There
is in the modern scientific world a riddle about how to understand what it
means to be human. Natural science and its methodology, on the one hand, have
taught us to view nature as a mechanistic system subject exclusively to the
working of natural laws. On the other hand, however, many people still view
humans as beings possessing dramatic consciousness and agency, which sets them
apart from their physical bodies and the rest of physical nature. According to
this view, humans possess non-physical souls that cannot be reduced away
through any naturalistic tinkering. Our bodies may be machines, but our souls
are something else indeed.

As Peter Carruthers states in his
introductory book, such beliefs are no longer popular among philosophers
studying the nature of the mind. Most are physicalists of one sort or another,
believing that both the mind and its states are physical in nature —
Carruthers being himself one of the most articulate physicalists in the theory
of mind and consciousness today. So it may come as a surprise that a
physicalist like himself has written an introductory book, which like no other
book of its kind takes dualism, the belief that mind and body are different,
seriously. Instead of simply rehearsing the classic objections to dualism
within a few pages before introducing some form of a physicalistic theory of
the mind, he decided to do something different: namely to carefully explore
these objections and refine them to see whether they are able to fulfill their
promises as proofs of the existence of a non-physical soul.

That the objections cannot
ultimately fulfill their promises according to Carruthers does not invalidate
their discussion in the book. Quite on the contrary, the reader will profit
immensely in any case from the clearly written and very well organized overview
of the dialectics between dualists and physicalists with respect to the mind.
Carruthers has a rare talent to present the complexities of arguments in ways
amenable even to novices in the field. The book introduces the reader to
problems and questions at the forefront of actual scholarly debates about the
ultimate nature of the human mind, and therefore also serves the advanced
student and even the professional as a stimulating source of new ideas. 

The book achieves its aim through a distinctive
choice of topics. Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of the traditional problem
of other minds: how do we know that the people around us are subject to
thoughts and feelings at all? If the reader thought that the answer to this
question is obvious, she has to think again. In the best places, Carruthers’
arguments are unsettling because they require the reader to rethink basic
assumptions that she may hold with respect to the mind. Chapter 2 then turns to
a succinct discussion of the purported proofs of the existence of the soul
found in the history of the field. Chapter 3 investigates the
identity-conditions for a soul or self, what fundamentally makes it the case
that different souls are distinct from one another. This is also the chapter,
where Carruthers starts to build his case against dualism and for his own physicalistic
theory of the nature of the mind. Chapter 4 then locates the earlier chapters
in the broader philosophical traditions of rationalism and empiricism. The
chapter is meant as a defense of the empiricist tradition in philosophy.
Chapter 5 develops the main arguments for physicalism, which is the doctrine
that both minds and their states are physical in nature. Carruthers draws
important distinctions between different versions of physicalism and defends
them against the myriad of objections mounted against the position. Chapter 6
tackles some of the most perennial questions in philosophy concerned with the
after-life. He tries to show that none of these concerns amount to convincing
arguments against physicalism (or at least against his own version of
physicalism). Chapter 7 introduces and defends one of the most influential
positions in philosophy of mind: the theory-theory, which states that mental
concepts are embedded in a substantive theory of the causal workings of our
minds. In an original and innovative move, Carruthers connects his discussion
of the theory-theory with newer controversial debates about how much of our
cognitive structure is innate in the mind by drawing on some empirical data
from developmental psychology. The book closes with a number of pointers
towards more advanced topics such as artificial minds, free will, and
consciousness.

The book is an excellent
introductory guide into the actual debates concerned with the nature of the
mind. While it definitely supposes some basic knowledge in philosophical
methods, no previous knowledge in the discipline of the philosophy of mind is
required. The organization of the arguments is always clear and lucid, and the
benefits derived from this book make it a valuable resource for further investigation
into the topic. The treatment of the classic objections against physicalistic
conceptions of the mind merits special emphasis: the discussion of these
objections in the book brings back some of their original intuitiveness and is
able to shake off some of the old dust surrounding them. 

The book, however, is more than
just an introductory text. Professionals in the field of philosophy of mind
will also greatly profit from reading the book since it contains many
stimulating ideas that connect the topic with studies outside philosophy
proper. One would have wished though that the further reading sections after
each chapter would have included some more up-to-date cutting edge literature.
Given the aim of the book as an introductory text one can see why the main
focus has been on classic texts, but the inclusion of more recent literature
would by all means strengthen the impact of the book.  

©
2005 Harry
Witzthum

Harry
Witzthum, Ph.D. did his doctorate in Philosophy at the University of
Sheffield (UK). His research interests comprise the philosophy of mind and
psychology, philosophy of language, and cognitive science.  He currently lives in Switzerland.

Categories: Philosophical