This book concerns the question how one ought to live. And since the author takes it for granted, as he says (1), that what one ought to do is what one has most reason to do, it concerns as well practical reason, or reasons for action. His answer is effectively that one ought to do–that one has reason to do–that which a person of good character would do. It thus provides a virtue theoretical account of reasons for action.

The volume divides into four sections. An introduction sets the stage for the argument, distinguishing, inter alia, Setiya's virtue theoretical account of practical reason from other projects that have gone under the title 'virtue ethics'. The first chapter argues against the idea that one always acts under 'the guise of the good'. The key to the argument lies in the problem of explaining an apparent necessary fact about action. Setiya thinks that competing accounts do not do as well as his in providing such an explanation. The second chapter concerns the connection between virtue and practical reason. It includes an argument for the virtue theory that hinges on what Setiya calls 'the metaphysics of being good'. He suggests that only if one adopts a rationalist account of reasons for action can one draw a principled distinction between standards of practical reason and standards for good character. He then proceeds to argue in the rest of the chapter that the relevant form of ethical rationalism in indefensible. Finally, a short conclusion draws together some of the central themes of the book.

The book is very well-written, and is full of provocative arguments. Details aside, it makes a strong case for the general view that standards of practical reason, on the one hand, and standards of character, on the other, are not easily or obviously separable. I want to suggest, however, that there is a potentially serious problem for one key step in Setiya's argument. The aforementioned apparent necessary fact about action is what he calls Belief:

When someone is acting intentionally, there must be something he is doing intentionally, not merely trying to do, in the belief that he is doing it (26).

Setiya takes this to be a necessary fact about intentional action, and takes alternative approaches to the theory of action to task for failing to explain, or allow for, this. But I think that the thesis is not obviously true, much less necessarily true. In defense of the thesis, Setiya reasons as follows: When an agent φs intentionally, without the belief that he is doing so, there must yet be something he is doing with the goal of φ-ing, "where this something is an instance of intentional action in the paradigm sense that does involve belief, and where it is not just 'trying to φ' (25). Now this is not much more than a statement of the thesis, but it does give us an idea why it is thought to be plausible. I want to suggest that there are cases of intentional action that fail to accord with a natural interpretation of Belief.

On one standard view, to φ intentionally is for one's φ-ing to be caused, in the right sort of way, by a belief-desire pair. One wants something that can be gained by φ-ing, and believes that φ-ing is a way to obtain that thing. It therefore appears to be a sufficient condition for acting intentionally that one's action be caused, again in the right kind of way, by one's beliefs and desires. The problem is that this would appear to be possible in the absence even of the ability to form meta-level beliefs about what one is doing, such as are apparently required by the thesis in question. Pre-linguistic human children, and some higher mammals such as chimpanzees, seem to possess certain genuine beliefs and desires. Their actions–or 'activities', to use a non-question begging description–often seem to be caused by these mental states. This seems to me enough to show that they are acting intentionally, on the relevant occasions. Yet it is plausible in many or most of these cases that these creatures lack any beliefs about what they are doing. They may not possess the concept intentional action. The upshot is that one need not be able to form thoughts about what one is doing in order to act intentionally. And if this is so then it seems to follow that Belief is false. This is a problem for Setiya's project because, as I have indicated, he relies upon the fact that certain alternative accounts fail to explain the necessary truth of the thesis.

Action theory is arguably hyper-intellectualized. Mature, sophisticated human action is taken as the paradigm, or even as the only, sort of action. This view loses sight of the fact that the presence of necessary elements in intentional action does not require the kinds of abilities possessed by mature human adults. It loses sight of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic roots of intentional action in our animal natures. This is not, in itself, a problem particular to Setiya. It is a problem with action theory as a whole.

Setiya says in the preface that he always wanted to write a book. Despite the reservations I have expressed about one of his central lines of argument, I can say that it is good that he did. This is a book that will reward reflection by those interested in the topics of ethical theory, virtues, practical reason, and action theory.

© 2007 Brad Majors

Brad Majors is in the PhD program in Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

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Categories: Philosophical