First published as "Psycho-electronics" in 1994, this reprinted
(2004) edition presents an updated text in an attempt to reach a wider academic
audience. In particular, this volume sets out to discuss the working lexicon of
researchers from disciplines concerned with the physiology, psychology, and
philosophy of mind and consciousness. More specifically, Tallis repeatedly puts
forward the idea that semantic (if not otherwise real) deficiencies may
underlie our inability to have yet provided any convincing neural account of
human consciousness. Indeed, from the outset of his 55-page, 17-item lexicon,
the author contends that "appropriate neural activity in a normally
functioning nervous system is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of ordinary
human consciousness and behaviour". However, in no quarter of his critical
neuro-epistemology does Tallis inform the reader as to where one might begin to
look for the solution to this insufficiency (i.e., there is none of the esoterica
so often included in final chapter speculations of books typical of this genre,
e.g., the World 3 of Popper & Eccles, 1977). Indeed one is perhaps reminded
of the debates surrounding the James-Lange theory of emotion, but here instead
the role of emotion being replaced by consciousness: Is consciousness equateable
to specific existential brain/body states, or does it arise only in response to
them? What really are the differences between volitional and reflexive arm movement
processes, for example?, and how might each be realized in the functioning
mammalian nervous system?

Tallis
constantly reminds us throughout this volume that much of the literature
concerned with consciousness suffers from fallacies derived from the use of
persistent abstraction mistakes or category errors such that having used up so
much of our higher level language to describe neural activity, one has little
remaining with which to describe the difference(s) between basal neural
activity in the presence or absence of consciousness. But whereas on the one
hand we cannot as yet satisfactorily explain consciousness in terms of any
functional neuronal circuitry, neither may we simply reduce it to terms of
grammar and information. For example, in his entry for Information, Tallis
rightly reminds the reader that information as stored in books or on hard discs
remain “potential information” (p.68), which, in and of itself only becomes
"’information’ proper once realized within the mind of its human receiver’s
consciousness. In this sense, such information necessarily requires "someone
being informed" in order that its description be confirmed. Here, as in
many other places throughout this volume, one is pulled up sharp in being
encouraged to worry that, if our specific sensations/perceptions are in any way
to be thought of as being dependant upon (or modulated by) our individual
consciousness, then the former cannot, therefore also be used to explain the
origin or emergence of consciousness.

In
his critical response to this and other such examples of "neuromythology",
Tallis’ 17-item lexicon seeks to rectify this situation (and hence the
subtitle), whilst also pointing out the poor use of human and mechanical
thinking machine homologues in explaining mechanisms of thought, language and
reasoning. However, although there is little to read here concerning the
detailed workings of either brains or machines, we are nonetheless treated to a
superb set of accessible and provocative reminders concerning the subtleties
involved in our use of language, symbols, signs, and the limitations upon their
use when positing explanations (as opposed to merely descriptions) of mental
phenomena. Together with the texts listed in the bibliography, I would envisage
critical use of Tallis’ various lexicon entries providing great tutorial
discussion material for psychology, philosophy, and cognitive neuroscience
majors alike. I thus strongly recommend this book for its advice to all in
search of an explanation (rather than merely a representational redescription)
of the phenomenon of human consciousness.

© 2005
Anthony Dickinson

Tony Dickinson,
McDonnell Center for Higher Brain Function, Washington University School of
Medicine, St. Louis.

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology