Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow
Full Title: Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow
Author / Editor: Stanley Cavell
Publisher: Belknap Press, 2005
Review © Metapsychology Vol. 9, No. 50
Reviewer: Harry Witzthum, Ph.D.
Stanley Cavell is widely regarded
as one of the most innovative and independent contemporary American
philosophers writing today. A philosopher originally trained in the analytical
tradition, he also effortlessly engages in dialogue with the continental
tradition of philosophy. Cavell’s breath of knowledge is very wide indeed,
seamlessly weaving together philosophy, film and literary studies in one
impressive cultural theory. His readings and interpretations of seminal
philosophical figures of the last century, Austin, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and
Derrida, are widely discussed within the academic field and are themselves
signs of Cavell’s creative approach to philosophy.
Cavell’s newest book Philosophy
the Day after Tomorrow comprises his most recent thinking on topics
pertaining to philosophy, literature und film. A collection of ten essays, the
book’s topics span over the whole range of questions that have at some time or
other preoccupied this philosopher’s interest.
Cavell sees philosophical
traditions as broad cultural phenomena. According to him, the philosophical
culture of Europe, for instance, has been deeply influenced by the remembrance
of the importance of tragedy, both Greek and Shakespearean. Tragedy is a
certain mode of critical interpretation of our human condition, which became
philosophy at certain crucial historical times and left its mark on
philosophical systems throughout the ages ever after — Hegel, Nietzsche,
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, just to name a few of the most important philosophers
working within this tradition. The predominant American culture of philosophy,
on the other hand, is a different fish all together. American philosophical
culture is willing in important measures to conceive of philosophy, in Quine’s
phrase, as a chapter of science. What is at stake in these traditions is the
sense of how human experience is to be accounted for: shall we look upon the
role of experience, again in Quine’s phrase, as mere "check-points"
in the service of (scientific) theory-building or shall we give them a richer
importance and significance in the interpretation of human existence?
In his new book, Cavell reiterates
some of his thoughts of why he wishes to part company with these traditions. As
the title "Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow" already suggests — a
remembrance of Nietzsche’s characterization of the philosopher as the man of
tomorrow and the day after tomorrow — Cavell wants to position his philosophy
as an alternative account of the interpretation of human experience. Two main
features of Cavell’s philosophy have so far set his system aside from
mainstream academic philosophy in the anglo-american world:
(1) His proposition that art be taken as part of
history (or progress) of philosophy. Cavell has gained academic reputation over
the years for the systematic inclusion of film and literary studies into
philosophical inquiry. He has put such prominent literary figures as
Shakespeare and Henry James and movie stars such as Fred Astaire to his
philosophical purposes: and it surprisingly works. One begins to glimpse an
understanding that literature and the medium of modern mass art (e.g. Hollywood
movies) are capable of providing interpretations of modern human experience
that are able to rival philosophy’s hitherto assumed cultural mastery
(especially chapters 2 to 4).
(2) His deep philosophical allegiance to the
thinking and practices of the so-called ordinary language philosophy as
developed by philosophers such as the late Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. Cavell
has shown over the years an increased sensibility for the vulnerability of the
ordinary in our human experience. According to Cavell, e.g., the real root of
skepticism does not lie, where common understanding would first try to find it,
namely in the failed search for absolute knowledge. The truth of skepticism
lies mainly in its proposition that "the ordinary is discovered not as
what is perceptibly missable but as what is intellectually dismissable, not
what may be but what must be set aside if philosophy’s aspirations to knowledge
are to be satisfied." And that is the real scandal of skepticism: that it
blurs our view and understanding of the ordinary. Cavell has been a staunch
philosophical advocate of the ordinary.
His indebtedness to ordinary
language philosophy is nowhere more tangible than in his critical discussion of
Austin’s concept of performative utterances (which discussion lies at the
very heart of Cavell’s philosophy in general and in the present book). Austin’s
discovery of utterances such as "I do (take this woman to be my lawful
wedded wife)", "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" and
"I apologize", which do not report on actions but are themselves
performances of such actions, has sparked a new interest of philosophical
criticism about the ordinary uses of language. Cavell associates himself with
these discoveries of performative sentences by Austin, but criticizes the
latter for his continued neglect of the passions, i.e. the expressive
dimensions of speech. Cavell’s intention is "to question a theory of
language that pictures speech as at heart a matter of action and only
incidentally as a matter of articulating and hence expressing desire." Cavell’s
reformulation of Austin’s theory, which he interprets as an extension of the
latter’s theory, is the basic critical instrument, which he puts to such
prolific uses in his cultural theory — in analyzing literary works, movies and
opera.
One is for sure: Cavell never
disappoints to surprise the reader with his insights. An astute reader and
interpreter of works of art, he is showing an acute sensibility that is capable
of unearthing new twists and turns in the canonic interpretations of classical
and modern works of art (or the supposedly mundane works of the movie world).
Only a philosopher such as Cavell could be brave enough to dig out hidden
philosophical propositions out of a short sequence of a dancing routine by Fred
Astaire…
The brilliance of Cavell’s
interpretations notwithstanding, he is not an easy author. His essays are
spiked with names of philosophers from all ages and fancies. He seldom pauses
to clearly introduce the specific aspects of the philosopher’s system that most
interest him in his pursuit of a topic. The web of assertions collected from
philosophers or other cultural beings are merely means toward an end, Cavell
does not always give them their necessary due — hence the reader might get
easily lost in this forest of name-droppings. But the trouble is worth the
expense: in the end, the reader is able to witness a universe of thought that
is both refreshingly idiosyncratic and deeply interesting.
Maybe Cavell’s book should be read,
as Nietzsche wanted his readers to read his own books: they should be read
slowly and with patience. In the end — who knows? — Cavell’s essays could
inspire readers of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow.
© 2005 Harry Witzthum
Harry Witzthum,
Ph.D. did his doctorate in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield (UK). His
research interests comprise the philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophy
of language, and cognitive science. He currently lives in Switzerland.
Categories: Philosophical