In
his brief but illuminating Foreword to Hung’s difficult book, Professor Peter
Lipton asserts that "Thomas Kuhn could fairly be called the most
influential figure in twentieth-century science studies, if influence does not
require agreement." Indeed, while Kuhn was by no means the first to
advocate and develop a sociology of knowledge, the study that attempts
to find social rather than exclusively rational bases for doing science (it was
foreshadowed in works such as Karl Mannheim’s 1929 Ideology and Utopia and
Ludwik Fleck’s 1935 Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact), his
famous, hugely successful–and highly controversial–1962 The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions "inaugurated a new epoch in the understanding
of science" (Ziauddin Sardar, Thomas Kuhn and the Science Wars, p.
20). It proposed a radical conception of the nature of scientific progress.

Kuhn’s
book has aspects of a Rorschach ink blot–it is amorphous, ambiguous (an
example is his concept of paradigm–see Alexander Bird, Thomas Kuhn, p.
67). It is perceived quite differently by different readers, welcomed and
praised by some as liberating science from unwarranted objectivism and
scientism, damned by others for leading to irrational foundations, to an "anything
goes" unconstrained relativism, to the claim that reality is made and not
found.

Structure
has spawned a huge secondary
literature (see my 2003 review of Steve Fuller’s Thomas Kuhn on Metapsychology 7:25) that pertains to a wide range of issues concerning primarily matters of
theory adoption and change in the natural sciences. In that context, one of
Kuhn’s central notions is the sharply debated, controversial thesis of the incommensurability
of (some) scientific theories: it is "the property exhibited by two
scientific theories provided that, even though they may not logically
contradict one another, they have reference to no common body of data" (Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 421); or, "The general idea of
incommensurability is that the existence of changes in perception, world,
standards of evaluation or in the meanings of key theoretical terms undermines
traditional, Old Rationalist conceptions of progress as the accumulation of
knowledge or increasing verisimilitude" (Bird, p. 149). Two
incommensurable theories speak from radically and fundamentally different
perspectives and premises, and thus appear to have no common measure. Yet,
presumably one comes to be judged as "better" than the other.

This
raises what Hung calls "the paradox of incommensurability: How can
incommensurable theories be both incomparable [having no common measure] and
incompatible [essentially: competing with one another]? To be incompatible,
they must have the same subject matter. To be incomparable, they would have to
have different subject matter. So incommensurable theories must have the same
subject matter and yet must differ in subject matter. This is the paradox"
(Hung, p. 69).  It seems Kuhn maintains "both that competing theories
cannot be compared and that they are competitors" (p. x).  It is this
problem which Hung selects from all the problematic, obscure, difficult,
ambiguous aspects of Kuhn’s work as the subject of his book.

I
begin with several internal criticisms (more or less, the kinds that at least
provisionally accept an author’s assumptions and framework, as opposed to
external criticisms, which do not), but I believe that for readers of these
reviews, coming as they do mostly from mental health and related philosophical
backgrounds, the external critiques that follow will be more relevant. 

One
problem is Hung’s frequent and extended use of symbolic logic and its esoteric
notational system, an obvious stumbling block for the non-specialist. A second
one is Hung’s prolific creation and use of special terminology, typically
conceived as opposed dyads. Examples are the dichotomy of nomological
(cause-effect) and the theoretic stages of explanations (p. 2); the disjunction
of representational spaces and the modeling of reality within those (p. 6–more
about this below); the polarity of reality-vs-experience explanations and
conceptual explanations (pp. 9-10); or, the distinction between theories that
use models and those that use statements (p. 60). At times when Hung introduces
and defines such polarized terms, the proposed antithesis seems facile, overly
simple, and thus suspect.

Yet
another internal problem with Hung’s enterprise is that his key paradox may be
spurious, or at least misconceived. Hung comes to that conclusion himself, and
I will comment on his supporting argument below. The notion of
incommensurability first arose in mathematics, and there one can find obvious
and compelling instances of two incommensurable quantities that still are
patently comparable. For example, the lengths of a side and of the diagonal of
a square are incommensurable. That is, one length may be representable by a
rational number of units, but then the other necessarily will be irrational–there
can be no common basic unit of measure such that a side equals n units and the
diagonal equals m units, where n and me are integers. Still, clearly the two
lengths are comparable (Bird, p. 150); does the fact that, or how, we know that
the diagonal is longer than the square’s sides really pose a paradox, or even a
problem? Analogously, does one’s ability to compare incommensurable theories
really pose a paradox? Perhaps it does only when one insists on articulating
the issue formally, in terms of symbolic logic.

I
have two more internal criticisms. The first concerns Hung’s treatment of the
concept that is absolutely central to his enterprise, namely, representational
spaces (RESes). These supposedly will provide Hung with the conceptual tool
for resolving the paradox of incommensurability. My main internal
difficulty with this concept is that I believe Hung  contradicts himself when
he describes and defines what RESes are. As I see it, he presents two
alternative, incompatible conceptions, but then conflates these. On the one
hand, he proposes that RESes are more or less like coordinate systems: he says
that a RES is a medium (e.g., a flat surface; an ellipsoidal surface–p.
32; a Newtonian space and time framework); a category system (p. 41); a
mathematical structure (p. 34); a logical space within which phenomena
can be modeled (p. 31). Thus according to this first version, RESes are
relatively sparse entities, logical constellations, armatures which serve as
organizing structures within which one then represents or locates more complex
entities, phenomena and concepts such as forces, fields, energies, or masses.
On the other hand, he states that RESes are generic or conceptual theories
(e.g., chemical theories, caloric theories, Newton’s gravitational theory, "all
are RESes"–p. 37; "scientific theories such as the general
theory of relativity and quantum mechanics should be understood as category
systems" [and category systems are RESes]–p. 6); he also refers to sets
of theoretical possibilities as RESes (p. 39), and even language is said to be
a RES (chapter 5). This is version 2.

It
seems obvious that the two conceptions differ significantly. The first version
envisions RESes as relatively simple skeleton-like structures, while the second
describes them as theories–surely considerably richer, thicker, complex,
conceptually much more problematic entities, different animals altogether. Can
one really maintain that in some basic way, a theory such as the corpuscular
theory of light, or the theory of relativity, and even the phenomenon of
language, is basically the same kind of entity as a representational medium or
logical space? To thus conflate the two versions of RESes seems to grossly
oversimplify and conceal puzzling key issues concerning the nature of theories.
That masks the complexities and attendant difficulties lurking in version 2 by
making it seem that conceptually, version 2 RESes are no more complex or
problematic than, say, media, or coordinate systems.

A
further objection concerns the author’s key move. After chapters of dense
theorizing, Hung states that although incommensurable theories may (must? the
point is unclear to me) differ in their internal subject matter (their
theoretical ingredients, such as fundamental particles, force fields,
relativistic space-time, or quantized energy levels), still they "may
share the same external subject matter" (p. 69–my emphasis). That, Hung
says, is why, and how, two incommensurable theories can be compared–in
the same way that one can compare two commensurable theories (p. 69n17.
That is, pairs of both types each have "the same external subject matter".

Obviously,
the crux of this argument is the concept of the  "common external subject
matter". I see two main sets of difficulties lurking here. The first
concerns the concept itself;  Hung assumes that it is valid, unproblematic and
clear, but I maintain that on closer examination it can be seen to harbor
considerable and intractable concealed problems. The second set of difficulties
concern the concept of incommensurability which Hung is developing.

As
to the first set of problems: Hung says that   "common external subject
matter"  means that some observed phenomenon is "the same
thing" (p. 68) for two theories, e.g., the bending of light observed
in Newtonian and relativity theory.  He says that "by external subject
matter we are not talking about such things as sense-data…" (p. 68),
later elaborating: "Empirical data are statements about mental
states produced in observers…. [are] propositional attitude statements….
[A] phenomenon is what is perceived by the senses…. p is the phenomenal
content of the empirical datum, ‘It is observed that p’ "  (pp.
110-111). By his epistemologically and ontologically casual treatment of the
concept of "common external subject matter", Hung suggests that it is
unproblematic, while actually it harbors a number of major but concealed
problematic assumptions. These include the distinction between the observed and
the "really real" (Kant’s noumena?), and ideas about the nature of 1)
language, 2) mental states, and 3)  perception. I will not recount the
familiar, age-old problems raised by any and all of these notions, but will
offer comments when I turn to external criticisms. The point is,  these
problems are tacitly introduced into Hung’s argument about comparability, 
remaining invisible and unacknowledged. That, however, does not mean that they
are not at work, that they do not make the discussions suspect. 

The
second difficulty with trying to resolve the commensurability paradox by means
of this two-level model (theories have internal and external aspects)
explanation of is that it is based on the negation of what most see as the key
ingredient incommensurability. As the Cambridge Dictionary says, if two
theories are incommensurable then they "have no common body of data".
But Hung goes against this definition, contradicting the standard view of
incommensurability. Using his twin model, he says first that such theories "may"
have a common external subject matter, and later widens the claim, saying that
they must have such a common ground (p. 134). So, in essence he resolves
the paradox which is the subject of his book by redefining incommensurability.
He concludes that incommensurable theories are comparable; he claims
that they do have "a common body of data" (the "external
subject matter"), and to maintain otherwise is the result of a confusion
that blurs or ignores "the sharp distinction between empirical data and
phenomena" (p. 134). So, as I see it, the entire ponderous machinery and
arguments of Hung’s book come down to this simple point: do, can, two
incommensurable theories have a common body of data? If they do or can, the
paradox becomes trivial or ill-conceived.

Here
is where an external critique becomes relevant. We see that the notion of "a
common external subject matter" has emerged as crucial in Hung’s argument,
but, as I already adumbrated, problems lurk in that argument because in using
that notion too casually Hung relies uncritically on the received views of perception,
and of language. He seems to think that there are no significant
problems with the idea of statements (especially about "mental states"),
mental states themselves, perception, and phenomenal content. Let us consider
the two principal received views that are involved in Hung’s views.

His
notions about the nature of perception embrace that received view which
the neurologist Raymond Tallis calls the "causal theory of perception":
any theory of the type that relies on a version of the standard energy- or
information-transmission model, the familiar "energy source
emission/transmission via a medium/sensory organ reception/nervous system
stimulation/neurotransmission paths/central brain activity/conscious experience"
chain. Even though this is a widely and uncritically accepted model type, a
radical analysis shows it to be highly problematic–inconsistent, circular,
relying on a good deal of hand-waving and legerdemain (see Tallis’s The
Explicit Animal, or his On the Edge of Certainty). All these
difficulties are imported when one makes a causal theory of perception part of
one’s explanatory framework, and thus they lie in wait in Hung’s arguments.

Similarly,
his notions about language also embrace a received view, with like results. It
is the received view of language: that it is a grammatical, semiotic system
comprising atomic elements; that its logico-grammatical structures (e.g.,
sentences) refer to facts, objects, ideas, thoughts, observations, and the like
(e.g., that verbal reports about "mental states" are meaningful and
unproblematic); and, that it has an independent existence (i.e., that it can
and should be studied as a self-sufficient, separate corpus, divorced from its
users). Hung seems unaware that there is a serious, deep "ontology of
language problem" (see Fred Olafson’s What is a Human Being ),
i.e., that the very nature of language is highly problematic and
elusive. (For radical analyses of the relevant issues see, for example, the
writings of Roy Harris, such as his Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein
or his The Language Connection, or Olafson’s work.) Once again,
the severe problems which a received view raises remain invisible in Hung’s
standard treatment of the nature of verbal reports pertaining to perception,
but, again, unfortunately that does not mean that the problems the received
view introduces covertly are irrelevant, can safely be ignored, or shunted
aside.

As I
have said, it is quite impossible for me to show here the deficiencies and
unresolvable paradoxes which are introduced by adherence to either or both of
these widely and largely uncritically received views. It requires an extended
and unorthodox critique to reveal and explicate the problems, and I have
outlined one version in a recent monograph.  There I argue that the crux of the
problem is what I call the issue of separability–the decoupling of
person and world. You might say that unresolvable, paradoxical difficulties
necessarily issue from profound, baffling boundary problems that evade
cognitive solutions. I must leave my remarks in this unsatisfactorily sketchy
state.

My
last point concerns the nature of theorizing in professions such as the mental
health fields. Although Hung does not say so explicitly, it is obvious that his
analyses pertain to theories in the natural sciences. I cannot find any
reference in the book to the nature of theories and theorizing in outside
fields such as psychology. (I doubt that from his point of view this is a
shortcoming.) At any rate, many years ago I began to develop the premise that
while the kind of formalization (mathematization) of phenomena that RESes bring
about may be appropriate in the natural sciences (although one can find
intimations in contemporary physics that this methodology may be unduly
limiting even in that field), it is an open and pressing question of whether it
is appropriate, productive when one employs anything resembling RESes to
theorize in the human disciplines. My past arguments relied on an analysis of
the use of what I came to call state process formalisms (SPFs), formal
structures which inevitably provide the logical-conceptual foundation for
mathematization in the natural sciences. These are similar to but more complex
than Hung’s RESes (version 2). Put simply, I have been arguing that the problem
with employing SPFs outside their befitting domain of application is that they
are unacceptably reductionist. Their use inevitably results in an impoverished,
constricted, ameaningful, lifeless discipline–in an older philosophical
terminology: they remove "secondary qualities" from the field,
leaving only "primary" ones. And, it seems undesirable to me that
psychology (especially clinical psychology), psychiatry, and allied fields
become disciplines whose subject matter has primary-quality features only.  

I
therefore maintain that in the mental health fields we ought not to simply
accept and adopt some variety of RES- or SPF-based methodology in our
theoretical work. We do not want to have a domain of study that is populated
only with disembodied, lifeless, mathematized ("objective") subject
matter. We need to be circumspect when it comes to choosing the vehicles and
frameworks for our theorizing. That, I claim, is the principal lesson
that we can, and should, learn from Hung’s book. His vision of theories and
theorizing ought to alert us to the dangers that follow from ill-conceived,
misplaced applications of scientific rigor.

 

© 2006 Louis S. Berger

 

Louis
S. Berger‘s career has straddled clinical psychology, engineering and
applied physics, and music. His major interest is in clinical psychoanalysis
and related philosophical issues. Dr. Berger has published 6 books, including Introductory
Statistics, 1981; Psychoanalytic
Theory and Clinical Relevance, 1985; Substance
Abuse as Symptom, 1991, and most recently, The
Unboundaried Self, as well as several dozen journal articles and book
reviews.  His book Psychotherapy As Praxis was reviewed in Metapsychology in January 2003.  He lives in
rural Georgia.

Categories: Philosophical