This collection of essays is written in honor of Michael Tanner, a Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. Many of the authors are former students of Tanner and retain his interests in philosophy, music, and literature. The essays vary considerable in their approach, but retain a common interest in how ethics relates to aesthetics. All are in agreement that the two fields are connected, but they vary in the extent of overlap and how this should be developed.

Each essay stands alone, although on occasion the same philosophical problem is addressed in more than one chapter. Their connection with Tanner's work is obvious, as with that of Nietzsche's philosophy and Wagner's music. Overall, the essays are very well written, philosophically challenging, and focused on specific issues within the field. The book provides an excellent overview of the main philosophical problems in the connection between art and morality. The following will illustrate the range of issues addressed by the essays.

Michael Tanner's first chapter, "Ethics and aesthetics are — ?", elaborates on his reasons for disagreeing with Wittgenstein's claim that ethics and aesthetics are one. Tanner approaches the Acquaintance principle from a few angles. This he defines as the view "that judgments of aesthetic value, unlike judgements of moral knowledge, must be based on first-hand experience of their objects and are not, except within very narrow limits, transmissible from one person to another" (p. 22). Sincerity differs between the two realms also. With ethics, we may not like to do what our morals say we ought to do, but sincerity in response to works of art demands an honest report to our first-hand experience. Aesthetic properties are perceived, but ethical qualities are normally inferred.

Christopher Hamilton is a teacher of Philosophy, Religious Studies, German, and French. His chapter, "Art and moral education," examines how human life is impoverished by the absence of serious contact with art. He lists a number of ways in which art leads to moral education: we enter imaginatively into others' lives; we learn what it is like to be someone else; we deepen our understanding of morality; we expand our understanding of the consequences of actions. He disagrees with Martha Nussbaum's view that novels can only develop moral character, and do not develop immoral dispositions. Hamilton disagrees citing numerous examples of narrative characters we are to despise and even hate. He also notes that different people respond differently to various forms of art. He then reviews the debate over whether a work of art that is morally repugnant is therefore aesthetically defective.

Matthew Kieran is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Leeds. In his chapter, "Forbidden knowledge: the challenge of immoralism," Kieran picks up the issue that Hamilton concluded with. Some hold that a moral defect necessarily constitutes an aesthetic defect. He holds that the moral character of art is aesthetically relevant only if "it undermines or promotes the intelligibility and reward of the imaginative experience proffered by the work" (p. 57). He then focuses on the authenticity of the imaginative experience to support his position.

Mary Motherwell is Professor Emeritus at Barnard College and Columbia University and Senior Scholar at Columbia University. Her chapter, "Make-believe morality and fictional worlds," focuses on the question, ‘Can I imagine both that I am a bad person, and that it is okay to be that way?' This is the problem of imaginative resistance and whether there are limits to what can be imagined. She uses an exchange between Kendall Walton and Michael Tanner to examine the different answers. She agrees with Tanner that imagination can allow us to ‘try on' views we find repugnant. However, we resist doing so because this unsettles us.

Michael Tanner's second chapter is a reprint of his classic article, "Sentimentality." He begins with Oscar Wilde's comments that sentimentality involves feelings that are unearned, or obtained too cheaply, and are directed at unworthy objects. He then demonstrates the difficulty with any definition. He moves hesitantly towards a conclusion that the emotions need education. Sentimentality then includes the idea that certain emotions ought to lead to some action, but they don't. He concludes that many of our feelings and attitudes are based on an inheritance of a Christian worldview, yet those beliefs are not taken seriously by most. He wonders where this will lead.

José Luis Bermúdez is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sterling and he provides another definitional chapter. Its title is "The concept of decadence." He finds this term used in very different ways: for a literary-historical movement, for a period in the historical evolution of many concepts, and as a tool in aesthetic criticism. The latter is tied into the idea of decadence as "art for art's sake" (p. 129). A decadent work of art is then defined as one where the formal structure and mechanics of the art overpower its ability to communicate with the audience. It arises from excessive individualism and a lack of discipline in the artist stemming from self-indulgence and self-absorption.

Aaron Ridley is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. In his chapter, "Critical conversions," he examines how someone can say that my judgment of art is truly my judgment. The problem arises for Ridley when he considers how much our judgments are influenced and shaped by our culture. He examines the problem and concludes that my judgment is one that arises from my own experience of the art, acknowledges how my values impact that judgment, and honestly reports the experience.

Roger Scruton was Professor of Aesthetics at Birkbeck College, London and Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. His chapter, "Love in Wagner's Ring," develops from a classic paradox that those things which have the greatest value in use (like air and water) have little or no value in exchange, and vice versa. He finds in The Ring is similar type of paradox regarding power: that there is an invisible, illusory power which is generated by the powerless, and yet ends up oppressing everyone. 

John Armstrong is Director of the Arts and Culture Programme at the Monash Centre for Public Philosophy in Melbourne, Australia. In his chapter, "Moral depth and pictorial art," Armstrong examines whether paintings can enhance moral understanding. He evaluates Sassetta's painting of Saint Francis of Assisi as thin in comparison with literature. But Nicholas Poussin's Landscape with the Gathering of the Ashes of Phocion he finds to have deep moral meaning. An informed understanding of the painting allows viewers to enter a certain frame of mind, one that might otherwise be difficult to retain. If that mindset is morally significant, the painting can help develop certain moral commitments.

Anthony Savile is Professor of Philosophy at King's College London. In "Kant and the ideal of beauty," Savile rejects the commonly held view that Kant viewed the ethical and the aesthetic as distinct. He claims this arises from lack of attention to a passage in Critique of Pure Reason (§17). To evaluate beauty, like any concept, would require an ideal. This, Savile claims, Kant found in man. So, the good soul is a person with a moral mind who will also love natural beauty. This suggests that an aesthetic sense is an essential element of a well-rounded character, not just a nice addition.

Alex Neill is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Southampton. His chapter, "Schopenhauer on tragedy and value," begins with a summary of Schopenhauer's ranking of various forms of art, other than music. In this, poetry is the most valuable, and architecture the least. Tragedy is the summit of poetic art because it points to the nature of life itself. Neill claims Schopenhauer did not hold to the common view that tragedy somehow brings pleasure. Instead he claims Schopenhauer saw tragedy as morally valuable in developing compassion and leading to resignation in the face of life, which opens the possibility of salvation.

Sebastian Gardner is Reader in Philosophy at University College London. His chapter, "Tragedy, morality and metaphysics," examines the claim that tragedy serves to enhance moral sensibility. He reviews the history of this view, focusing mostly on Schiller. The view that tragedy is incompatible with morality is developed mostly from Schelling and Schopenhauer. The moral meaning in tragedy, according to Gardner, is incomprehensible. Yet tragedy remains deeply important, pointing to the indeterminacy of human life.

Christopher Janaway is Professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London. His chapter, "Nietzsche's artistic revaluation," develops the view that Nietzsche's mature prose works are art. He claims that Nietzsche uses language to elicit an affective reaction in readers to cause them to question their moral values. This arises from Nietzsche's claim that moral concepts result from rational reflection about feelings. Thus, his writing is designed to elicit feelings that will lead to different thinking and eventually different emotions.

Colin Lyas is a freelance philosopher and his chapter, "Art, expression and morality," takes up the earlier question of the place of morality in aesthetics. Michael Tanner and others claim that art can be a place where "serious thinking about central concerns of human life can go on" (p. 279). Lyas questions the difference between art and philosophy. He claims that Tanner, and many of us, come to art with a self that is discontent, seeking answers to profound questions and moral dilemmas. Art gives us a way to see our philosophy of life lived out and tested. In this, we may see that we need to think some more. Or that we no longer want to live with that picture of morality.

 

© 2007 Dónal P O'Mathúna

 

Dónal P O'Mathúna, PhD is Lecturer in Health Care Ethics in the School of Nursing at Dublin City University, Ireland. He also teaches bioethics and sports ethics, and has research interests in the role of narrative in teaching ethics. donal.omathuna@dcu.ie

 

Categories: Philosophical