Lynne Sharpe begins her book by some personal reflections on
how she never doubted that the animals in her family were creatures like us,
and how it was a shock for her to realize that the acceptance of animals as
equals was not universal.  In Creatures Like Us? Sharpe offers a
detailed analysis of the views one is likely to encounter in contemporary moral
philosophy that mirror the popular, largely anti-animal, views.  The recent events in the aftermath of the
Hurricane Katrina testify that Sharpe’s concern for animals is rather
widespread, once one moves away from strict academic considerations: many
residents of the flooded New Orleans refused to evacuate when they learned that
the rescuers had no provisions to care for their companion animals; these
people opted to risk perishing than abandoning their companions.  This illustrates that Sharpe is by no means
alone in the view she is advocating, even if she voices a minority
philosophical view.  Given this, Sharpe
devotes the bulk of her book to challenging the prevalent moral theories that
subjugate the moral status of animal to that of humans.

Drawing from moral philosophers
whose theories both acknowledge the moral status of animals and from those who
deny such status, Sharpe argues that each of them is flawed, albeit for
different reasons.  The general flaw of
these theories is in their underlying anthropocentrism (or ‘us-ism’), the
notion that humans are superior to other species.

In Chapter 1, "Us and
Them," Sharpe focuses on a motley collection of philosophers on the rights
of animals, and argues that even those who generally support the inclusion of
animals into the moral domain (such as Peter Singer and Thomas Regan) rely on
biased assumptions on how the individual life predominates over the social life
(52).  Primarily, Sharpe argues against
the different value-of-life theories that take humans to provide the gold
standard of valuable life, against which all other animals are to be judged
based on how much ‘like us’ they are. 
Sharpe challenges these approaches because they take for granted that we
have a clear understanding of what ‘we’ are, and which of our attributes give
us moral status.  Her suggestion is that
we can understand the status of animals only by understanding our own
status.  Throughout the book, Sharpe
criticizes the popular moral theories for relying on an overtly cerebral notion
of human life: the introspective and linguistic abilities of humans make us a
remarkable species, but this does not entail that we are superior to other
animals. 

Sharpe delineates four different
views that each deny that moral concern should be restricted only to humans,
but she challenges the objectivity of these views.  Her charges against the various attempts to compare the value of
animal lives to the value of human life are twofold.  First, such comparisons make sense only if we know what makes
life valuable.  Second, these
comparisons render the value of life instrumental rather than intrinsic.  Sharpe’s criticism is that the various
theories that purport to assess the value of animal life raise nothing more
than the question ‘what can we do to these animals?’ instead of asking ‘what
can we do for them?’  

In Chapter 2, "Friends and
Neighbours," Sharpe’s primary target is Peter Singer, who seemingly
dismisses the views of those who have close relationships with their companion
animals.  In championing for the ‘principle
of equal consideration of interests,’ Singer views giving moral status to
personal relationships, not to mention relationships with partner animals, as
mere ‘soggy sentimentalism’.  Sharpe
points out that although Singer is right in advocating impartiality in ethics,
this cannot be applied categorically, especially when it comes to relationships
between individuals.  Given how humans
are social creatures, and how personal relationships play a crucial part in our
lives, Sharpe argues that their moral significance cannot be dismissed as mere
sentimentalism. 

Chapter 3, "Nearest and
Dearest" targets Peter Singer once again, now concerning his argument that
the great apes should be included among the moral community with humans, given
that the great apes are in many ways ‘nearest to us.’  Sharpe argues that the different ways in which this claim could
be understood (in terms of genetic similarity, or in terms of similarities in
capacities and ways of living) are not morally significant.  More problematically for Singer, if these
features were morally significant, then so would be features such as race and
sex, and this would allow one to argue for racism or sexism, which Singer
strongly condemns.  Instead of trying to
find ‘objective’ features on which to ground the moral considerations for
animals, Sharpe suggests that those ‘nearest to us’ are the companion animals
with whom we have the closest relationships, and it is to them that we have
special moral obligations.  In short,
Sharpe’s considerations are based on the fact that the relationships are
between individuals, even if the individuals are of different species. 

Chapter 4, "Beyond the
Pale" is a criticism of philosophers who aim to preserve the status quo of
affording no moral concern to animals. 
The philosophical theories criticized include one on which only
language-users can be said to have interests (Frey); one on which only persons
can be viewed as ends in themselves (Kant); and one on which only conscious
mental states are morally significant (Carruthers).  Sharpe’s criticism is twofold. 
First, such theories amount to nothing more than blatant speciesism, and
second, the theories are inconsistent in many ways.  One of Sharpe’s targets, Raymond Frey, advocates a view on which
only language users can be said to have interests; the view not only excludes
animals from having interests, but as Sharpe points out, it excludes human
infants as well.  Yet Frey is ‘happy to
grant interests not only to human beings who are permanently comatose, but to
fetuses and "future beings" not yet conceived’ (118); moreover, Frey
waives the language requirement ‘for any creature which can be "identified
as a human being"’ (119), thus substituting his inconsistency with blatant
anthropocentrism. 

Through the first four chapters,
Sharpe’s own positive account of the proper moral concern for animals emerges
interspersed amongst the objections she raises against the various theories
that denigrate the moral status of animals. 
The fifth chapter, "Creatures Like Us" finally provides an
answer to the claim she raises at the outset of the book.  If we are to judge our obligations to
animals by inquiring how they are like us, it is paramount that we know what we
are like.  Sharpe turns to consider the
richness of behavior both in humans and non-human animals, and argues that any
model that relies on paradigms falls short of capturing the full extent and the
subtleties of behavior, human or non-human. Any useful model for prediction
needs to take the context into account, and what is even more crucial for
understanding animal behavior is knowledge of the individual animal.  Sharpe
draws most of her support from personal experiences with companion animals, and
one could try to criticize her approach for relying on overly emotional
attachments.  However, Sharpe points out
that the proper way to understand the multifarious human relationships with
companion animals is to gauge them in this context. 

In conclusion, Sharpe brings
together her considerations from the first four chapters to show that the
question ‘are the animals like us?’ is useful, but only when its purpose is
known.  What is more, the considerations
she raises show that this question, if it is to be truly objective, should be:
in what sense are we like the animals? 
To refuse to consider the fact that humans have significant
relationships with their companion animals is to show prejudice in favor of the
theoretical. 

Sharpe’s arguments do a great
service not only to animal rights but to our understanding of the human
condition as well.  The point that
humans are social beings is often treated as an uninteresting side note not
only in ethics but also in the metaphysics of personhood.  Sharpe imputes many of the contemporary
moral philosophers for remaining under ‘the long shadow of Descartes’ (191)
despite the fact that they explicitly reject other Cartesian theories. Although
Sharpe does not pursue the metaphysical aspects of this claim in her book, her
discussion serves as a useful springboard for a better understanding of the
social nature of personhood, which is, unfortunately, neglected by many
writers.

Sharpe’s views will no doubt face
opposition from those committed to specific views on personhood, but those
opposing her conclusion that animals should be accorded moral consideration
will face a formidable task in refuting her arguments, lest they contend with
inconsistent or blatantly anthropocentric moral theories.  Creatures
Like Us? is written with great lucidity, and the opposing arguments are
subjected to close scrutiny.  The book
is valuable not only to those interested in animal rights, but also to those
who are sympathetic to the social conception of moral status and
personhood.  

©
2005 Tuomas W Manninen

Tuomas Manninen is a Ph.D. student at the University
of Iowa, currently working on his dissertation entitled "The ontological
foundations for personhood over time". 
He will complete his degree in December 2006.  His research interests include contemporary metaphysics,
philosophy of mind, and history of early analytic philosophy.

Categories: Philosophical, Ethics