The theory of consciousness has assume a center stage in recent philosophy of mind. This book consisting of a pioneering collection of essays examining the self-representational theory of consciousness from a wide range of perspectives by leading theorists edited by Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford is a welcome addition to the literature on the theory of consciousness. 

            The theory of consciousness features two distinct and largely independent debates, namely reductive theories of consciousness and positive theories of consciousness. A reductive theory of consciousness attempts to account for phenomenal consciousness in non-phenomenal terms, which are, for a physicalist are bound to be ultimately physical. Since most of the theories of consciousness are reductive, there is a connection between these two debates and the recent literature on the theories of consciousness has been dominated by  two leading reductive theories of consciousness. One of these competing theories is the representational theory of consciousness (RTC) and the other is the higher-order monitoring theory (HOM). According to the former theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents in the right way, while for the former, a mental state is conscious if and only if  it is represented in the right way.

            The self-representational theory of consciousness, on the other hand, holds that a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way and therefore, stands as an alternative to the other two dominant reductive theories of consciousness by combining elements of both RTC and HOM theory in a novel fashion that seeks to avoid the fundamental deficiencies of each. On this view, a mental state is conscious both in virtue of representing and in virtue of being represented.

            But, although the self-representationalist views have been common throughout the history of both Western and Eastern philosophy, they have only found their ways into the philosophy of mind literature very recently. The purpose of this volume, as the editors themselves acknowledge, "is to showcase an alternative reductive theory of consciousness that has been gaining visibility of late but still remains underdiscussed" (p. 1). The chapters that make up this volume discuss the merits and demerits of the self-representational theory of consciousness from different perspectives, with contributions from scholars in analytic philosophy, philosophy of mind, phenomenology and history of philosophy.

            The book is divided into four parts. The first part contains six chapters arguing broadly in favor of the self-representational theory of consciousness. The second part contains five chapters arguing broadly against the theory. The third part contains five chapters broadly exploring connections of the theory to a number of related philosophical issues such as the nature of propositional attitudes, knowledge, attention and indexical reference. The last part of the book contains two longer essays exploring connections of the self-representational theory to the sciences.

            The first part opens with a chapter by Robert van Gulick, who offers a presentation of his higher-order global states theory of consciousness arguing for a weakened version of self-representational theory, namely each form of consciousness seems to involve a corresponding type and degree of self-awareness. In the following chapter, Terry Horgan, John Tienson and George Graham describe a "puzzling phenomena" (p. 41) as they call it, such that certain forms of global skepticism about our conscious life does not have the same grip on us as do their external-world counterparts, and argue that the only plausible account of this involves the supposition that conscious experiences are self-representing. In the next chapter, Kathleen Wider argues that it is not the thinking activity of the mind alone that produces the most basic level of self-awareness; it is the affective nature of consciousness that does. In the following chapter, Andrew Brook gives a comprehensive interpretation of Kant's theory of consciousness that gives a central place to self-representing representations. The last two chapters of the first book of the book is written by the editors in which Kennett Williford defends the pure self-representational theory and Uriah Kriegel defends a weakened version of it.

            The second part opens with a chapter by Joseph Levine arguing that neither pure nor weakened forms of self-representational theory can bridge the explanatory gap, or even capture the nature or source of the gap. In the next chapter, John Drummond explores the lineage of the view that self-awareness is intrinsic to object-awareness as it runs from Aristotle to Brentano and Husserl. Rocco Gennaro's chapter, while defending a weakened version of the self-representational theory, focuses mostly on difficulties with the pure self-representational theory that could cause one to retreat from it. In the following chapter Christopher Hill presents objections to all kinds of internalist theories and argues for the superiority of representational theories of perceptual consciousness that do not involve any reference to a self-representing structure. The last chapter of this part, by Dan Zahavi, offers an argumentative exposition of work on the self-representational theory within the phenomenological tradition, culminating in the claim that the theory does not do justice to the phenomenology of experience, which suggests a purely intrinsic conception of consciousness.

            In the first chapter of the third part, Peter Carruthers sketches an account of phenomenally conscious experience according to which such experiences always have a dual (and self-referential) analog contents. Following in the eliminativist tradition, Carruthers puts forward a provocative line of reasoning for the tentative eliminativist conclusion that there might be no such thing as conscious beliefs and conscious desires. Robert Lurz, on the other hand, argues against Carruthers and develops a "same-order monitoring" approach to conscious beliefs and desires. Jason Ford and David Smith, in the following chapter, attempt to explore the possibility of naturalizing and demystifying the self-representation involved in consciousness using the psychological literature on attention. In the next chapter on the connections between indexicality and self-representation, Tomis Kapitan argues that indexical thoughts and experiences involve a form of self-awareness and that since, as is plausible, all conscious states are indexically mediated, self-awareness is ubiquitous in conscious life. The last chapter by Keith Lehrer argues that a satisfactory account of representational lucidity will implicate the thesis that conscious states involve a particular kind of self-representation.

In the first essay of the final part, Antonio Damasio and David Rudrauf propose an empirically verifiable identity thesis linking consciousness as lived with consciousness as described in neurobiological terms. They argue that subjectivity and affectivity (feeling) are essentially connected and that the phenomenology of affect can be mapped onto the dynamics of the brain-and-body structures and processes known to be associated with consciousness. In the last chapter, Douglas Hofstadter compares consciousness to the "strange loop" of mathematical self-reference brought to light by Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

I truly believe that this volume will make an important contribution to the current debates on consciousness. Throughout the volume there are many interlinking and recurring themes and subjects of interest. This volume offers a rich panoply of ways of approaching the vast and deep set of questions and issues that arise when we explore the relations between consciousness and self-awareness. The editors bring a wealth of experience to this book by assembling a top-notch group of contributors.

I think this is a very useful collection of essays for the researchers and academicians in philosophy, cognitive science, linguistics and cognitive psychology. I heartily recommend it as both a valuable tool for classroom use to facilitate discussions for the case for and against the approach, the various ways it might play out, and its possible implications for other issues in philosophy and cognitive sciences in philosophy, cognitive science, cognitive psychology and linguistics, and also for initiating further research in related fields.

© 2007 Kamuran Godelek

Kamuran Godelek, Ph.D., Mersin University, School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy, Ciftlikkoy, MERSIN, TURKEY

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology