need to
given up on such searches for knowledge, as it is traditionally conceived. 
There is no universal sense in which we will be able to use such a concept.

Instead, we do better to aim for what he
terms ‘clinical knowledge’ and focusing on ‘the contrast between a practitioner’s
reasonable judgments and a theoretician’s rational computations’, thereby
highlighting the important differences between rationality and reasonableness. 
The upshot being that making a transition to a notion of reasonableness will
keep us balanced and on a more even keel.  Similar to the method of casuistry Toulmin
advocated in his book The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (co-authored
with Albert Jonsen), he maintains that instead of universalist tendencies
towards the development of absolute principles or concepts, practical
disciplines ought to focus on particular episodes.  By examining the particularist
factors in these episodes, especially their unique narratives, we can use a form
of argumentation that attempts to bridge the gulfs between science and
literature.  I will avoid rehearsing here the common and well-known objections
against casuistry and particularism as a moral theory or ethical practice, but
for those unfamiliar with such approaches, it is a very approachable glimpse.

So how successful is the redressing of
the balance between rationality and reasonableness?  What hope, as Toulmin puts
it, do we have for healing to wounds of reason?  Unsurprisingly, he believes
there is such hope.  We are starting to see a turn towards a more balanced view
when it comes to the proper uses and limits to reason.  As we continue to
acknowledge a spectrum of experience involved in the process of inquiry and the
limits of abilities as reasoners we come closer to redressing the balance in
being more like pragmatists of Dewey’s stripe who jettison a search for
necessity and certainty, as opposed to rationalists like Descartes and Newton.  We will become, Toulmin
maintains, better prepared to live in the real world of ‘practical hopes and
dreams’.

But as Toulmin himself admits, this is
merely one perspective on the matter.  Others, when adopting this narrative
method of personal perspective, we will arrive at different conclusions.  For
many, this will be highly unsatisfactory.  While narrative and personal
perspective accounts are interesting and may help us to question particular
aspects of our standard views, given their subjective nature, it often feels
that they fail to provide anything substantive in its place.  Then again, maybe
it is a remnant of the antiquated view of reason that Toulmin seeks to shake
loose.

©
2004 Adrian M. Viens

Adrian M. Viens, Department of Philosophy, Oxford University

Categories: Philosophical, Ethics