As part of Continuum's Key Concepts in Philosophy series, Eric Matthew's book Mind aims to provide a non-technical introduction to some of the historical debates in the philosophy of mind while also providing critique of several viewpoints and a positive account reflective of his own opinion.  This text would serve as an excellent resource in an undergraduate class alongside a text that provided a more technical account of the current debates or an anthology on the philosophy of mind. While Matthews focuses on providing an overview of the major debates in the philosophy of mind, he also successfully introduces the reader to many of the technical terms in use in the literature, enabling the beginning student to proceed into more difficult reading.

The book is divided into six chapters:  Mind and soul; Minds and brains; Subjectivity, intentionality, and behavior; Animals and machines; Other minds; and Reasons and causes. In the first two chapters, Matthews' focus is to describe historical characterizations of the mind held by philosophers.

In chapter one Matthews outlines crucial differences between the concept of mind in Aristotle's and Descartes' writings. Although Matthews purports to only introduce the views he favors beginning in chapter three (see pp. vii-viii), he makes his opinion resoundingly clear at certain points in his discussion of Cartesian dualism. While Matthew's opinion is evident in this discussion, he does deal well with the standard objections against Cartesian dualism so that a reader unfamiliar with the terrain would be able to follow along easily. In the second chapter, Matthews continues the historical account and details the eliminative materialism advocated by, for example, Paul and Patricia Churchland.

The first two chapters set the stage for the rest of the book as they provide the two important viewpoints, that is, Cartesian dualism and eliminative materialism, against which Matthews will primarily argue in the chapters that follow. Having introduced the concepts of 'intentionality' and 'subjectivity' that he believes are necessary to describe human behavior ('intentionality' relates to our thoughts necessarily being about something and 'subjectivity' relates to the idea that we are the subject of our own mental life and someone else is not), in chapter three Matthews argues that the key problem with both Cartesian dualism and eliminative materialism is their focus on "minds" as unique substances rather than on the "beings who have minds and the role which having a mind plays in their lives" (p. 69). This statement seems to encapsulate Matthews' opinion of how one should develop a philosophy of mind that permeates the book. To provide support for this desired emphasis, Matthews incorporates extended discussion of the philosophy of Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, philosophers in whose thought Matthews sees various similarities.

The discussion of evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology in chapter four would likely be of special interest to the beginning reader. Here Matthews contemplates what can be said about the mind being a product of natural selection and wonders to what degree a connection can be made. He does not discourage such a view completely, but cautions that survival value can only be one factor among others in explaining the mind (see pp. 77-82). Additionally, Matthews' discussion of the well-known "Chinese Room" argument in chapter would greatly aid the undergraduate student.

One particular thread that reappears several times throughout the book is Wittgenstein's so-called "Private language" argument (see, for example, pp. 16-17, 53, and 90). At various places, Matthews uses his interpretation of this argument to provide support for his critiques against, for example, Descartes and Searle, among others. In chapter four, it plays a special part in Matthews' argument against the possibility of machines presently being able to think–because they are unable to engage in semantics since they do not participate in a society as humans do. Here Matthews sides with Merleau-Ponty, arguing that "…to be a subject, to have a mind, cannot be separate from being a living being" (p. 92). This argument, while not ruling out the logical possibility of machines thinking, does limit the ability to think to things which are embodied (i.e., preventing a brain or a computer by itself from thinking).

Although interesting and certainly engaging, Matthews' take on the debate about whether computers and other forms of AI are able to think depends strongly on his interpretation of Wittgenstein's so-called "Private Language" argument. It is with reference to this argument that Matthews attempts to buttress what he views as a weakness of Searle's case, namely, the admission on Searle's part that brains are machines (see p. 89). Without support from this interpretation, it is unclear that a computer could not, at some point in the conceivable future, be modeled on the human brain and be able to think. Despite this reliance on the controversial "Private Language" argument, Matthews' exposition and critique in chapter four would excellently serve to spark the interest of readers previously unexposed to the debate.

In the fifth chapter, Matthews addresses the problem of other minds, outlining the problem as it appears for those who espouse Cartesian dualism and highlighting the issue of solipsism that confronts the Cartesian. To make a case against solipsism, Matthews marshals Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box example as well as Merleau-Ponty's argument that solipsism is inconceivable since we only know what it is to be alone by in fact not being alone. Returning to the more general problem of other minds, Matthews closes the chapter by indicating that there may appear to be paradox involved by including both the concepts of 'subjectivity' and 'communication' in a philosophy of mind, but that both seem essential in what we mean when we talk about what it is to have a mind. This apparent paradox is left unresolved for the reader.

The final chapter on reasons and causes deals with Matthews' viewpoint on the status of folk psychology and its relation to science. Matthews believes that the reason-cause distinction is useful in providing a framework for understanding why folk psychological explanations may still provide explanation for actions that a physiological explanation would miss. Here he argues that "…there are different ways of making sense of the world which are appropriate in different contexts" (p. 136). This section, being one of the sections most clearly indicative of Matthews' opinion, would be useful in a classroom setting when contrasted with, for example, an account of folk psychological concepts by the Churchlands.

In spite of the minimal criticisms above, I would recommend Matthews' text as an essential overview text for undergraduate courses in the philosophy of mind or contemporary philosophy. In such a course, it might best serve as a secondary or optional text to help acquaint students with broader issues and topics that may be missed by reading only an anthology on the subject.

© 2007 Marcus P. Adams

Marcus P. Adams has a Master of Divinity in religious studies and is currently a graduate student in philosophy at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan (USA).

Categories: Philosophical