Thinking with Animals collects
nine essays that grew out of talks presented at a corresponding workshop at the
Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin in May 2001. The
essays are centered around different aspects of anthropomorphism (i.e. the
supposed problem of describing animals in terms of human psychology or human behavior).
Thinking with Animals is neither another collection on the
methodological problem of anthropomorphism in (cognitive) ethology [like Robert
Mitchell et al. (Eds.) Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes
and Animals. New York, 1996] nor does it take on the more recent
developments in that debate [like Eileen Crist’s Images of Animals
(Philadelphia, 1999) or John Kennedy’s The New Anthropomorphism
(Cambridge, 1992)]. Thinking with Animals rather takes a wider
perspective beyond the way animals are described in science. Thinking with
Animals thus takes up a current trend of increased interest not just in
(cognitive) ethology, but in historical and cultural studies of the
human/animal relationship. As the introduction has it: ‘This is the double
meaning of the title of the book Thinking with Animals: humans assume a
community of thought and feeling between themselves and a surprisingly wide
array of animals; they also recruit animals to symbolize, dramatize, and
illuminate aspects of their own experience and fantasies.’ (2)

The essays, accordingly, range in
style from the analytic philosophy of science to post-modern cultural studies.

Part I of Thinking with Animals
contains three essays on the history of anthropomorphism. Wendy Doniger shows
how in ancient India monkeys are transformed into humans and humans are
transformed into animals, especially ‘to partake of animal sexuality’ (26).
Lorraine Daston compares today’s anthropomorphism with respect to animals with
medieval theories of angels, and claims that because medieval thought did not
know the modern subjective/objective distinction ‘medieval angelology was not
about angelic subjectivity’ (45) — whereas modern anthropomorphism wants to
know what animal thoughts are from the perspective of the animal. Paul White
tells the story of experimental animals in Victorian Britain and the
simultaneous treatment of animals as mere machines (in the laboratory) and as
family members (at home).

With respect to the methodological
problem of anthropomorphism Part II of Thinking with Animals contains
two essays. Elliot Sober highlights the one-sidedness of the debate on
anthropomorphism. Whereas anthropomorphism is often considered a mistake the
opposite mistake (of denying animals a description in human-like terms where it
in fact is appropriate) does not even have a common name. Sober calls it ‘anthropodenial’.
He examines in detail Morgan’s canon (of always preferring to give an
explanation of an animal’s behavior in most simple terms applicable). It turns
out that Morgan’s canon might either be considered to be an application
of more general methodological guide lines (like a principle of parsimony or a
principle of conservatism in explanations) or the canon has no ‘justification
in evolutionary biology’ (96), since one may with the same right opt for
cladistic parsimony and work on the canon that homologous behaviors or features
are produced by the same proximate mechanism (which include in this case
cognitive faculties or feelings in animals). Sandra Mitchell analyses where the
mistake in anthropomorphic reasoning is supposed to lay. She sees it in a form
of analogical reasoning where one concludes from some similarities to overall
fit between the base system (humans in this case) and the target system
(animals in this case). Nevertheless the analogical inference may work in some
cases. So one has to check the individual cases — ‘In short, anthropomorphic
models are specific, scientifically accessible claims of similarity betweens
humans and nonhumans.'(114)

Although the book, as said, is not
a reader in the philosophy of cognitive science these two essays are worth
reading for anyone interested in the methodological debate on anthropomorphism.

Part III of Thinking with
Animals deals with our pictures of animals in daily life. James Serpell
proposes that the ubiquity of pets rests on their role in enhancing the health
of pet owners, which in turn rests on the fact that pet owners ‘must have
interpreted and evaluated the various behavioral signals of social support they
received from their pets as if they were coming from fellow human beings’
(127). Anthropomorphism so was causal to benefit from pet animals. Cheryce
Kramer explores Tim Flach’s photos of animals and their usage in advertisement.

Part IV of Thinking with Animals
deals with animals in film. Gregg Mitman tells the story how the
anthropomorphic portrayal of elephants in some Discovery Channel films helped
the cause of elephant protection. Sorita Siegel provides an inside view on her
making of a National Geographic documentary on orang-utans. Anthropomorphism is
seen as a didactic device for an ‘untrained audience’: ‘Carefully crafted
scenes that combine video images and interviews in meaningful ways bring
audiences into the world of orangutans and imbue the film with subjectivity,
emotionality, and wonderment. Strong human and animal characters establish an
emotional identification with the audience.’ (197).

(Anyone interested in these broader
topics dealt with in Thinking with Animals may also subscribe to a list
like H-ANIMAL@H-NET.MSU.EDU )

© 2006 Manuel Bremer

Manuel Bremer, University of
Düsseldorf, Germany

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