Jason Stanley is a philosopher working in the fields of formal semantics, philosophy and language and analytic epistemology. In this book, he gives a convincing attempt at using analytic tools pertaining to those three areas in order to contribute to the theory of ideology. He is not the first in doing so. And he accordingly acknowledges his debt to the works of Rae Langton, on silencing and subordinating speech (especially in pornography) and Elizabeth Fricker on epistemic authority.

Though the explicit topic is propaganda, the book is also and mainly based on a worrying diagnosis about the real situation of our so-called “liberal democracies”. The study case is the state of ideology and power in the United States of America. But anyone confronted to the rise of demagoguery and populism in a democracy other than the States, will surely find Stanley’s work useful and relevant.

The book is intended at a general audience, and Stanley is concerned with explaining basically philosophical concepts. But I must say that, without some basic knowledge in analytic philosophy, some parts of the book are somewhat difficult to grasp, especially in chapter 4 and 6. Nowadays, one may understand the whole point and appreciate it without this basic knowledge in analytic philosophy. Numerous and various examples, and a vivid tone help to make the reading a very enjoyable one. I learned a lot of things. It is full of interesting references in history, linguistics, philosophy, literature. Stanley is a very good writer and  an awesome philosopher. It is so rich, convincing and knowledgeable, that this book is one of those that you could recommend to anyone.

Stanley’s point is twofold. On the one hand, he’s providing an analysis of the concept of propaganda, and he is encapsulating a kind of propaganda which is, according to him, especially problematic for democracies. He claims, too, that a propagandistic message of this sort is accepted only, provided that some sort of “flawed ideology” has been accepted. On the other hand, according to Stanley, it is highly probable that “large and unjust distribution of goods will lead those that are its beneficiaries to adopt a flawed ideology” (p.228), therefore, the efficiency of propaganda of the sort which is Stanley’s analysis target, is enhanced by a social predicament where social inequalities are the rule and not the exception.

From the author’s standpoint, once the frontiers of the topic are settled by distinguishing it from an inquiry about the essence of democratic values (chapter 1), and once propaganda is defined (Chapter 2), two kinds of analyses are needed. The first one focuses on the mechanisms underlying the efficiency of propagandistic utterances, concepts and terms (chapters 3 and 4). The second one is about the way flawed ideologies (without which propagandistic utterances would not work) are a joint product of an effort of the elites to legitimate their leading position and of an acceptance by the negatively privileged group of this ideology (chapters 5, 6 and 7).

Stanley’s historical and political point seems to be that the United States of America’s liberal democracy is corrupted by a deep link between racism against African-American citizens on the one hand and the legitimization of inequalities by the elites. The myth which helped to legitimize slavery is still efficient. Of course, words changed. For mentalities are evolving. But even neutral words may have the effect of eroding the cognitive empathy toward a group. In the chapter 4, Stanley gives a very interesting analysis of the linguistic mechanisms making it possible that some neutral words as “welfare” work as slurs, eroding the empathy toward African-American citizens.

Prejudices are deep-seated (Black people as violent and lazy people), and make the bed for demagoguery. The trouble is that this predicament is self-strengthening and self-comforting. For citizens of the groups targeted by propaganda lose their capacity to fight for their rights: “the problem flawed ideological belief poses for negatively privileged groups is that it prevents them from acting to overcome the injustices they face” (p.249), but it hinders positively privileged groups to be really (in the kantian sense) autonomous, for “the false ideology of the elite group leads to members of the elite group acting against their own ethical interests” (p.266).

Even if Stanley’s tone and conclusion are not too optimistic, there are nowadays several examples where ideology was subverted by the dominated to promote their right to participate in the rational democratic discussion and decisions: paradigmatically, Martin Luther King and the Selma to Montgomery March (p.113): “The Selma to Montgomery March is a paradigm case of democratically acceptable propaganda: manipulation of the media to draw attention and empathy to the predicament of an otherwise invisible group”.

The author concludes (p.294): “…I have sketched the mechanism by which the subversion of democratic ideals occurs. It is my hope, which by no means rise to the arrogance of expectation, that this book will play some positive role in its prevention.” In my opinion, if Stanley’s book does not succeed in playing that sort of positive role, I don’t see who may succeed in doing so. This is a very important book.

© 2015 Christophe Al-Saleh

Christophe Al-Saleh, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Picardy, Amiens, France