Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology is a collection of papers, most of which were originally written for a conference on the same theme held in Copenhagen, Denmark in June 2006. One helpful feature of the volume, which stems from its origins, is that each chapter comes with a commentary written by one of the other authors included in the collection. Not only does such expert criticism help the reader to get the most from the individual papers but it helps make explicit links between the various chapters of the book.

The bulk of the collection deals with issues of causation and explanation.  There are chapters on these topics by Sandra Mitchell, Kenneth Schaffner, Dominic Murphy, James Woodward, and John Campbell. Shorter sections deal with phenomenology — with chapters by Josef Parnas and Louis Sass, and Shaun Gallagher — and with nosology — with chapters by Peter Zachar, and Kenneth Kendler.

The collection is marketed as being suitable for mental health professionals interested in philosophy. An introduction by Kenneth Kendler seeks to give a overview of the philosophical foundations of psychiatric practice, and brief introductions to each chapter written by the editors seek to make the papers accessible. The editor's introductions are helpful, but I think that the collection as a whole will be of more use to professional philosophers than to those with a mental health background. The papers are philosophically sophisticated but also tough going.

The section on explanation and causation is especially strong (and long) and includes much that will be of interest to philosophers concerned with mental causation and explanation. Papers by Sandra Mitchell and by Kenneth Schaffner highlight the complexity of the causal pathways that will be important in understanding mental disorder. By the end of these chapters the prospects for traditional reductionist-style explanations in psychiatry look bleak. Dominic Murphy accepts that understanding mental disorders is a complex matter, but suggests that we can make headway by seeking to model exemplars of mental disorders. Successful models will incorporate causal pathways at different levels.  James Woodward shows how his "interventionist" perspective on causation can help dissolve traditional worries about the possibility of mental causation. For Woodward, any variable that can be reliably manipulated in order to control another counts as a cause. This means that mental causes can count as causes like any other causes, and that finding a physical mechanism which can act as a conduit for causal influences is unnecessary. John Campbell's chapter reinforces the call for a rejection of mechanistic accounts of causation.

All these chapters are strong and will be of interest to philosophers. However, unlike the editors I do not think that they provide a fair overview of current work on causation in philosophy of science. The editors conclude that one thing we can learn from "contemporary philosophy is a less mechanism–bound view of causation" (p390). However, mechanistic views of causation are alive and well within philosophy of science, and are currently being developed by a number of researchers including, for example, Jon Williamson at Kent.  What's more the proponents of mechanistic accounts frequently see them as being especially useful for thinking about causation in medicine and psychology (and, thus by implication in psychiatry as well).  The views on causation presented in Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology represent only one type of account that philosophers are currently developing alongside others.

The sections on Phenomenology and Nosology are much shorter. In the phenomenology section a chapter by Josef Parnas and Louis Sass  presents a nice overview of the aims of the phenomenological study of mental disorder. A chapter by Shaun Gallagher critiques experiments that have been conducted on feelings of agency and free will.

In the final section, on nosology, Peter Zachar has a clear and thoughtful chapter on whether there might be natural kinds in psychiatry. Zachar argues that, on an appropriately modest understanding, we can hope to find "real kinds" of mental disorder. A final chapter by Zachar and Kendler concludes by offering sensible guidelines for classificatory projects in psychiatry.

All in all Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology is a good collection of papers. However, it will be of most interest to specialists in the area of philosophy of psychiatry (and to philosophers of mind and psychology) rather than to a broader audience.

© 2009 Rachel Cooper

Rachel Cooper, Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Furness College, Lancaster University

Keywords: philosophy, psychiatry