This book is based on Wollheim’s 1991 Ernest Cassirer lectures at Yale University. Their unity is Wollheim’s recurrent theme that dispositional concepts need to be repsychologized from the horizon of epistemological conceptualism in which they have been treated in analytical philosophy of mind for over fifty years (4, 6). While using a highly analytical method, Wollheim abandons one of the major assumptions of analytical philosophy of mind to break new ground in the philosophical study of emotions. This permits him to develop his elegant arguments drawing evidence and examples from a broad range of sources including literature, psychology, and philosophy.

The argument is developed in three chapters. First, Wollheim considers what emotions are and how they arise in our lives ("Originating Conditions"). Then, he develops a classificatory scheme of emotions based on their object that links emotions back to desire and belief via a mediation of value ("As the Emotion Forms"). Finally, he considers how "standard" and "moral" emotions differ ("On the So-Called Moral Emotions").

The central thesis is that emotions, like beliefs or desires, are mental dispositions or underlying forces that erupt from time to time into the stream of consciousness (9). They are a distinct psychological category from beliefs and desires (12). Beliefs, on Wollheim’s account are maps or pictures of the world a person inhabits. Desires provide persons with objectives or things at which to aim and so ‘target’ the world. Emotions, which presuppose both beliefs and desires, are altitudes or orientations to the world that tints or colors it (15). Such ‘coloring’ is an affective evaluation of things and facts in terms of positive (pleasure, satisfaction) and negative (discomfort, frustration) attitudes. If the attitudes persist they generate different mental states to generate a variety of mental dispositions. These manifest themselves in a number of ways, including behavior. Among the mental dispositions that emotions generate are desires which when joined with "worldly information" and instrumental belief may lead to action. If this account is correct, then, emotions cannot nor ought not be assimilated to beliefs or desires or some combination of the two. As attitudes or orientations to the world, emotions are associated with the imagination about actual or imagined objects to which the emotion is attached. It is his exploration of the relation of imagination and emotion that Wollheim breaks new ground.

Wollheim’s arguments are powerful, so one has to take his case seriously. For the most part he makes his case ably. This does not mean, however, that the presentation is not without problems. First, Wollheim’s position that emotions originate with desire is somewhat problematic because it is reductionistic in that it does not allow emotions any existence independent of desire. While emotions, as attitudes, are not to be confused with desire, they originate from desire. Positive emotions are responses to satisfaction of desire. Negative are responses to frustrated desire (61). Further, if they persist in giving rise to dispositions, then they are the source of further desires (16). On the surface this circularity seems to make sense. However, if one enlarges the range of human emotional responses, there seem to be a class of emotions that are difficult to analyze in this framework. For example, the feeling of pleasure of a beautiful sunset when one is not otherwise occupied (i.e., not engaged in looking at sunsets in particular) seems related to an aesthetic response not based in desire. Wollheim might argue this is not what he means by emotion but is instead simply a feeling. This is reasonable to an extent. However, the feeling of pleasure or delight can grow until it colors or tints the whole range of one’s responses to the world, which on Wollheim’s account is what an emotion is. The feeling of pleasure that one experiences does not seem related to any desire. Indeed, part of emotional response is the surprise that transcends the immediacy of desire. One could provide similar examples using emotions such as contentment, happiness, or enjoyment. In the case of these emotions, especially contentment, what seems paramount about them is an absence of desire. If the disposition of ultimate satisfaction generates desire, as on Wollheim’s account, it would seem that a state of contentment would be impossible.

Part of the problem with Wollheim’s account is that he has a limited affective vocabulary. Emotions are positive or negative responses to the satisfaction or frustration of desire. This definition of emotion seems to inextricably link emotion and desire in a circular way without considering that some emotions may not have this link — or at least not as directly as Wollheim’s definition would require. Affirming that the class of negative emotions is larger than positive, he goes on to state that the positive emotions are restricted to love, joy, tenderness, gratitude, admiration, compassion, hope, and perhaps pity and pride. One wonders, however, about possible other obvious contenders like happiness, contentment, passion, commitment, delight, felicity, or enjoyment. One might argue that some of these (e.g., happiness or delight) are included in the positive emotion by implication but certainly passion, commitment, or enjoyment are not. On Wollheim’s account, his list is exhaustive not illustrative (61). So one is left wondering whether they are emotions on not. As I have shown above, if one includes them, then Wollheim’s genealogy of emotions runs into some difficulty. Moreover, there are emotions that are hard to classify on Wollheim’s scheme, like rage, lust, warmth, piety, reverence, or awe. While this objection is not fatal to Wollheim’s project, his scheme is more restricted than he supposes.

Finally, it is difficult to understand why Wollheim limits the "moral emotions" to shame, guilt, remorse and regret. In chapter one, he clear shows that emotions are evaluative. Emotions shape our experience of the world either positively or negatively. In chapter two, he convincingly argues that value mediates between emotion and desire. With these two claims, it seems to me, he has opened the door to affirming that emotions are intentional responses to value that are relevant to the moral domain and so are, by extension, "moral." I do not think that his distinction of "standard non-moral emotions" and "moral emotions" will hold. However, his analysis in this chapter that links affective responses to the world and moral evaluations remains valuable.

In the end, these criticisms are small when compared to the rich fruitfulness of Wollheim’s work. His account of the emotions opens the door to a rich conversation between philosophy and psychology about the emotions that has, at least in the analytical tradition of philosophy, been a closed door.

The book is extremely demanding of its reader. It is a work of technical analytical philosophy, albeit practical rather than purely abstract. It will not have an immediate appeal to those primarily interested in a psychology of emotions. Although some will find its method too eclectic, those who take the trouble to follow Wollheim closely will find the book both satisfying and challenging.

James Sauer is Associate Professor of Philosophy, St. Mary’s University, San Antonia,Texas. He is author of Faithful Ethics According to John Calvin: The Teachability of the Heart (Edwin Mellen Press, 1997). He is co-editor of the journal Philosophy in the Contemporary World, and specializes in ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of social science. His articles have appeared in the Personalist Forum, Southwest Philosophy Review, Southwest Philosophical Studies, and the Journal of Social Economics among others.

Categories: Philosophical