The World in my Mind is not presented
as a philosophical book, but rather a book about the practical issues around
consciousness.  As the author explains, this book is about "breaking
consciousness down into simpler elements to make the concept more accessible"
(p. 4).

A noted researcher in the area of artificial
intelligence, Aleksander’s solid engineering
background is evident in the straight-forward flow of this book.  The author
begins by directly asserting his belief that conscious
machines are not only theoretically possible but will in fact be created,
and will be capable of passing any test devised to refute their consciousness. 
This position sets the stage for the book’s approach:  the author’s task is that
of reverse-engineering consciousness (primarily but not only human
consciousness).

Aleksander proposes five axioms
regarding consciousness.

1. We are conscious of being a single entity existing in a
   non-self, "out-there" reality, and that we have internalized (or
   "depicted") this external reality;
2. We have a sense of continuing as a single self-entity
   across time (despite brief respites such as sleep and longer breaks such
   as a coma);
3. Our consciousness selectively attends to specific features
   of the self and non-self realities;
4. A primary function, perhaps the major function, of our
   sense of self is to decide what to do next; and
5. Emotions appear to be inseparable from the consciousness
   of our self-sense.

These axioms would not be at all
unfamiliar to psychologists, of course; and each axiom leads to its own
fundamental questions, which Aleksander addresses and answers. For example, how
is it that when we wake in the morning our consciousness of self, which was
left off when we fell asleep, resumes where it left off the night before?  How
are emotions generated, and what purpose do they serve?  What cognitive
mechanisms are involved when we distinguish self-identify from non-self?

Aleksander’s position on all these
questions is unquestionably materialistic. That is, he takes it as given that consciousness
is the result of brain function, the product solely of the firing of neurons:  "They
work so fast and there are so many of them that they are credibly responsible
for whatever it is that makes up our consciousness" (p. 164).  Yet he also
considers Chalmers‘
more non-reductionist point of view carefully, finding points of distant agreement,
or at least tolerance.  Indeed, one of the most reader-friendly aspects of Aleksander’s
approach in this book is that he willingly weighs many sides of several
conceptualizations of consciousness, pointing out their strengths and
limitations and noting where they are consistent with his own model. 

It is in tackling the so-called
hard problem of consciousness (how it is that consciousness arises from
neurology) that Aleksander waxes the most philosophic – in fact he begins that
chapter with a warning to this effect.  In this chapter he posits the
following:  "[P]ersonal sensation implies some brain activity and this
brain activity implies the personal sensation.  This, in mathematics is not a
correlation it is an identity" (p. 149).  By extension Aleksander is
taking the position that consciousness, or at least the sensations and cognitive
activities that give define it, are not only related but are identical, one and
the same.  This would appear to be the definitive position of the materialist/reductionist
school.  It would also seem to make consciousness difficult to clearly differentiate
from an illusion, and as Susan Blackmore says in her review of the
book, "Aleksander rejects this idea but gets into a fearful muddle in the
process."

After taking the reader on an
interesting journey through the positions and arguments of Chalmers,
Wittgenstein and others (as they bear on Aleksander’s positions), the reader
may be left wondering where they have arrived at the end.  The concluding
paragraph of the book, however, recaps Aleksander’s motivations: to give
credence to the position that consciousness is not mystical or mysterious, that
it can be understood in mathematical, logical and engineering terms, and that
machines are therefore surely capable of achieving it.

© 2006 Keith Harris

Keith Harris, Ph.D.,
is Chief of Research for the Department of Behavioral Health in San Bernardino
County, California. His current interests include the empirical basis for
mental health research, behavioral genetics, and the shaping of human nature by
evolutionary forces.

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology