This
volume consists of a wide range of interdisciplinary studies of the body under
various interpretations, drawing upon philosophy (with a strong emphasis on
phenomenology), psychoanalysis and neuroscience, and with the concepts of body
image and body schema as "conceptual anchors" (p.2) for each of the
varied contributions. The editors’ explicit aims are "to stimulate, to
clarify and perhaps also to confuse", and by each of these standards have
achieved considerable success, in roughly equal measure.

Just
what is meant by body image and body schema, and how the two interrelate, is a
major topic of debate in the volume. Shaun Gallagher proposes the following
definition, closely echoed by Jonathan Cole:

Body
image: a system of (sometimes
conscious) perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one’s own body.

Body
schema: a nonconscious system of
processes that constantly regulate posture and movement. (p.234)

The
two systems, while distinct, are normally integrated in a way analogous with
perception of one’s own body and the ability to move it around. Several of the
key features of these definitions are, however, disputed by other contributors.
While Jacques Paillard supports a clean and apparently static distinction
between the two systems, citing a neural basis in how we map space relative to
our bodies, Yves Rossetti et al. argue that clinical evidence shows the
systems to have a dynamic relationship, in which possibly each influences the
other. Maxim Stamenov attacks the idea that image and schema are univocal terms
at all, favoring instead a multitude of different images and schemas, each of
which may individually function as their univocal counterpart is supposed to.

These
writers nevertheless accept the basic distinction in question. Maxine
Sheets-Johnstone goes further in arguing that the image/schema distinction is
conceptually inadequate, on the grounds that is unduly static, and proposes its
replacement with the rather opaque term ‘kinetic melodies’, which are dynamically
‘played out’ through ‘corporeal-kinetic intentionalities and patternings’. As a
defender of the distinction, the response Gallagher gives to an earlier version
of this argument is intriguing: body image and body schema are dynamic systems,
and in fact are terminologically interchangeable with Sheets-Johnstone’s ‘kinetic
melodies’. So there is no need to employ the latter when we’ve already got the
former. But of course the converse equally applies, so the victory is somewhat
Pyrrhic at best — if Gallagher is right about this interchangeability, then
the most that can be claimed is that there is a genuine need for a body
image/body schema distinction or something like it. Some consensus about
body image and body schema does emerge from the various discussions, however.
The distinction runs close to that between conscious or reflective and
unconscious or unreflective, and body image is consistently interpreted as self-referential
whereas body schema is not.

Much
of the volume is also concerned with the dual relationship between the two
central concepts and empirical and clinical evidence; how is the body
image/body schema distinction supported by such evidence, and what light can it
shed upon psychological and developmental disorders? The primary evidence
Gallagher gives in favor of the distinction, summarizing a more detailed
discussion in his How the Body Shapes the Mind (reviewed in Metapsychology
9:48), comes from an apparent double-dissociation of these systems. Stroke
patients who fail to recognize – and dress – one side of their body
nevertheless use that side in activities such as tying a knot, apparently
showing a disrupted body image but intact body schema. In contrast, those with
sufficiently damaged sensory nerve fibers (called deafferentation) can only
successfully control their movements when able to perceive their own bodies,
seemingly using their intact body image as a substitute for a disrupted body
schema. Stamenov presents a complementary developmental analysis, suggesting
that body image and body schema are related by means of the mirror neuron
system, which fires equally in response to both one’s own and perceived others’
actions of grasping and manipulating small objects with hands and mouth. The
primary function of this system in infancy, then, is to extract a basic ("root")
body image from an inborn body schema toolkit. Mirror neurons are also discussed
in further depth by Helena De Preester, who diagnoses a tension in the
literature between the object-oriented characterization of their activity and their
supposed function of matching perceptions.

To
demonstrate the value of the body image/body schema distinction Aaron Mishara
argues that it is critical to establish a core deficit in schizophrenics’
bodily experiences, and using a range of neuroscientific sources argues that
schizophrenics compensate for a lack of body image by effortfully constructing
incomplete proxies from their body schemas, which are themselves disrupted. In
a somewhat similar vein, François Sauvagnat argues by analogy of symptoms for a
continuity between childhood autism and schizophrenic-like psychoses, with sleep
disorders, repetitive movements, self-harm and other symptoms arising from lack
of structure in the body image. Jonathan Cole also discusses the impact — both
positive and negative — on the body image arising from physical sensations,
and their absence.

Amongst
the sixteen contributions to this volume many themes not discussed in this
review also loom large, including the significance of speech for
self-consciousness and Lacan’s "mirror stage" where infants recognize
the unity of their own bodies in a mirror. The breadth of material covered, and
disparity of opinions expressed, across all sixteen inevitably raises more
questions about the key concepts of body image and body schema than are
answered — particularly concerning the structure of the two systems and how
they influence each other — but together succeed in providing a lively and
engaging tour of these concepts’ development and use, and make a strong case
for the value of applying them, or some cognate terms, across a wide range of
body-related disciplines.

© 2006 Richard de
Blacquière-Clarkson

Richard de
Blacquière-Clarkson, University of Durham, UK

Categories: Philosophical