This book is published in Palgrave Macmillan’s Philosophy Today series, which is supposed to provide researchers and advanced students of philosophy with an introduction to contemporary discussions in specific subfields of philosophy. In this case, the subfield in question is philosophy of action as it is carried out within analytic philosophy. Lilian O’Brien’s focus here is philosophical work concerned with our everyday “folk” understanding of agency and intentional action. There is little discussion of empirical work on action, intention or decision-making.

It is a refreshingly short book. The nine chapters span no more than 172 pages and deal with a wide range of topics. The first four chapters, however, are focused on the question that is–as O’Brien puts it–at the book’s center, namely: What is the nature of intentional action? After a brief informal discussion of ways in which intentional action can be distinguished from mere bodily movement in the first introductory chapter, the reductive causal theory of action and a non-reductive teleological alternative is presented in chapter 2. On the reductive causal theory, actions are intentional in virtue of being caused and coordinated in the right way by certain mental states such as belief-desire pairs or intentions. But according to the non-reductionist alternative that O’Brien discusses, the purposive nature of intentional actions cannot be reduced in this way to causal control by mental states. In chapter 3, O’Brien turns to volitionism and trying theories of intentional action, according which primitive acts of willing or trying must somehow be involved in an intentional action. Finally, in chapter 4, the view that intentional action is to be equated with acting for reasons is discussed. In this chapter, arguments for and against internalist and externalist views about reasons for action are also presented.

In these first four chapters, O’Brien also touches one the question of how we should individuate and count actions (when I turn on the light at home by flipping the switch and thereby alert the burglar of my presence, am I merely performing one action that can be described in at least three ways, or am I performing at least three different actions?), as well as the question of what sort of “thing” an action is–an irreducible event, a property-instantiation, or a relation of some sort? O’Brien wants to remain neutral on these metaphysical questions. But with respect to the question of what the nature of intentional action is, she is clearly favoring a causal theory of action, although perhaps not a reductionist one (see p. 21). She argues that an agent who acts on an intention to do something has undertaken to perform a task and evaluates himself with respect to his completion of this task. To form intentions and perform intentional actions, on O’Brien’s view, an agent therefore has to have the capacity to represent himself as himself. (Her view is not fully presented in any one place in the book, but is rather revealed at various places throughout it, e.g. at pp. 7, 37, 109-110, 113-116, 140, 143-144.)

In chapters 5-9, O’Brien leaves the core topic of the nature of intentional action and instead discusses a number of further but sometimes closely related issues. In chapter 5, she consider issues raised by what we might think of as some non-paradigmatic cases of intentional action: some side-effects of intended actions, mental actions, as well habitual and skillful behaviors which aren’t explicitly intended by the agent but which nevertheless reflects her competence. Chapter 6 deals with different views on the nature of action explanation are presented and contrasted. In chapter 7, O’Brien discusses shortcomings of the belief-desire model of rational agency, the differences between desiring and intending (here O’Brien draws on the work of Michael Bratman and Alfred Mele), as well as the nature of the rational requirements that intentions seem to impose on agents. Chapter 8 is concerned with self-control, autonomous agency and free will. The book ends with a discussion of different types of possible agents in chapter 9, where this includes a discussion of the possibility of groups of individuals forming group-level agents that perform their own intentional actions.

It should be evident from this outline of the contents that the book covers a great range of issues, introducing readers to many questions and concerns that occupy contemporary philosophers of action. The chapters often provide crisp overviews of important topics that will be useful to philosophers who are new to the philosophy of action in particular. I think this is especially true of the discussion of causalism in chapter 2, the presentation of internalism and externalism about reasons for action in chapter 4, and the discussion of self-control and autonomy in chapter 8. The treatment of some topics is fairly superficial though (as O’Brien herself acknowledges). This is unavoidable given the book’s length, but I suspect that the book would have benefited from a somewhat more narrow focus and a fuller treatment of the question at the book’s center. For example, the discussion of different kinds of agents in chapter 9 strikes me as quite peripheral and only loosely connected to the rest of the book. At the same time, “for reasons of space”, O’Brien barely touches on the view associated with Elisabeth Anscombe and others that intentional action essentially is a manifestation of the agent’s self-knowledge (the exception is a description of David Velleman’s self-knowledge view of intention on p. 113). However, I think a discussion of such views would have given the reader a somewhat better grasp of the range of answers given the question of what the nature of intentional action is.

This is not to detract from the fact that this is a quick enjoyable read, clearly and concisely written. It gives the reader a taste of some of many fascinating issues that are being explored in contemporary philosophy of action.  A reader who is looking for more detail and in-depth discussion can consult a comprehensive companion or handbook (such as Wiley-Blackwell’s A Companion to the Philosophy of Action for example) or pick up the suggested readings with which O’Brien ends each of the book’s chapters.

© 2017 Olle Blomberg

Olle Blomberg, Postdoc, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen