There is no pressing need in at the moment for further theory in psychology. In addition, its bounty of empirical data is enormous with more coming everyday. Sorting through what data is commensurate with available theory may prove the most utility for psychologists or, as Thomas Kuhn might have said, psychology has matured to a stage wherein normal science can proceed. Normal science is a process wherein empirical studies are related to available theory in order to make an increasingly comprehensive tapestry representing the subject matter under investigation.  What is there for philosophers to do – beyond waiting for an opportunity to identify enough anomalies in current theory to set the stage for the next revolution in theory?

During a period of normal science philosophers continue to play a valuable role in specific scientific disciplines by doing as Wittgenstein advised and tidying up conceptual entanglements evident in current theory and in the presentation of empirical data. For example, all the data in the world when added to apparently robust theory about a topic such as knowledge acquisition cannot reveal much if couched in terms that are inherently ambiguous or that omit through definitional fiat, relevant matter. Such is the case with the concept of luck when considering what should count as knowledge or a case of knowledge acquisition.

In Epistemic Luck, Duncan Pritchard offers a wonderful example of what philosophers can do for psychology during this period of so-called normal science. Pritchard makes no attempt to denounce any theory of mind as inadequate nor does he propose any new theory. He does not make methodological recommendations as philosophers are wont to do in more revolutionary writings. But what he does is essential to progress in psychology (and philosophy) nonetheless.  Harkening to Wittgenstein it appears that the first order questions have all been asked, new empirical knowledge left to able scientists to uncover and all that is left is for philosophers to work on second order questions.  This is not a bad thing for there is much important work to do. As noted, in this latter capacity, philosophers produce no new knowledge, or at least it's fair to say no new empirical knowledge, that they leave to the scientists.  Nonetheless the scientist's conceptual warehouse has a tendency to get a bit untidy and it is up to the philosopher to tidy things up a bit, and this is just what Pritchard does with his work in Epistemic Luck.

I know of no empirical work that has been attempted on luck and that is no surprise. The word itself should send chills down the back of any researcher, since whatever "luck" is it has the potential to disturb a great deal of both theoretical and empirical work on knowledge acquisition.  The few other philosophers who have attempted work on luck, people such as Nicholas Rescher, Ernest Gettier, Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams are criticized legitimately criticized by Pritchard for treating the notion of luck as a primitive or reducing it to the related concepts of either chance or accident.  Pritchard shows why any such effort is bound to prove costly, distorting the comprehensive scope of intended research.

Luck as Pritchard explains it, cannot be written off as neither chance (unpredictable) nor accident (unpredicted or of indeterminate cause).  The former error is more likely in cases of more purely epistemic claims and the latter is often more compromising in cases of so called analogous claims involving moral luck.

Let's take epistemic claims first.  Psychologists want to know when a person may legitimately be said to know some X. Evidence that a person now possesses X in her cognitive repertoire does not by itself explain whether the possession of X counts as knowledge for that person. Getting a right answer by chance through a Ouija  game makes the answer no less and no more right. However, getting a right answer in such a manner certainly raises serious questions about the reliability of procedures for knowledge acquisition. And there is yet more to consider. Good fortune in acquiring knowledge in this fashion is a certainly a matter of chance but only if the answer truly matters to the possessor do we say the good fortune truly represents good luck.  But how does the researcher factor in luck when trying to understand knowledge acquisition?

Obviously, the first step in giving an account of luck in epistemic matters should begin with a clear definition of luck. This is something one rarely comes across. In fact this reader cannot ever recall coming across such a definition until reading Pritchard! For example, as Pritchard ably points out, just factoring for chance occurrences doesn't grasp the fact that what matters to people in chance encounters is not chance alone but chance that affects them in important ways. By chance, Louis Pasteur used old anthrax and to his good fortune came to realize the affect on cattle was significant. Those envious of Pasteur denounced him for just being the benefactor of good luck. But Pasteur countered importantly that serendipity leads to success only in the presence of a prepared mind. In other words, chance alone doesn't account for the development of knowledge even when the chance occurrence is truly identical with a truth of the world.

The concept of knowing has a long and rugged history and even today so much is left unsettled.  Classical theorists try to construct an account of know around objective principles of justification, evidence and the truth of X.  Virtue accounts of knowledge that are so much in vogue today try to account for knowledge in terms of practices and good-faith efforts to identify suitable constructions for distinguishing knowledge claims from other sorts of claims.  Pritchard, after establishing an account of epistemic luck in sections 5.1 and 5.2 of his book points out that even in the most recent virtue or constructivist accounts of knowing apprehending when the person has fully exercised her epistemic virtues that alone cannot fully determine if the person has knowledge. Obviously, the concept of knowledge must also be addressed. But Pritchard's point is that it cannot be addressed in absence of considerations about luck in addition to more traditional considerations.  Certainly if this is the case it raises serious questions about what can be learned from much psychological research into knowledge acquisition beyond simple memory studies.

There is great satisfaction in Epistemic Luck for the reader who enjoys being awe struck by his own predilection to overlook something very fundamental in an area of study close to his heart. Finishing Pritchard one is bound to feel a bit like the character Lucy in the television show I Love Lucy, hearing Ricky's admonition, "Lucy…we have some work to do!"

© 2007 Paul A. Wagner

Paul A. Wagner, Ph.D., Professor, Philosophy, University of Houston — Clear Lake, Houston, Texas

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Categories: Philosophical