Stephen E. Braude has been researching exotic–and some would say ‘controversial’–domains of human behavior and mental phenomena for well over three decades. While the bulk of his work has focused upon issues in parapsychological (or ‘psi’) research, he has also made significant contributions to several other areas of inquiry including most prominently the topic of dissociative identity disorder (formerly: multiple personality disorder), and he has been cited extensively for such work in Tim Bayne’s 2010 The Unity of Consciousness. In the present climate of the philosophy of mind–a discipline dominated by one or another form of reductive materialism, and quick to scoff at and dismiss anything that appears to have slightest connection to the paranormal, often without so much as a passing glance at the relevant evidence–Braude’s courage and integrity is commendable. Without a doubt, Braude remains one of the most serious and knowledgeable philosophers in this area. His approach to the evidence is one of even-handedness in an otherwise hostile sea of shouting denouncement (from so-called skeptics) or insufficiently critical theorizing (by proponents of psi phenomena). Braude’s latest is a compilation of expanded and updated earlier essays along with some new entries spanning various topics which are unified by the fact that they all have some bearing upon or relevance to research in parapsychology. While some of these articles are quite accessible, several are more sophisticated and would likely require an advanced undergraduate degree level of skill, or at least a careful reading supplemented by some self-guided research into new or specialized areas of theorizing.  

His first chapter focuses on memory trace theory and argues that it is a confused and ultimately nonsensical approach to explaining human memory. To begin with, Braude identifies a foundational problem for cognitive science in general: namely, that it is committed to a narrow and mechanistic conception of human thought and behavior that, if not outright false, is clearly incomplete at best. A result of the ubiquity of this mechanistic view is that researchers tend to focus only on how memory traces might be implemented at the level of neuronal functioning, rather than question whether the notion of a memory trace is one that makes any sense to begin with. In very rough outline, memory traces require persisting internal structural modifications or encoding at the level of the brain. These traces are produced by acquaintance with particular facts or objects and later activated in instances of remembering. Despite how appealing such a view might appear to be on the surface, and no matter what a memory trace is presumed to be composed of, it turns out to be an impossible object according to Braude, because the theory requires that memory traces perform roles that in fact nothing can fulfill.

In the second chapter, Braude provides what amounts to a fatal critique of Sheldrake’s A New Science of Life. In short, a significant fault of Sheldrake’s characterization of formative causation and morphic resonance is that it tacitly relies upon the same sort of inadequate mechanistic thinking, for which it was developed as an alternative. Indeed, Sheldrake’s reliance upon essences or kinds of morphogenetic fields to explain certain organic phenomena makes it vulnerable to the same sort of critique that was leveled at memory trace theory in the previous chapter. Additionally, absent a plausible (or possible) mechanism of operation, there simply does not appear to be any value in proposing the existence of such fields–i.e. they explain nothing beyond the mere existence of the organic facts for which they are evoked. Braude indirectly makes a strong argument here for the value of philosophical critique and conceptual clarity in the sciences.

The next chapter is a new essay wherein Braude provides a defense of folk psychology by first challenging a dominant alternative to folk psychological explanation called inner-cause theory (ICT). Psychological explanation, in order to be scientific, must both explain why an individual acted in one way rather than another and be able to predict how the individual will act in the future under different conditions. Many cognitive scientists maintain that these two explanatory roles are met when an inner cause and an outer behavior are subsumed under a general law. But Braude argues that genuine and informative psychological explanation need not be law-like and that behavior is not explained by pinpointing supposed inner causes. At the heart of the failure of ICT, for Braude, is again a reliance upon a mechanistic view of human thought and behavior that turns out to be untenable. In this case, the representationalist view of mind that ICT (and cognitive science in general) relies upon is exposed as incapable of making sense of even rather basic social phenomena such as how we interpret a comment to be either made jokingly or as a form of passive aggression. This is a stand-out chapter that merits widespread attention and makes a strong case for the superiority of folk psychological explanation over the currently dominant reductive view.

The next two chapters center upon dissociative identity disorder (DID). In the first, extended consideration is given to the creativity expressed in cases of DID in order to maintain a profoundly dissociated state within intolerable (or at least non-supportive) circumstances. The second examines the question of the moral responsibility of a multiple for one or another of their alters. Traditionally, most philosophical treatments of multiple personality have tended to focus upon an understanding of personal identity or the nature of persons, but Braude maintains that these concerns can be bracketed while we attempt to determine the more practically pressing issue of whether or not a multiple should be held responsible for the actions of their alters. This chapter provides an interesting and sustained examination of an issue that has not received much attention yet; it will be of value to moral philosophers, psychotherapists, and legal theorists.

Chapter six focuses on the nature and extent of human abilities both generally and in more exotic cases like DID, hypnotism, savantism, prodigies, and the parapsychological data. In this chapter, Braude provides some constructive criticism to the field of parapsychology in general and to the area of survival studies in particular. Despite its brief treatment here, this chapter is likely to be of great value to those who study psi phenomena and are interested in the theoretical difficulties that arise when a thorough appreciation of the implications of various exotic phenomena are held concurrently (e.g. as concerns the survival vs. super-psi interpretation of mediumship).

In chapter seven, Braude speculates on the potential reach of both conscious and non-conscious forms of psi phenomena. In particular, he considers whether we may in fact be responsible for punishing ourselves for bad behavior via psychic means (e.g. by psychically and unconsciously setting ourselves up for various negative experiences in order to atone for the bad behavior). He also considers psi as a potential means of naturalistically explaining the occasional efficacy of prayer.

In his final chapter, Braude shares his experience about the uglier side of academia, the sorts of extreme bias he has encountered, as well as some advice to other researchers in the field and people interested in beginning to study psi phenomena. This is a frank and honest account of his experience, and a message for anyone else courageous enough to follow the path begun by other thick-skinned researchers. Along the way, Braude exposes the sleazy tactics deployed by critics of psi phenomena, enough to reveal their dishonesty and agenda-driven stances.

This book is of great value not only because it provides several impressive challenges to dominant models of mind but also because Braude is self-critical with respect to his major field of interest. It will be a rewarding read for anyone with a sincere interest in the topics covered.

© 2017 Brandon D. C. Fenton

Brandon D. C. Fenton Ph. D. 2017