In his book Philosophy of the
Social Sciences: Towards Pragmatism, Patrick Baert offers both an
introductory text and a pragmatic proposal for redirecting the social sciences
in a new direction. The bulk of the text is dedicated to a historical overview
of major figures and viewpoints, with comparative analyses and critical
assessments that eventually pave the way for Baert’s explanation, and the defense
of his own perspective in the final chapter. Altogether, this provides an
informative and interesting introduction to the philosophy of the social
sciences, with plenty of fodder for further thought and exploration.
Considering the fact that the philosophy of the social sciences is a large,
sprawling field with many tangents and multi-disciplinary connections, it
should be noted that Baert (admittedly) does not cover all of the territory,
but he addresses as much as can be reasonably expected within the space of a
single 170 page text. The target audience is presumably upper-level
undergraduate or beginning graduate students, and the book could work well as an
assigned text for courses at these levels. Some background in philosophy and/or
the social sciences will no doubt assist the reader in following the text, but
Baert’s writing is accessible enough for the material to be informative and
rewarding to a general reader interested in understanding philosophical
perspectives on the social sciences. Considering the inclusion of a relatively new
perspective that suggests a major reorientation regarding the nature and goals
of the social sciences, seasoned philosophers and social scientists will likely
also find the book of interest.

I will have more to say about
Baert’s own perspective in a moment, but first I want to address his overview
of the major figures, and perspectives, in the philosophy of the social
sciences. Baert chooses six focal points here: Emile Durkheim’s Naturalism, Max
Weber’s Interpretive Method, Karl Popper’s Falsificationism, Critical Realism,
Critical Theory, and Pragmatism (with particular emphasis on Richard Rorty). Although
not all-encompassing, these selections provide a good cross-sectional
representation of philosophical perspectives on the social sciences,
illustrating a broad spectrum of thoughts on the nature, methods and goals of
social science. For each of these viewpoints, Baert provides a fair and
accessible overview that explains its major tenets, concepts and contributions,
with some discussion of relevant additional figures and viewpoints along the
way (bringing up Thomas Kuhn as a counterpoint to Popper, for instance). Baert’s
narrative also introduces the reader to some major works (such as Weber’s The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, to give one example),
illustrating how they embody the philosophical perspectives and methodological
approaches of their authors. Throughout his discussion, Baert offers a variety
of comparative and critical remarks, noting where major agreements and
disagreements occur and identifying the philosophical differences that lead to
them. This provides the reader with some conceptual understanding of the major
theoretical issues that lie at the heart of the philosophy of the social
sciences, such as whether or not social phenomena are best explained by the
actions of individual agents, and whether or not the social sciences should
follow the same method(s) as the natural sciences. However, Baert’s conceptual
analysis of such issues does not penetrate as deep as some other introductions
to the philosophy of the social sciences, perhaps a by-product of the largely
historical orientation of the book. For this reason, I recommend that the
serious student (or instructor, as the case may be) supplement this text with
another, more topic-oriented, text (such as Alexander Rosenberg’s Philosophy
of Social Science), which will provide a more thorough understanding of the
conceptual issues in the philosophy of the social sciences, along with the
reasoning and arguments that surround them. Still, Baert’s text provides enough
background to enable a basic understanding of the major issues, and the
historical orientation of his text lends some useful narrative context and structure
to the field, which should be very helpful to first-time explorers of this area.
I would like to have seen a bit more discussion of recent major developments in
the social sciences, such as the emergence of rational choice theory and the
growing influence of evolutionary thought (as seen in some new domains of
social inquiry, such as evolutionary psychology and memetics), as these topics
point to important and interesting issues in contemporary social thought. But
Baert could not cover everything, of course.  

Baert hints at his own perspective
throughout the text, but it does not seem to obscure or hinder the reader’s
understanding of the various viewpoints that are discussed. However, as the
text progresses, these remarks lead up to an explanation and defense of Baert’s
pragmatic reorientation of the social sciences in the final chapter. For many,
this will be the most interesting aspect of Baert’s text. Building upon ideas
derived from the American pragmatists (Pierce, James, Dewey, and especially
Rorty), Baert rejects the foundational attempt to unify the social sciences
under a single methodology that has the aim of objectively describing the realm
of the social, whether this methodology is specific to the social sciences or a
purportedly universal approach to science in general. As Baert points out, the
social sciences are a diverse lot, with a plurality of goals and concerns, both
within and across disciplines. So, proposing a single methodological
orientation does not fit well with how social science (nor science in general) occurs
in actual practice, and only limits the possibilities for social research. With
this, Baert brings to the table a pragmatic awareness and reevaluation of the
purposes and cognitive interests of social scientists. He urges us to recognize
that social scientists are not passive observers of a given social reality.
They are active seekers following specific aims, whether they realize it or
not. So rather than attempting to objectively explain social phenomena and get
away from their subjective goals and interests, Baert’s suggestion is that social
scientists acknowledge, embrace, discuss, and critically reflect upon their various
perspectives and goals. With this, Baert proposes several possible aims for
social researchers to consider, including the critique of society and existing
institutions, emancipation from limiting social patterns and structures, and,
most interestingly, social self-understanding. Regarding this last aim, the
idea is that social research can guide us towards understanding our own social
systems and cultural presuppositions, enabling us to comparatively assess them
in light of alternative conceptions and ways of living. Baert supports this approach
to the social sciences by noting that several social science domains are
already heading in this direction, such as the ”critical turn” in
anthropology and Foucault’s genealogical investigation into how historical
events have created and shaped current social concepts, institutions, and power
structures. By following this emerging trend, Baert thinks that we can reorient
the social sciences to offer more to us than they have in the past, allowing us
to actively evaluate and guide society in a more informed and self-aware
manner.    

Being somewhat of a pragmatist
myself, I am sympathetic with some elements of Baert’s perspective. I agree
that the social sciences, and indeed the sciences in general, are pluralistic
and subject to a variety of different purposes and guiding interests. I also applaud
the suggestion that we acknowledge and critically reflect upon the aims behind
social research, investigating where they lead us and what they can do for us. This
could lead to significant improvements in both the social sciences and society
itself by allowing the social sciences to serve an elevated role in the
evaluation, development and guidance of social phenomena. However, I do not
follow Baert’s dismissive attitude towards the attempt to represent and explain
social phenomena in a descriptive manner. Baert characterizes his view as
anti-representational, insisting that knowledge does not involve the representation
of reality but rather a kind of purposeful action. However, I see no need to
tie a pluralistic view of the social sciences to this sort of claim, nor to
draw a dichotomous either/or choice between representation and action. Representing
something is itself a kind of action, and one which is essential to the ability
to critically reflect upon something. To actively understand and assess
something, that thing must be represented in some way by the agent that is
attempting to understand and assess it. Moreover, the better the agent is at accurately
representing the object of its inquiry, the better it will be able to actively evaluate
it and instantiate its goals towards it, however varied those goals may be. 
So, rather than dismiss the representation of social phenomena, we ought to
acknowledge and reflect upon it, considering ways to maximize our ability to accurately
represent the social world around us. Consider the parallel with individual
self-knowledge. To truly know oneself, one must attempt to represent oneself as
accurately as possible. Otherwise, as cognitive and social psychologists well
know, self-interest and self-protective biases will come to the fore, allowing
for self-deception rather than self-knowledge. Of course, there is a sense in
which we actively create who we are through the choices we make (including how
we choose to represent ourselves), so knowing ourselves is not simply a matter
of passive observation, but nor is it simply a matter of actively engaging with
our own existence. It is both of these things, with self-knowledge residing at
the complex intersection between accurate self-representation and active
self-evaluation. Analogously, I suggest that social self-knowledge calls for
both the accurate representation and critical appraisal of social phenomena. We
should not disparage the attempt to represent social phenomena as accurately as
possible, but rather embrace it as an important component of social research
that can usefully feed into the other sorts of activities that Baert
recommends. Otherwise, without the genuine intention to accurately represent
the nature of the social, social scientists may only address what they want to
find, rather than what is really there.

With this caveat, I support most of
Baert’s recommendations for the social sciences. Reorienting the social
sciences towards a more pragmatic perspective, where the aims of research are
explicitly drawn to the fore, could significantly improve both our
understanding of social phenomena and our ability to thrive as social
creatures. The social sciences can and should critically assess their goals,
and actively employ this assessment in the pursuit of social self-knowledge.
However, elevating the social sciences to this more prescriptive role brings in
a whole new set of questions and issues. If the social sciences do not simply
attempt to describe the social, but also to actively evaluate and guide it,
then we need to decide by what values we are to do so. This puts the social
sciences squarely into the realm of ethics and socio-political policy,
rendering social scientists not just seekers of social knowledge but also
advisors on what society can and should be. The methods and values by which
they make such judgments therefore become of the utmost importance. I think
Baert is right to bring the social sciences in this direction, and his text
does a good job of doing so, but this is just the beginning. Deciding which
purposes and aims are to be followed by social researchers and social systems
themselves will require much reflection and discussion among social scientists,
as well as between social scientists and the members of society itself. Hopefully
Baert’s text will prompt up and coming social scientists to engage in such
activities.

© 2006 Jesse W. Butler

Jesse W. Butler recently received a
Ph.D. in philosophy and is now working at the Center for Applied Social
Research at the University of Oklahoma. For more information, visit his webpage
at: http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/B/Jesse.W.Butler-1/

Categories: Philosophical