Moral Psychology: Volume IV

Full Title: Moral Psychology: Volume IV: Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Author / Editor: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Editor)
Publisher: MIT Press, 2014

 

Review © Metapsychology Vol. 19, No. 21
Reviewer: Christopher M. Caldwell, Ph.D.

Moral Psychology is the fourth in a series of books concerning moral judgments. This volume focuses upon issues surrounding moral responsibility and free will. The issues surrounding free will and moral responsibility need to be investigated in light of new scientific work by neuroscientists and psychologists. Sinnott-Armstrong opens the volume with a clear introduction which fulfills three important functions. First, the introduction provides a clear discussion of why this volume is needed in light of these new discoveries in empirical science. Second, the introduction provides a clear introduction into the traditional understanding of the difficulties surrounding free will and moral responsibility. Finally, the introduction provides some very helpful overview of the entire volume through concise discussions of the issues discussed in each section of the text. By the end of the introduction the reader has a clear view of what the book is hoping to accomplish and how the book is organized.

          The book is organized around 10 articles. Each article addresses a specific issue concerning the topic. After each article there are two responses to the article which each provide critiques and analyses of the initial article. Finally, the author, or authors, provide replies to the various responses the initial article. The organization allows the reader to read only the articles that one is interested in or to read the book not in the order it is organized. However, the order of organization does lend itself to reading straight through as the opening section and closing sections are certainly nicely placed.

          The volume attempts to bring science and philosophy together by looking at the evidence for positions such as determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism, epiphenomenalism, etc. One of the virtues of the book is the area covered in these 10 exchanges. Since there are so many voices, there is a wide terrain covered. Such a wide range of coverage does make the book challenging to the reader. There is no single style or approach, thus the reader must be mindful of the changes as the book proceeds. The book is quite technical both in terms of the topics discussed and the approaches taken. Ultimately, the book is attempting to bring together science and philosophy and does so successfully. However, readers should know that this complicated task centered around some complicated issues yields a book that is often challenging and complex.

          The terrain covered in this volume focuses upon the traditional issues as viewed by both philosophy and the biosciences. However, non-traditional issues are also utilized to attempt to shed some light upon these traditional issues. For example, in “Evolutionary Insights into the Nature of Choice: Evidence from Nonhuman Primates” Ellen E. Furlong and Laurie R. Santos explore the role of situational influences upon the decisions made by nonhuman primates in attempt to show that these influences have a greater affect upon the decision-making of the nonhuman primates, and to humans by extension, than one may think. Another non-traditional issue is taken up in “A Social Perspective on Debates about Free Will” by Victoria K. Lee and Lasana T. Harris. Lee and Harris discuss the role of group formation by individuals in forging inherent social conflict in manner that hinders interdisciplinary intellectual exploration of the free will debate itself. The article concludes by connecting the discussion to how aspects of such group dynamics is influencing the debate in manner that favors determinism. Thus, such non-traditional issues are connected straightforwardly to some of the central issues of the free will debate.

          Ultimately, this volume should be of interest to philosophers, neuroscientists, and psychologists. Brian Hare states that the topic of free will “traditionally has not lent itself to empirical study from an evolutionary perspective.” (Pg. 361) This volume successfully brings together some of the new work which is closing this gap and classical, and non-classical, philosophical issues surrounding the notion of free will.

 

© 2015 Christopher M. Caldwell

 

Christopher M. Caldwell, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Chair of the Dept. of History and Philosophy, Virginia State University