The popular and academic discussion of empathy has seen a steady expansion in recent years and it is not uncommon to read about the close connection between empathy and moral motivation, understanding or behavior. However, the exact relationship between empathy and morality is often not carefully explored, and controversial questions and assumptions remain unaddressed. Empathy and Morality (OUP, 2014) is a stimulating collection of papers that sheds further light on this important topic. The volume will be accessible to an educated audience, but will be of primary interest to academic researchers engaged in the study of empathy.

The discussion is helpfully framed by Heidi Maibom’s introductory survey of the philosophical, psychological and neuroscientific literature on empathy. She proposes a general account of affective empathy: one empathizes with the emotion of another (in a particular situation) if one comes to experience that emotion as a result of believing, perceiving or imagining being in that situation. This is distinguished from sympathy (also referred to as ’empathic concern’) where one comes to feel sad (or happy) for the other as a result of believing that something bad (or good) has happened to them. These broad distinctions are largely accepted by the other contributors in this volume.

Each of the authors approaches the general theme differently, but empathy could be related to morality and moral behavior in a number ways. The papers in this volume fall into one of two general categories. Empathy might serve some role in: (i) moral judgment, reasoning or understanding, or (ii) the motivation of moral behavior. Maibom outlines both historical and contemporary versions of these claims, as well as complications with the conceptual accounts of ‘morality’ that are employed in such discussions. First, let’s consider the relationship between empathy and moral judgment, reasoning or understanding.   

I

There is a long-standing historical tradition which holds that moral judgments are in part constituted by our sentimental responses. Drawing on the work of David Hume and Adam Smith, Antti Kauppinen presents a novel account of moral judgment, arguing that our ideally-regulated, empathic reactive attitudes (like resentment or gratitude) serve a foundational role in both explaining and justifying our core moral judgments. Kauppinen further argues that this account has theoretical advantages over other sentimentalist accounts of moral judgment proposed by Michael Slote, Shaun Nichols and Jesse Prinz. Those interested in meta-ethics and moral psychology will find Kauppinen’s neo-sentimentalist theory of moral judgment interesting and provocative.

          Shifting from meta-ethics to moral psychology, Abigail Marsh approaches the topic of moral reasoning by examining the moral deficits found in individuals with psychopathy. Marsh draws attention to the fact that psychopaths have notable difficulties experiencing fear, and they suffer from similar deficits in their ability to respond to the fear of others. She concludes that our empathic responses to the distress of others (in particular, to fear) are necessary for at least some subset of moral reasoning. A related form of argument is developed by Giuseppe Ugazio, Jasminka Majdandzic and Claus Lamm. After developing a careful conceptual account of ’empathy’ and ‘morality,’ they argue that empathy plays an important epistemic function in moral deliberation, giving us an additional source of information about other individuals. However, they are careful to note (as a number of authors in the volume do) that nothing about engaging in empathy with others will produce the best moral results.

          The connection between psychological capacities and moral behavior is also explored by R. Peter Hobson & Jessica Hobson. They argue that the diminished theory-of-mind abilities of autistic children result from their inability to subjectively identify-with others. They explore the concept of identifying-with, arguing that identifying-with is neither strictly a ‘theory-theory’ nor a ‘simulationist’ account of other minds. Given the present theoretical discussions in theory of mind, it would it would be illuminating for these authors to contrast their view with existing hybrid theories.

          Changing the focus to non-humans, Kristin Andrews & Lori Gruen examine the nature of empathy in other apes. They note that while apes may lack the higher-order ability to reason impartially about themselves in relation to others, they have a number of related capacities. Apes are sensitive to the perspectives of other apes and appear to understand agency and intention. There is also some evidence that they act in accordance with general social norms. Andrews & Gruen argue that by overly focusing on the standard view of morality (which requires reasoning about moral norms), we can overlook the deeper continuities between human and ape moral behavior.  

II

The second general theme of this volume is the relationship between empathy, sympathy, and moral behavior. Tracy L. Spinrad & Nancy Eisenberg outline the development of empathy and empathic behaviors in children, explaining the links between empathy and social competence and pro-social behavior. Of particular interest here is their attention to newer research which locates the development of various empathic capacities earlier in development than was previously held.

Following this developmental approach, Martin L. Hoffman outlines his well-known model of empathy, alongside a detailed account of empathic over-arousal, which is sometimes referred to as ‘personal distress.’ In these cases, an individual can be empathically overwhelmed with the distress of the other. Drawing on historical and legal case studies, Hoffman argues that empathic distress (and anger) can motivate powerful social change, particularly in challenging unjust laws, and in encouraging legislation where it is lacking.        

Another area where empathy may be related to moral improvement is outlined by Tony Ward & Russil Durrant in their discussion of empathy and the rehabilitation of sexual offenders. Often sexual offenders lack sensitivity to the mental states of others, and tools like writing autobiographies of past victims play a role in helping offenders better understand how their behavior affects others. Ward & Durrant argue that rehabilitation should focus on ‘altruism failure’ (failure to modify behavior in light of its effect on others) and should incorporate broadly empathic skills to correct this failure. 

While there are reasons to think that empathic concern (sympathy) for an individual in need can cause pro-social behavior, C. Daniel Batson argues that we should be careful to note that there is no necessary connection between empathic concern and specifically moralbehavior (understood as behavior in accordance with moral norms or principles).  This is because feeling empathic concern for another can lead individuals to violate moral norms of fairness and justice.

Even if empathy is limited in various ways, K. Richard Garrett & George Graham argue that empathy ought to be at the ‘center of our moral lives.’ While empathy appears to be prone to tribalism and local bias, they argue that it is feasible to develop an empathetic response for all living persons. It would be useful for the authors to develop these arguments further, particularly what we recognize when we understand what is best for the other empathetically.

          Finally, Douglas Hollan presents a challenging discussion of the concept of ’empathy’ across cultures. While there is some overlap with similar concepts in other cultures (empathy as ‘compassion-pity-love’), not all cultures share the standard account of empathy often discussed in Western academic settings. One implication that Hollan draws from this research is that our notions and practices of intersubjectivity may be more socially situated than is sometimes recognized.

Overall, the discussions in Empathy and Morality are rich and diverse. The reader will be left with a clearer account of the complicated relationship between empathy and morality. While the details of this relationship will depend on the features of empathy (and morality) under discussion, these authors seem to agree that while empathy can contribute to better moral reasoning, understanding or behavior, it does not necessarily produce these qualities.

 

 

© 2015 David Schwan

 

David Schwan, Bowling Green State University,