Happiness is a modern obsession. Its pursuit was elevated by the American Declaration of Independence to the dignity of one of humanity’s most important rights, and by the utilitarians to the status of the single criterion whereby morality was to be governed. But its value for philosophy and politics has been limited by the fact that until recently we have been forced to rely upon introspection and anecdotal evidence for our assessments of the best means whereby it could be promoted.

Research on subjective well-being (SWB) is intended to fill this gap. SWB is not simply happiness–it includes a sense of fulfillment and purpose, personal growth, and so on, as well as pleasant emotions and the absence of unpleasant ones-but it provides us with a quantifiable measure of life-satisfaction. It thereby provides the raw material for answering importance questions about the promotion of welfare. Can money buy happiness, after all? We might be able to answer this question by measuring the SWB of the wealthy, and the results might prove useful to us when it comes to making decisions about resource allocation.

The present volume, which contains contributions by most of the important figures in this emerging field, takes the investigation of SWB into the cross-cultural sphere. It asks whether SWB differs from culture to culture, and, if so, what explains these differences. It aims thereby to give us criteria by which to judge the success of societies. It might be, for example, that a large measure of inequality might be correlated with a lower level of SWB in a society. If this were the case, it would make us more confident in advocating changes in that culture’s social structure. Measuring SWB might thus help settle the extent to which we all share a universal human nature, and it might limit the extent to which cultural relativism seems plausible.

The results reported here are often fascinating. It emerges from this research that SWB does indeed vary dramatically across the world. The typical American reports a much higher level of well-being than does the typical resident of the former Soviet Union, with most of the nations of the world falling somewhere in-between. Of course, this raw data only becomes useful if it can be explained; if, for example, SWB can be shown to correlate with political and social conditions. The vast bulk of this work is taken up with attempting to establish such correlations.

One of the most interesting findings to emerge from analysis of the data concerns the relation between SWB and income. In general, income is positively correlated with SWB, as one would expect. But above a certain level, the link is broken. Thus an increase in wealth from mere subsistence to economic security significantly increases SWB, but an increase above that level has little effect upon it.

What accounts for this phenomenon? Several suggestions are advanced by different contributors to the volume. One suggestion is that income is only a significant predictor of SWB up till the level at which basic needs are met, and above that has no impact on well-being. Another suggestion is that above a certain income level, people’s expectations rise as or more rapidly than does their income, so a sharp rise in GDP does no more than keep pace with expectations. One might also point to the success of the advertising industry in wealthy countries in stimulating demands for ever newer and more expensive consumer goods.

These findings are suggestive, but we must be careful before we conclude that SWB has indeed given us a method judging between societies. In some cases, at least, the data lends itself to divergent interpretations. Several of the authors claim, for example, that individualism correlates with a higher level of SWB. This seems intuitively plausible: as Triandis suggests in his contribution, individualist cultures permit their members more social mobility, and thus allow them to find roles which are suited to their personalities. But a quite different interpretation of the same phenomenon is offered by Suh. Given the importance placed on happiness in individualist countries, Suh suggests, and the link perceived to exist between it and individual effort, the members of individualistic cultures are strongly motivated to report that they are happy. Moreover, since happiness in these cultures is conceived of as the extent to which individuals meet criteria which they settle upon for themselves, much greater scope exists for them to interpret their experiences selectively. Americans, for example, are able to view themselves as above average in many spheres of their lives, because they can reinterpret the meaning of the ability being measured to suit themselves. Thus an American might describe herself as being of above average intelligence because she has better mathematical skills than her peers, whereas others might downplay their lack of mathematical ability and regard themselves as of above average intelligence due to their linguistic abilities.

In contrast, Suh suggests, East Asians will assess themselves in relation to external, and therefore more objective, standards. Rather than ask "how well do I meet my own standards," the East Asian will ask "How am I viewed by others?" Hence, they have much less scope for selective interpretation of the evidence. This might provide an explanation for the lower reported SWB of East Asians, Suh suggests.

If this interpretation is correct, we ought to notice, one of the goals of the cross-cultural comparison of SWB turns out to be much more difficult to achieve than most people (including Suh himself, if one is able to judge by the introduction to this volume) realize. For if reports of SWB reflect the extent to which the standards that measure it are manipulable by agents, then it significantly decreases the importance of SWB itself as a goal. Unless we value happiness no matter how it is brought about-by drugs or, as in this case, by a process somewhat akin to self-deception, for example-we have no grounds for saying that one society is better than another simply because its average level of SWB is higher. Thus, the extent to which SWB will help us overcome cultural relativism is significantly diminished. This conclusion is reinforced by the finding that East Asians value happiness less highly than do members of more individualistic cultures.

Much more research remains to be done, therefore, before we can be confident that SWB gives us a cross-culturally valid means for judging the success of a society. That this volume marks an important step toward that goal is, however, beyond doubt.

© Neil Levy

Dr Neil Levy is a fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University, Australia. He is the author of two mongraphs and over a dozen articles and book chapters on Continental philosophy, ethics and political philosophy. He is currently writing a book on moral relativism.

Categories: Philosophical, General