The advances of neuroscience in the last twenty years have been far-reaching. These advances raise questions for both medicine, and ethics, and may also hold solutions to problems in philosophy of the mind. In Mapping The Mind, Rita Carter offers an accessible exploration of these questions. The book is designed to appeal to those who want the “broad-brush strokes” of neuroscience combined with the latest neuroscience research (p. 6). The book is full of intriguing factoids, real-life thought experiments, and scientific curiosities. While the layout of the book is that of a textbook, complete with pictures and short articles by various authors (some of which are better than others), Carter’s writing approach is non-technical. Her prose style is one that might be expected from a popular work that combines psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy.

Carter points out that there are surprisingly few (if any) popular works dealing with the social and philosophical import of modern neuroscience. Mapping The Mind is meant to be just this sort of book. Her expressed purpose is to point out some of the social implications of modern neuroscience, and use neuroscience to bear on some classic problems in the philosophy of mind. I will examine her success in achieving these two purposes.

The social implications of neuroscience, to which Carter points, can be thought of as twofold: first, she hypothesizes about the sociological implications of potential technological advancements from neuroscience; second, she makes general ethical comments concerning issues that, in her judgment, originate from neuroscience. An example of the first is her conjecture of genetic engineering of brains better suited for the modern world (p. 64).  Such comments tend to leave readers with more questions than answers about the implications of neuroscience, though admittedly, this may be Carter’s intent. Concerning her more straightforward ethical comments, it becomes unfortunately all too obvious that she has ventured beyond her area of competence. Carter tends to make immense leaps from the natural to the normative. Examples abound; in one such instance, after inadequately stipulating that romantic love is merely sexual desire (p. 68), she concludes: “romantic love is a chemically induced form of madness and a terrible basis for social organization as the divorce rate in the Western world demonstrates” (p. 76). It is doubtful that a single book, much less, a single sentence, could support her sweeping claims.

Mapping The Mind is, however, much more productive and insightful when Carter remains in her own area of specialization: neuroscience and its medical applications. Carter explains the neurological basis for a number of problems. Most are familiar examples such as phantom limbs, Phinaes Gage, and face blindness. Chapter six and seven are the strongest chapters of the book in which Carter explains, among other things, Asperger’s syndrome and problems with memory. Such chapters may be of interest to those concerned with mental disorders.

Regarding philosophical debates, Carter is most interested in the age-old mind-body problem. Carter clearly favors a physicalist solution to this problem. She explains that there are essentially two positions one may adopt with regard to the relation of the mind and body. The first position holds that the mind is the product of brain activity; philosophers call this position “physicalism.” The second position holds that the mind is some non-physical substance; Cartesian dualism is the best-known version of this position. The final chapter of the book might be considered its climax. In this chapter, Carter argues that modern neuroscience “suggests that consciousness emerges from the activity of the cerebral cortex” (p. 181). Unfortunately, Carter misunderstands the debate between the dualists and physicalists. She seems to think that she has undercut the basis for dualism by offering examples in which a particular brain state causes a particular mental state. She does not seem to take into account that, in fact, dualists are happy to admit causation between the mental and the physical. Rather, the puzzle for the dualist is to explain how this kind of causation works. Furthermore, Carter seems oblivious to the debates between non-dualists as to which physicalist theory to adopt.

The book’s greatest problem is that Carter equivocates between folk psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. A major question in philosophy of mind asks how our folk psychology (the way we typically talk of the mental with words like ‘belief,’ ‘desire,’ ‘pain’ etc.) and neuroscience will fit together. Carter seems to think there will be a smooth connection. She willingly bites almost any bullet associated with her stance. For example, from the premise that exactly the same neurons do not fire in each instance of a certain kind of experience, Carter concludes that we never experience exactly the same thing twice. Here there seems to be a tacit allegiance to a strong type-type reduction. That is, Carter seems to assume that a certain type of mental state must be equivalent to a certain type of brain state. While some might be willing to accept that we never experience exactly the same thing twice, most philosophers of mind reject this kind of naïve type-type identity.

Mapping The Brain might be a better title for this book, especially if Carter cut down the philosophical, ethical, and social aspects of the book, which are generally poorly handled. Carter’s treatment of the social ramifications of modern neuroscience frequently appear to be quickly tacked on at the end of her pop-science discourse. Her treatment of philosophical issues is, at best, naïve.  However, Carter certainly introduces some interesting and perplexing puzzles through a number of her scientific examples, and this book may retain some import for those interested in exploring the connections between mind and brain. 

© 2011 Joshua Mugg

Joshua Mugg is a PhD candidate at York University in philosophy. He specializes in metaphysics (especially dispositionality) and its application to the philosophy of mind. He may be contacted by email at joshuamugg@gmail.com, and you may find him on academia.edu.