"Folk psychology" refers to the ways in which normal people (the "folk") predict and explain each other's mental states. Currently debate rages over the method that folk psychology employs. The basic options are that we use a theory or that we use simulation. Commonly it is this case that we can use either theory or simulation to predict the future behavior of systems, and the difference between the two approaches is perhaps best illustrated via a non-mental, and oft-used, example. Suppose we are building a bridge and want to know whether our design will withstand the winds in a particular valley. We might work this out in either of two ways: We might use a theory, and using the laws of physics do various calculations to see if the bridge is strong enough. Or, we might use a simulation, and predict the behavior of the bridge by making a scale model and placing it in a wind tunnel. When we use a simulation to predict, we use a system that is analogous to the target system and reason that the two can be expected to behave similarly.

When it comes to folk psychology, or "mindreading" as Goldman prefers to call it, the debate really got going from 1986 onwards, following the publication of papers by Jane Heal and Robert Gordon who independently proposed that we a simulation-based method to predict and explain other's mental states. In the early debates the "simulationists" and their opponents — the "theory-theorists"- were clearly distinct: The simulationists claimed that we understand and predict other minds by simulating them. The theory-theorists disagreed and claimed that such predictions depend on theory — they claimed that we have a tacit understanding of laws that link various types of mental state, which we postulate as theoretical entities.

Since the early days, however, things have got complicated. Now, apart from the pure simulationists, and pure theory-theorists, many think we use both simulation and theory, and a minority think we use neither. In addition, a huge body of potentially relevant empirical work has built up. There are numerous studies on child development, and autism, and neuroimaging that might shed light on how it is that we can predict and explain others.

In Simulating Minds, Goldman seeks both to provide an overview of the debates about mindreading and relevant empirical findings, and also to develop his own brand of simulationism. In his reviews of the relevant literature, Goldman largely succeeds in the heroic feat on providing some order to the now voluminous literature. Chapters of the book set out the contemporary options: different varieties of simulationism, theory-theory and rationality theory are clearly reviewed and explained. Later sections of the book provide a comprehensive guide to the latest empirical findings that might be relevant to the debate. Readers who want to know about autism, or mirror neurons, or emotion perception can find succinct overviews and all the references they need in Goldman. My only slight disappointment with Simulating Minds, considered as an overview of the field, is that Goldman has comparatively little to say about versions of simulationism apart from his own. Goldman does such a great job at distinguishing the different types of theory-theorist, that I'd have liked him to have said more about how the different varieties of simulationism differ.

In addition to providing an overview of the debates, Goldman also spends a considerable amount of time developing his own version of simulationism. Chapters set out his account of both "low-level" simulation, which depends on mirror neurons and emotional contagion, and "higher-level" simulation, which relies on us consciously seeking to put ourselves in another's shoes. Here Goldman's account is extremely persuasive.

The book ends with chapters on mental state concepts and "The fabric of social life". Being unfamiliar with the literature on concepts, I found the chapter on mental state concepts hard to follow. The chapter on "The fabric of social life" is rather bitty — it moves all too quickly from important and much discussed topics such as the role that simulation can play in reading fiction, and in moral evaluation, to Goldman's thoughts about how simulationists can provide accounts of erotic arousal.

All in all, however, Goldman's Simulating Minds is an excellent book. The book is densely packed with reviews of debates and empirical findings. The level of detail is probably too great for the book to be of much use to undergraduate students or casual readers, but for postgraduates and academics working in the field Goldman's Simulating Minds will become required reading.

© 2007 Rachel Cooper

Rachel Cooper, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, Furness College, Lancaster University

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Categories: Philosophical, Psychology