This is a book on self-consciousness. It is a noteworthy feature of writings purporting to define or explain the nature of consciousness that their authors warn would-be readers that the topic is profoundly perplexing one and that any treatment of it, including their own, will no doubt prove provisional and controversial. Upon this reflection, self-consciousness is likely to seem implacably mysterious and utterly unique. To be self-conscious is to have, at a minimum, knowledge of oneself. But this is not all; self-consciousness involves knowledge not just of one's physical states, but knowledge of one's mental states specifically. Self-consciousness seems to be a kind of continuous apprehension of an inner reality, the reality of one's mental states and activities.

            Sebastian Rödl in this book holds the view that self-knowledge is not empirical; it is not knowledge from sensory affection, rather it is knowledge from spontaneity; its object and source are the subject's own activity. In Rödl's own words: "self-consciousness is the nature of a subject that manifests itself in her thinking thoughts whose linguistic expression requires the use of the first person pronoun "I". Our theme, then, is a manner of thinking of an object, or a form of reference… An inquiry into self-consciousness, then, is an inquiry into a form of knowledge, which is knowledge of oneself as oneself" (p. vii).

            What is self-consciousness? What is it to be conscious of oneself? These are the kind of questions Rödl attempts to tackle in the first chapter adequately titled as First Person Thought. He thinks that a theory of self-consciousness that does not reveal a subject of first person thought to know herself as a thinker is on that account inadequate. This suggests that the first person thoughts we must investigate first are those that predicate concepts of thought. Thus, the aim of this introductory chapter is to explain why self-consciousness is to be understood as a form of predication, or knowledge.

He distinguishes two kinds of thinking as practical and theoretical thinking, ie., as action and belief. In the contemporary literature it does not so happen that action and belief fall within the purview of self-consciousness. Belief and action are such as to be known by their subject in a first person way; acts of thought are essentially self-conscious. Therefore, a theory of self-consciousness is a theory of action, belief and knowledge. But, Rödl thinks that contemporary philosophy of mind has lost the central insight of German idealism, namely that any philosophical study of action and knowledge must be pursued as part of an inquiry of self-consciousness. Taking the full measure of this insight requires a major conceptual reorientation in action theory, the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Accordingly the remaining chapters of the book cover action and belief, freedom and reason, receptive knowledge and the second person.

In the second chapter titled Action and the First Person, he describes the way in which I know that I am doing something when my knowing it is an act of self-consciousness, and in the following chapter titled Belief and the First Person, the way in which I know that I believe something when, again, I know it in such a way as to know that I believe it. The third chapter titled Reason, Freedom and True Materialism is devoted to the expounding the nexus of self-consciousness and reason. It is in virtue of the unity of explaining why one is doing something and showing it to be good, and of explaining why one believes something and revealing it to be true, that action and belief are known in first person way; and this is the nexus of self-consciousness and reason. Rödl claims that empiricism is the principle obstacle to a true materialism; empiricism that pervades contemporary philosophy produces a flawed materialism, which is unable to think a self-conscious material reality: a movement that is thought, a receptive relation that is essentially self-conscious, and a material substance that is known through an order of reason. Accordingly, last two chapters are devoted to showing the truth of this diagnosis in his treatment of receptive knowledge in Chapter 5, and of thought of a second person in Chapter 6.

Rödl's agenda in this book is to recover and rejuvenate the achievement of the German Idealist tradition that self-consciousness occupies a central position in action theory, philosophy of mind and epistemology. According to him, an articulation of the form of knowledge that constitutes self-consciousness is not the description of a stance towards a reality to which one may with equal justice take other stances. Rather, as this manner of knowledge is internal to the reality that is known in this manner, a description of it gives the metaphysics of the self-conscious subject. This description of the account of self-consciousness expounded throughout the book is meant to be faithful to the principle of Kant's and Hegel's philosophy and yet be materialist, that is, it represents spontaneity, or self-consciousness, as the character of a material reality.

Rödl's book is a valuable contribution to the current interdisciplinary discussions of self and self-knowledge as it covers broad concepts such as action and belief, freedom and reason, receptive knowledge and second person each of which deserves its own book, but here treated in terms of their nexus with self-consciousness. He very skillfully shows that self-consciousness is the principle of their subject matter. This book is especially of interest for academicians and any philosophy student who wants to further his/her ideas about self-consciousness and first person thought.

© 2007 Kamuran Godelek

Kamuran Godelek, Ph.D., Mersin University, School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy, Ciftlikkoy, MERSIN, TURKEY

Categories: Philosophical