In The Social Nature of Mental
Illness, Len Bowers presents a defense of psychiatry against antipsychiatry
and critical sociological accounts.  The book is misnamed, since is it not
about the social nature of mental illness, but rather about social accounts of
the mental health practice, from theorizing and diagnosis to treatment and
cultural portrayals of madness.  It shows a detailed knowledge of the
literature in both sociology and psychiatry, and proceeds methodically to make
its case that the attacks on mental health institutions are largely flawed. 

Bowers is not aiming to argue that
there are no problems with psychiatric theory or treatment, since he concedes
that many of the particular observations concerning practice are correct. 
Generally, his reply to them is that they do not demonstrate that we should
fundamentally alter our practices; the more plausible conclusion is that we
should improve our practices as we find flaws in them, building on existing
approaches.  He is very methodical in making his case, dividing his book into
the different topics within the critique of psychiatry.  He starts with the
sociological literature on deviance, especially focusing on the work of Sheff
and Gove.  He proceeds to examine the implication of anthropological studies of
mental illness, the debates about diagnosis and classification, the debates
over the history of psychiatry, political theory and debates over the social
function of psychiatry, the definition of psychiatric disorder, and the role of
physiology in psychiatry.

This book would be very useful for
students of philosophical issues in psychiatry.  Bowers himself is not
primarily a philosopher, but he sees the importance of philosophy and places
himself solidly within a Wittgensteinian tradition.  Indeed, his reliance on
Wittgenstein is itself rather uncritical, as seen  for example in Bowers claim
that Wittgenstein dissolved the problems that philosophers claim exist about
the relation between mind and body.  While Wittgenstein’s approach of
explaining away the "mind-body problem" as a linguistic confusion is
still one defended by some, it has not convinced many, and it is somewhat risky
for Bowers to simply assume that this is the best solution.  If his defense of
psychiatry rests on such controversial claims, then it lacks a firm
foundation. 

However, for the most part, Bowers’
arguments do not depend on speculative philosophy, but rather rely on
clear-headed argument.  He has performed a valuable service in both showing the
philosophical importance of a great deal of literature in the sociology of
mental health and also show the limitations of this literature. 

© 2005 Christian
Perring. All rights reserved. 

Christian
Perring, Ph.D., is Academic Chair of the Arts & Humanities
Division and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Dowling College, Long Island. He is also
editor of Metapsychology Online Review.  His main research is on
philosophical issues in medicine, psychiatry and psychology.

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology