In this fairly short, very clear, wide-ranging and quite lively introduction to the philosophically religious thought of Søren Kierkegaard, Claire Carlisle has done a service of great value to undergraduate students and also non-specialists interested in the formidable and vast collection of texts written — though, importantly, not all signed — by Søren Kierkegaard. These texts of Kierkegaard's are, in one way, strangely untimely: their genre is far from certain to everyone and they deal with some themes that seem completely modern or at any rate totally relevant (e.g. anxiety, freedom, becoming) but also some themes that will feel curiously archaic or passé (e.g. sin) to some (though, I am certain, not all) of those at home in the world of Continental philosophy; a world that Kierkegaard was, at any rate, partly responsible for. The majority of Kierkegaard's texts are also famously — perhaps even notoriously — vast, and reading unwieldy tomes such as his Either/Or: A Fragment of Life and the almost equally monumental text Stages on Life's Way is surely a formidable undertaking, even for those already accounted with the rudiments of his philosophy. Such texts as these almost demand such a guide as Carlisle has provided.

 Carlisle's Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed safely guides the reader through all the distracting thickets of Kierkegaard's thought: the question of the importance of the excessive and ambiguous use of the pseudonym; the changing styles and genres; the unusual structure of books such as Either/Or. It also throws some light on all the philosophical and theological topics, familiar and seemingly passé, which I mentioned in the above paragraph. The actual concluding chapter omitted, the final two chapters are less thematic and are specifically on individual books by Kierkegaard: namely, Fear and Trembling and the Philosophical Fragments.

Within the discussion of Fear and Trembling, Carlisle writes that Kierkegaard '….is hostile to organized, institutional religion and people who gain support and strength from belonging to a religious community may find this attitude difficult to accept.' (p.131). It seems to the present reviewer, however, well worth mentioning in this regard that the majority of Christians belong to versions of Christianity (Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox, for example) according to which salvation is — dogmatically — only to be achieved through participation in the religious institution (for example, in the sacrament of reconciliation and in participation in the Mass), regardless of whether individuals 'gain support and strength' from that participation, or not. Such Christians as these will find Kierkegaard's attitude towards organized religion impossible rather than difficult to accept; and for theological, not psychological reasons.

Fear and Trembling is one of Kierkegaard's shorter works and, partly (though only partly) for that reason, it is likely to be better known and studied by non-experts. Another reason is, of course, its breathtaking philosophical, religious and stylistic radicalism. It was thus well chosen as a case study by Carlisle. Yet despite the relative brevity of Fear and Trembling, both it and the Philosophical Fragments are texts that are dense, conceptually difficult and still very much open to interpretation even by experts in Kierkegaard's thought, so it is some real achievement that Carlisle provides a convincing reading of each text that remains pretty clear. Indeed, the book is pitched throughout at a readily comprehensible level and, it seems to the present reviewer, can be understood by an intelligent reader who has not had much of a background in philosophy, although possibly the section on the philosophy of Hegel (and that of the subsequent Hegelians), which is introduced as some background to Kierkegaard's thought, might be found to be relatively heavy going by novices to the philosophical tradition, even though it is necessary and important to include. (It only spans a few pages.)

Elsewhere, however, the presentation of this book is happily very understandable and consistently illuminating and Claire Carlisle clearly wears her scholarship very lightly, for her engaging style of introducing Kierkegaard to a more or less non-specialist audience does not wholly conceal the fact that she has obviously worked on Kierkegaard for some time and knows him to his backbone. Finally, although this must certainly not be taken as a criticism of the book as such, I should just mention here that the blurb on the back of Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed also advertises a discussion of Kierkegaard's influence on Wittgenstein contained therein; but — perplexingly enough — there isn't any mention of Wittgenstein in this helpful and engaging book.

© 2007 Matthew Ray

M. Ray is author of Subjectivity and Irreligion (Ashgate, 2003).

Categories: Philosophical