Psychology is the specialized area of inquiry into the mental life and activities of humans and animals. Psychology was part of philosophy until the mid nineteenth century when psychologists began to consider their research findings as part of the data of empirical science. The philosophy of psychology is concerned with the examination of how psychologists conduct their studies, what conclusions are reached by them, and how they justify those conclusions. While most books on the philosophy of psychology deal primarily with cognitive psychology or cognitive science, William O’Donohue and Richard F. Kitchener offer a collection of essays which also investigate pre-scientific or “folk” psychology, discuss issues in the clinical practice of psychology—especially psychoanalysis and rational emotive therapy, and examine the morals and ethics of psychology. Furthermore, these essays are both descriptive and normative. That is, their authors offer various accounts of contemporary theories, research activities, and clinical practices in psychology as well as arguments concerning what ought to constitute theory, research, and practice in future.

The book is divided into five parts. The first part, entitled “Epistemology, psychology of Science, and the Foundation of Psychology” covers such topics as naturalism, rationality, social epistemology, and genetic epistemology. At first glance, these topics may seem somewhat daunting, but O’Donohue and Kitchener’s introduction to this section is very helpful to the reader trying to come to grips with the technical terminology. Although all the essays in this section are very readable, I found Brown’s “Psychology, Naturalized Epistemology, and Rationality” and Fuller’s “Social Epistemology and Psychology” especially informative about the so-called foundational issues in both philosophy and psychology.

Part 2 is entitled “Behaviorism, Psychology, and Philosophy.” Max Hocutt’s clearly written essay “Behaviorism as Opposition to Cartesianism” puts the oft-maligned school of behaviorism into historical perspective both in relation to Cartesianism (the separation of mind and brain into two interdependent entities) and “New Cartesianism” (that mind is only material brain matter). Also noteworthy in this section is Chapter 8, Kitchener’s essay “Skinner’s Theory of Theories.” In it he discusses the six different senses of the term “theory” that Skinner employed in discussing his approach to psychology, and the difficulties one may encounter in attempting to counter Skinner’s naturalistic accounts (known as psychologism) with philosophical arguments. A challenging counter-point to this chapter are the five separate essays which comprise Chapter 17. This chapter is headed “‘Folk Psychology’ and its Implications for Psychological Science.” Here the various authors discuss issues that are very important in our New Age oriented western society, such as whether folk theories and folk psychology can stand up under the scrutiny of good science, and whether they have anything to offer scientific psychology.

Anyone interested in artificial intelligence and computer programming will no doubt find the first chapter of the third part thought provoking. Part 3 is entitled “Cognitive Science and Psychology” and begins with the chapter “Computational Theories of Cognition.” Not only does the author, Herbert A. Simon, deal with computer-like conceptions and descriptions of the functioning of the human mind, he also discusses how research in human cognition has brought technology closer to overcoming what are often considered limiting factors to computer “thinking” such as intuition, insight, and creativity. Delving deeper into human biology, the essay “Neurobehavioral Science, Neuropsychology, and the Philosophy of Mind” by Karl H. Primbram discusses the latest developments in both theory and research regarding the interaction between the various functions of the mind and the brain, including that illusive quality known as consciousness that was for so long attributed mainly to humans. Another function of the mind that was, until very recently, considered to be an exclusively human biological function is emotional reactions. In the not-too-distant past many cognitive scientists believed that an emotion was simply a biological reflex to some external stimulus. In the sixteenth chapter Aaron Ben-Ze’ev discusses what the majority of philosophers and psychologists today hold to be the most plausible theory of the emotions: that a typical emotion has a cognitive and evaluative core.

One of the recent developments in philosophy is the advent of philosophical counseling. Philosophers working in this field of “clinical philosophy” have been raising the kind of issues that are raised in Part 4 of this volume, titled “Clinical Psychology and Philosophy.” Edward Erwin’s essay “The Value of Psychoanalytic Therapy: A Question of Standards” as well as the essay “What is an Irrational Belief? Rational-Emotive Therapy and Accounts of Rationality” by William O’Donohue and Jason S. Vass both raise a number of important issues regarding their respective approaches to clinical psychology. Unfortunately, while each is critical of psychotherapy as practiced, both essays come to rather bland conclusions. For example, O’Donohue and Vass, after their extensive criticism of Albert Ellis’ attempt at a theory of rationality, and after admitting that “an attempt to develop an adequate account of epistemology and rationality is a very difficult task,” simply end with the somewhat timid, “It is hoped that a more adequate account of rationality can further aid the development of this valuable approach to therapy.” A more courageous philosophical approach would have been to not only criticize but offer a more plausible alternative to that which was criticized.

The final part is entitled “Ethics and Psychology.” In the essay “The Formation and Transformation of Values” Hugh Lacey and Barry Schwartz discuss the various meanings given to the term “values” and their implications for psychological investigation. One thing that seems to have lost a considerable amount of its value in North America in recent years is psychotherapy. In the essay entitled “Prescriptions for Responsible Psychiatry” Joseph Agassi offers a number of suggestions as to what may be done not only to regain the public’s trust in the profession but to make the profession itself more responsible. The final chapters offer the kind of information that is standard fare for most biomedical and even business ethics texts, namely discussions of the concepts of patient autonomy, informed consent, and the foundations of a reasonable professional code of ethics.

While most of the essays are fairly clear, they are not all easy to read. The authors employ an extensive variety of technical terms and some authors presume a certain level of philosophical sophistication in their readers. A few authors also employ a somewhat ponderously academic style. One essay I find especially troubling is Chapter 18 entitled “Is Psychoanalysis Viable?” by Adolf Grünbaum. It reads like one of those unnecessarily convoluted polemics you can find in any specialized academic journal. The author has written in response to other authors who have previously written in response to his previous responses, and so on ad infinitum. On pages 283 and 284 the reader will find Grünbaum disagreeing with Geller who is quoting Grünbaum who is disagreeing with Popper for criticizing Freud who is quoted by Geller while quoting Grünbaum (if I have it all correct). This leaves the reader feeling as though there is a private correspondence going on within an “in-group” of writers, where the reader is only allowed to read one message at the most recent end of the “thread.” I think it’s completely unnecessary for a good writer to employ this kind of near incomprehensible “cascade effect” of responses and counter-responses of other writers to make his point.

Furthermore, while Grünbaum’s essay is only six pages long, the Endnotes section fills another three and a half pages. They contain so much detailed information and argument that they could have been published as separate essay. Again, it is not uncommon to find such an unwieldy amount of verbiage in the endnotes of specialized academic papers (in this same volume, C.A. Hooker also presents a ludicrously long list of endnotes—six pages), but it is out of place in a book which is offered to students and other interested parties as “a comprehensive overview of the key topics and current discussions” in the field. The editors should have stepped in.

As a final note, two points: (1) I like the fact that this book has fifteen pages of detailed index. It is exceptionally rare—but very welcome—to find an index in an anthology of essays. This makes the discrete information in each of the essays in this volume readily accessible; and (2) Out of thirty-four authors listed only two are women. Considering the number of essays that have been written on feminine and feminist epistemology, ethics, and philosophy, it is puzzling why the editors didn’t offer their readers a few more essays written from the female perspective.

Categories: Philosophical