In the opening section of the book, “Acknowledgements”, the author Anne Phillips, states that the book content is mainly a result of a healthy discussion, with her students, during a course in Feminist Political Studies, focused on prostitution and surrogacy, that took place at LSE (The London School of Economics and Political Science). During the course, Phillips adds: “I […] gradually overcame my initial preference, which was to declare these difficult issues and sit on the fence.” (p.vii) Having read Phillips’ book, I am not certain if the author has fully overcame her initial preference.

         The book is about “markets, bodies, and property” (p.1) and while presenting these topics, and the way they interrelate, the thesis is that “framing bodily rights as property rights is not the way forward.” (p.14) Philips starts by addressing ‘what’s so special about the body’ (Ch.1), then focusing the following three chapters on rape, surrogacy, and body parts (Ch.2–4), closing with a fifth chapter.

         The author starts by attempting to untangle the concepts of ‘object’, ‘commodity’ and ‘item of property’, that are usually attached to an understanding of ‘body as property’ (ownership of one’s own body) claiming that these may not necessarily appear in a link, even to those who favor a discourse of ‘ownership of one’s own body’ ie. one can defend that one owns his/her own body but that his/her body is not an object. The perversion of the discourse that lies on an understanding of the ‘body as property’ (in the context of markets), according to Phillips, is the way it relates with choice.

Is one that declares to own his/her own body always in the best circumstances to actually choose, and therefore justify, what he/she decides to do with it? No. Therefore, one of Phillips’ critiques, e.g. in cases of alleged rape, is that a lot of times, the difficulty in proving that a rape took place, happens because the evidence that is taken is only physical, making the body the only valid proof. In feminist theories, the body and soul have no distinction and the violation is both physical and psychological. How can the ‘body as property’ discourse be of help in these situations? One may own his/her body but how can this help to assess the soul’s scaring or a situation where the alleged victim is somehow coerced or a situation where one does not find herself/himself in the best circumstances to exert her/his agency? 

In the case of surrogacy: can someone with no agency (no capacity to choose), feel coerced to choose to use her own body as a commodity by necessity (legitimized to do so on the moral discourse of ‘body as property’)? Yes. In what does that discourse help those women who act out of necessity, in maintaining their rights throughout the process? According to Phillips, it does not and that is why bodily rights as property rights assists and moralizes their commodification. (p.41) The same applies to the commercialization of body parts.  

A discourse grounded on ‘body as property’ constrains the making of social policy. (p.137) The concept of equality is frequently referred to, in order to prove that an understanding of ‘body as property’, fails to make an effective link between equality (between all existing bodies) and society, in the sense that to legitimize an individual choice (a lot of times with no agency) reveals itself as prejudicial to society, as a whole. And the ‘body as property’ discourse is precisely what allows the link between choice and agency, whether there is agency or not. This is the discourse’s perverse aspect that Phillips aims to denounce, while asserting its social cost. The author defends that a discourse based on ‘bodily integrity’, instead of one based on property, can, not only defend better the one abused, or the one who has “chosen” to go into the market, but also to have less harmful effects on society. This is not developed as a real alternative though, and that is why I consider that the author barely passed the fence but, in due fairness, to offer an alternative was never stated as one of the book’s goal.

My remarks on Phillips’ book can be easily summed up:

1) The first chapter, appears to me as being devoid of philosophical references that, if used, would allow the author to frame much more firmly the subject she is addressing; references to Locke, Hegel, Kant and Marx are made but are flimsy. (E.g. a reference to Gabriel Marcel and his distinction on ‘being a body’ and ‘having a body’ could have been very useful to securely frame the subject.)

2) The author herself does not clearly states the grey area in which the book stands, failing to contextualize it (which distorts the reader’s expectations, by making them higher). It presents itself as grounded on feminist theories but that only covers the angle it takes and not the area it aims to cover.  The subject it addresses is complex, yes, but why? Because the area it is covering lays between the pre-moral and the post-ethical. I.e. ‘I have a body’ and when considered individually, the matter seems to be ethical (I orient my body according my own principles); but if I consider that my body is one among many and that many others have a body, then the matter is moral, and therefore, it relates with common principles, established as a shared moral ie. as law. The book aims to claim that a link between ethics and moral, grounded on ‘body as property’, while useful to legitimize one’s own ethical principles, can easily lead to moral illegitimacy, i.e. Illegality.

3) Taking the book a feminist angle, it is ironic to find that most examples used throughout the book, are women and that most authors quoted, are women. As if rape, surrogacy and, commerce of body parts takes place in a world where there are no men involved. (E.g. concerning rape, except once, women are exclusively referred to.)

Medicine and technological advances will continue to make this book’s subject growingly relevant. But is this book relevant to the subject? Due to the three remarks I have made previously I hesitate. To the extent where the author aims to go (to claim the ‘body as property’ discourse as socially ineffective and counter-productive), though I agree, I do not find in it, strong arguments that sustain the position. Still, Phillips is an experienced scholar, in the field of Political and Gender Theory, and it is therefore possible that stronger arguments can be found among her extensive literature.

© 2014 Diana Soeiro

Diana Soeiro. Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Philosophy at NOVA Institute of Philosophy /IFILNOVA at Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal). Updated information: www.linkedin.com/in/DianaSoeiro