In The meaning of evil, James Sias takes the reader on a journey that overviews the meaning and use of the word evil. This journey, however, is not an easy or simple one. The polythetic dimensions that comprise the meaning and use of the word evil force his scholarly investigation not only to be multilayered and detail-oriented, but also to incorporate, in a rich tapestry of facts, conventions of daily use and theoretical speculations.

The diverse contexts where the word evil is exercised, which represent its complex and imprecise meanings, require the author to distinguish carefully between improper and proper practices. For instance, he cites the incorrect use of the word to express one’s disparagement and dissatisfaction towards political opponents and their views. In this sense, evil has an undesirable expressive value equivalent to that of a slur. The author then reminds his reader of the practice of referring to an incomprehensible entity as evil if causing the suffering of others is both a means and an end in itself (denotation of pure evil), or the practice of referring to evil as the opposite of good (metaphysical connotation). Although both uses of the term evil may appear proper, or at least sensible practices, the author skillfully and relentlessly underscores their fuzziness, limitations, and resulting contradictions. For instance, he notes that if evil is used in a metaphysical sense to refer to anything that is bad, its meaning must unavoidably include a broad range of occurrences, all involving suffering, but varying considerably in magnitude and agency. Namely, the term evil will be thought not only to apply to moral wrongdoings, such as genocide, but also to include natural phenomena, such as natural disasters, and even unpretentious ailments, such as headaches. According to Sias, common sense dictates that an acceptable definition of the word evil, albeit complex, be capable of distinguishing between moral and non-moral causes of suffering, including the former (e.g., genocide) and excluding the latter (e.g. natural disasters). Furthermore, for the selected definition to be acceptable, the defining phrase must integrate the immoral quality of the action, its magnitude, and agent. Namely, the phrase must distinguish between actions that are morally wrong and those that are evil, as well as be capable of identifying people who are not merely bad or immoral, but evil.

The author’s narrative is an exemplary exercise of his critical thinking skills. He states that his approach to evidence is driven by the scientific method. Accordingly, data arise from a fact-based and detailed examination of notorious, real-life cases of human evil. Such cases are painstakingly examined for their similarities and differences so that their main features are magnified in an unmistakable lucidity of expression. In another substantial section of the narrative, the author’s intent seems to be that of clarifying existing interpretations of evil based on known theories as well as highlighting their limitations and inconsistencies. Sias distinguishes between evildoer and evil person to remind the reader that a person who performs an evil deed may be fundamentally different from someone who is the sort of person who performs such deeds. This distinction is then used to support his view of an evil person as an individual who possesses moral disregard for others and of evil action as a behavior that shows moral disregard for others.

Sias’s view, according to which the determinant of evil is moral disregard, appears to clash with the main tenet of situational theories. Simply stated, the latter assume that evil actions, but not evil people exist, and that situations that lead people to commit such actions are the motivating factor. Evidence from a countless number of studies involving phenomena of social influence, such as conformity, compliance, and obedience, supports Zimbardo (2007)’s viewpoint that environmental forces (i.e., the situation) are the culprit. At this point Sias’s determination to demonstrate that human evil exists emerges undeterred by the vagueness of the linguistic boundaries that he attempts to draw. Language “is ‘a veil’ over the reality of the culture in which it is used, involving an agreement of its users about what there is to be seen and how it should be seen” (Kim, 1988, p. 89). Although information the author weights and integrates into his developing definition of evil is filtered through, and thus shaped by his determination to identify the defining characteristics of evil, the words used still represent a veil covering a mysterious statute on a windy day. Namely, the definition is something that appears to escape him every time he tells the reader he has reached it, while, at the same time, the wind reveals unforeseen aspects of the statute. The reader follows the author in this allegedly erratic dance until the very end when the statute is fully revealed by a forceful weather phenomenon.

Reasonable to conclude then is that the veil obscures the existence of a compromise between the author’s view that evil results from moral disregard for others and Zimbardo’s view that the situation is the culprit. Indeed, careful analysis of the data of experiments on social influence, irrespective of the nature of the actions studied, points to individual differences in people’s susceptibility and thus responses to social influence. Indeed, even in Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment, not all guards were equally abusive. However, if individual differences exist in the extent to which people exhibit moral disregard for others, how do some come to embrace such an undesirable disposition so completely? Can exposure to a specific set of circumstances, at a certain time in one’s life, lead the person to become an evildoer and perhaps embrace the role to such an extent to become an evil person? If so, what are the distinguishing properties of such circumstances above and beyond those that have been discussed in the scholarly literature?  What are the changes in brain functioning that reflect the likely impact of situational determinants? Clearly, the author’s careful analysis of the differences and similarities of a variety of key case studies has been unable to find a common set of situational determinantsfor all evil doers. Yet, under the umbrella of the scientific method, a null hypothesis can be rejected, but can never be disproven. Thus, reasonable to propose is that more investigative work must be accomplished in the area of developmental neuroscience to understand the banality (i.e., shallowness/ deliberate thoughtlessness) of evil, especially the sort of evil that Arendt (1963) attributed to Eichmann before his execution. If moral disregard for others pertains to a diverse array of infamous evildoers and is the defining trait of evil, what are the defining attributes of its source(s)? A sequel to The meaning of evil, which remains, in and of itself, a remarkable piece of scholarly work, may be necessary to uncover the basic properties of the conditions that generate moral disregard for others. If a decision is made to explore such conditions, through empirical studies and critical analyses, those who are now familiar with the author’s work will certainly be the first wanting to read his next manuscript.

© 2017 Maura Pilotti

Maura Pilotti, PhD