With The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious, Paul Katsafanas focuses attention on Friedrich Nietzsche’s remark that “‘psychology shall be recognized as the queen of the sciences'” because “psychology ‘is once again the path to the fundamental problems'” (1).[1] Fascinated by Nietzsche’s claim, Katsafanas asks: “What are these ‘fundamental problems’ that psychology helps us to answer? How exactly does psychology bear on philosophy?” (1). The problems running through and engaged by Nietzsche’s philosophical thought, Katsafanas observes, give the reader clues to understand his elevated claims for psychology. Certainly, one important recurrent theme in Nietzsche’s work, as his readers can attest, is ethics; however, “the central task of ethics,” Katsafanas writes, is to determine “what it is to live well” (1). Nietzsche, according to this reading, “wants to understand how ethical claims are justified, how evaluative and normative claims structure human life, what possibilities and dangers lurk in them, and, more generally, what the possibilities for human flourishing are” (1). The question, then, is: “How might psychology be relevant for these problems?” (1). If the tradition of moral philosophy holds, Katsafanas asserts, that “the central task of ethics is to specify what it is to flourish, to live well,” then what it means for human beings not merely to exist but to flourish requires an examination of “human nature” which is “inextricably intertwined” with such topics as “the good life” and “goodness more generally” (1). Hence, ethical theory must grow out of an accurate explanation of human nature.

To be sure, the tradition has embraced the idea that an understanding of human flourishing requires an understanding of human nature. The ethical thought of the ancients—Plato and Aristotle, for instance—emphasizes the importance of an understanding of human nature; this is also true for the “British sentimentalist tradition” and here Katsafanas names Shaftesbury, Hutchenson, and Hume (1). These thinkers all agree that human nature must be examined because “morality rests on “other directed emotions” (1). Plato initiates his discussion of “the good life” through an examination of “the tripartite structure of the soul,” while Aristotle considers “the distinctive function of human beings” to determine “what it is to live well” (1). David Hume proposes “to ‘examine’ human nature ‘in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behavior'” (1-2).[2] Since Nietzsche wants to develop “an accurate picture of human nature and use it to specify a conception of human flourishing,” Katsafanas places him squarely in this tradition (2). Psychology, then, is relevant to an understanding of fundamental human problems because ethical theory requires an understanding of human flourishing and human nature.

Nietzsche’s claim “that psychology shall once again be the path to the fundamental problems” suggests that while psychology once was a way of addressing ethical problems, this is no longer the case (2). Nietzsche, Katsafanas argues, holds this view for two reasons. First, Nietzsche argues that psychology has been forced to serve morality (2). In Beyond Good Evil, for example, Katsafanas observes that, according to Nietzsche, if one wants to “‘explain how the most abstruse metaphysical claims of a philosopher really came about,'” one should “‘ask first: at what morality does all this … aim?'”;[3] and further on in the same text, he writes: “‘All psychology so far has got stuck in moral prejudices and fears; it has not dared to descend into the depths'” (2).[4] Hence, Katsafanas understands Nietzsche to be calling for “greater honesty about human psychology”; instead of allowing “our convictions and intuitions about morality shape our reflections on human nature,” we must attempt “an unprejudiced account, letting it take us where it will” (2). If this means that an accurate account of human nature and human flourishing contradicts our longheld ethical and moral principles, then we must revise or give up our cherished ethical theories.

Second, Nietzsche holds the view that “eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers” have given up grounding “morality in an account of human nature” (2). While “Plato, Aristotle, and the British sentimentalists” are mistaken “because they had inadequate, morality-laden conceptions of human nature, Kant and Bentham are far worse” for both reject any attempt to base their ethical or moral theories on an account of human nature (2). As an example, Katsafanas cites Kant’s Groundwork:

The basis of [moral] obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conception of pure reason … Thus not only are moral laws with their principles essentially distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part. When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws a priori to him as a rational being. (Groundwork 4:389)[5]

Kant, then, distinguishes empirical knowledge, derived from experience, from moral philosophy that attempts to ground ethics in an account of a priori principles derived from human reason. In other words, and this is the important point, since Kant grounds ethics in an account of a priori principles, he does not attempt to derive ethics from an understanding of human nature; for Kant, any discussion of human nature would belong to philosophical anthropology.

Kant’s influence in this regard is also evidenced in the work of such contemporary thinkers as Barbara Herman, Michael Smith, and Russ Shafer-Landau. For Herman morality is not found in an account of human nature, but “‘… requires an a priori foundation'” that only originates in “‘the principles of pure practical reason: the Moral Law. … the ground of obligation must <be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason>'”; hence, “‘the Moral Law applies to human beings with necessity'” (2).[6] Similarly, Smith claims that almost everyone agrees: “‘moral knowledge is relatively a priori'” (3).[7] Shafer-Landau echoes these sentiments, insisting that “‘ethical evidence is different in kind from the sort we find in the natural sciences'” (3).[8] However, since these individuals—Herman, Smith, and Shafer-Landau—follow Kant in assuming “that ethics is unconstrained by facts about human nature,” they conclude “that Plato, Aristotle and the sentimentalists” are mistaken in assuming that ethical inquiry requires an understanding of human nature (3). While others—and here Katsafanas is thinking of Frances Kamm and Derek Parfit—may not reject human nature out right, they “tend to ignore” any discussion of it (3). Since Kamm and Parfit accept the Kantian distinction between science which deals with empirical fact and ethics which necessarily, according to this line of interpretation, draws its principles from a priori principles, a discussion of human nature is unnecessary. Parfit, for example, argues that “‘there is a deep distinction between all natural facts and irreducibly normative reason—involving facts'”; if Parfit is correct, Katsafanas claims, an account of “human nature” would be superfluous (3).[9]

According to Katsafanas, Nietzsche, however, rejects these approaches to ethics. While Nietzsche’s interpretation of human nature may not “answer the fundamental problems of ethics,” Katsafanas believes that “it will be a significant step in that direction” (4). Hence, to understand Nietzsche’s elevated claims for psychology Katsafanas intends “to explicate and assess Nietzsche’s account of human nature” (4). Still, any account of human nature will require an examination of many other topics that are presently understood “under the rubric of moral psychology” (4). By “moral psychology,” Katsafanas means “the study of human nature, especially the aspects of human nature that are relevant for assessing the justificatory status of normative claims and determining what happens when people act on the basis of these claims” (4). Here Katsafanas follows Parfit’s distinction between human beings and other animals. While other animals neither comprehend, nor respond to reasons and while they cannot control the future of their own lives or the life of the planet, humans “‘can understand and respond to reasons. These abilities have given us great knowledge, and power to control the future of life on Earth'” (4).[10] In other words, humans are capable of a different kind of agency for “we can self-consciously reflect on the considerations in favor of various courses of action, consider how these courses of action relate to the values, commitments, and projects that we embrace, and … actuate ourselves on the basis of these self-conscious thoughts” (4). “Moral psychology,” then, examines “the processes and capacities involved in this kind of action” (4). While he does not provide the reader with an exhaustive list, Katsafanas identifies the six following topics that moral philosophy must address, and, he notes, these are precisely the issues that concern Nietzsche:

(1)  Reflective vs. unreflective action: in light of the fact that some human action involves the deployment of self-conscious thought and deliberation, whereas other action does not, we can ask whether there is a significant difference between reflective and unreflective action. Is reflection merely superadded to a stream of behavior, or does it make a philosophically significant difference?

(2)  The action / mere behavior distinction: relatedly, might there be a significant distinction between genuine or full-fledged action and its lesser relative, mere behavior? …

(3)  Valuing and making evaluative judgments: How do evaluative judgments manifest themselves and impact actions? More generally, what’s involved in having a value? Does valuing something differ from merely desiring it, and if so how?

(4)  Motivation: more generally, we need to investigate the structure of human motivation: How do drives, desires, urges, whims, emotions, feelings, thoughts, habits, character traits, and so on interact in the production of action?

(5)  Freedom: What sense can be given to the notion of freedom or autonomy? … Is there a coherent conception of freedom?

(6)  Responsibility: we typically distinguish between events for which we are responsible and those for which we are not. How is this distinction to be drawn? Does it line up with any of the aforementioned distinctions? … (4-5)

Thus, when Nietzsche claims that psychology will once again allow us to understand the fundamental human problems, he means that psychology “will reorient our approach to these topics” (6).

One line of scholarship holds that Nietzsche rejects any theoretical discussion of ethical problems and does not develop his own positive account; even if he does sometimes offer a positive account, these passages often contain contradictions or contradict other passages in his work. Katsafanas, however, rejects this reading and he contends “that these appearances are deceptive”; indeed, a close reading of Nietzsche’s moral philosophy will reveal a positive ethical teaching “that is insightful and challenging”; however, as he himself admits, his approach to Nietzsche’s moral philosophy faces an “interpretive obstacle” involving how one understands the conception of ‘system’ in Nietzsche’s work (7). Some of Nietzsche’s readers have assumed that since Nietzsche rejects any system whatsoever, he “lacks any positive account of moral psychology” (7). Katsafanas, however, demurs; instead, he turns to Bernard Reginster, who argues that when Nietzsche rails against philosophical systems the object of his critique is the systematic philosophies of Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling.[11] Nietzsche rejects the attempts of these “post-Kantian” thinkers who attempted “to develop an all-encompassing account of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics by deducing or deriving it from a single starting point …”; Katsafanas though intends “to demonstrate” that Nietzsche “does not reject … sustained inquiry into a connected set of topics” (7). According to Katsafanas, then, Nietzsche’s “accounts of the conscious / unconscious distinction, human motivation, the will, agency, self, and freedom are inextricably intertwined”; indeed, any discussion of anyone of these topics without considering the others will lead to “a hodgepodge of dubious and seemingly inconsistent assertions” (7). Katsafanas’ goal “is to untangle these threads, revealing the force of Nietzsche’s account and critically assessing its philosophical import” (7). Hence, Katsafanas intends to develop an accurate reading of Nietzsche’s positive ethical thought by selecting and “piecing … together” his thoughts on specific topics, such as the unconscious, consciousness, drives, values, the will, freedom, and the self—all topics emerging from his moral psychology (7).

In this respect, Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche’s work and his ‘piecing together’ a coherent understanding of Nietzsche’s ethics reminds one of Karl Jasper’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy. “The Interpretative study of Nietzsche’s thinking,” Jasper writes “always requires the gathering together of all utterances that relate to a given topic.” [12] Additionally, to his credit, Katsafanas does not read or interpret Nietzsche through his unpublished notes. Although he does occasionally refer to the notes, Katsafanas supports his interpretation of the Nietzschean self through a careful and thoughtful reading of the published works.

Katsafanas not only summarizes his discussion of Nietzsche’s conception of agency, but he also wants to explain “how it differs from and improves upon the Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian alternatives” (13). Katsafanas lists four advantages of the Nietzschean account of agency:

1) Nietzsche’s account is “more psychologically realistic” since it fits “with empirical results about human psychology and action.” (13)

2) Nietzsche’s account explains “the ways in which unconscious processes play a signal role in human action.” (13)

3) Nietzsche’s account “avoids philosophical problems concerning the locus of agency, without committing itself to an exaggerated role for reflective thought. (13)

4) Nietzsche’s account “frees itself from the often unnoticed moral assumptions that infect so many previous attempts to offer philosophical psychologies.” (13)

Katsafanas notes that most philosophers have emphasized the importance of consciousness. Beginning with Descartes who states: “there cannot ‘be any thought in us of which … we are not conscious,'”[13] Katsafanas offers the reader a brief overview of the way in which consciousness has been treated by various thinkers in the history of philosophy (14). He points to John Locke, for example, who writes: “‘consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other things'”;[14] hence, Katsafanas holds, “consciousness” for Locke, “determines our identity” (14). Hegel elevates consciousness even more, arguing that “[w]orld history” attains its zenith “with the emergence of self-conscious creatures who self-consciously recognize the nature of self-consciousness”; thus, thinkers “from Descartes to Hegel” have emphasized the importance of consciousness in one way or another (14). Kierkegaard, Katsafanas claims, captures this way of understanding consciousness, when he writes: “‘Generally speaking, consciousness—that is, self-consciousness—is decisive with regard to the self. The more consciousness, the more self; the more consciousness, the more will; the more will, the more self””(14).[15]

Nietzsche’s understanding of consciousness is opposed to the view found here for he holds that consciousness is “intermittent, unimportant, dangerous, superficial, and falsifying” (14). First, according to Katsafanas, Nietzsche approves of Leibniz’s claim that consciousness is intermittent. In the Gay Science, for example, he writes:

Leibniz’s incomparable insight … that consciousness is merely an accidens of representation [Vorstellung] and not its necessary and essential attribute; that, in other words, what we call consciousness constitutes only one state of our spiritual and psychic world … and not by any means the whole of it. (15)[16]

Again, in the Gay Science, Nietzsche criticizes the “‘ridiculous overestimation’ of consciousness; … consciousness is only something with various ‘intermittences’ and gaps” (15).[17]

Furthermore, while many thinkers have argued that “‘consciousness constitutes the essence of man, what is enduring, eternal, ultimate, and most primary in him! …,'”[18] Nietzsche, in contrast to thinkers like Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard, maintains “that consciousness is ‘basically superfluous,’ for ‘all of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in the mirror; and still today, the predominant part of our lives actually unfolds without this mirroring'” (15).[19] Indeed, “‘states of consciousness … are (as every psychologist knows) trivial matters of fifth rate importance'” (15).[20] And again in the Gay Science, Nietzsche writes, consciousness can even be “‘a danger to the organism'” (15).[21] Consciousness is not a sign of the superiority of human beings; instead, “it is a potentially damaging regression” (16). According to Katsafanas, then, for Nietzsche “all conscious states are merely articulations or expressions of underlying unconscious processes. Every conscious mental state is ‘only a certain behavior of the drives towards one another,’[22] and ‘thinking is only a relation between these drives'” (15).[23] Nietzsche even sees “‘… the development of consciousness, <spirit,> as a symptom of precisely the relative imperfection of the organism … we deny that anything can be made perfect as long as it is still being made conscious'” (15).[24]

Katsafanas’s third and final point is that for Nietzsche “consciousness is necessarily superficial and falsifying” (16). We are only conscious of “a surface-and sign-world, a world generalized and made common” (16).[25] Consciousness simplifies everything; indeed, in one note, Nietzsche calls it a “‘simplifying apparatus'”[26]; thus, “consciousness ‘involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialzation, and generalization'” (16).[27] This point is related to the previous one for consciousness is a danger precisely because it is superficial; attention to the surface may lead to important details being ignored—details that, being ignored, could endanger the organism. At the same time, if action is not instinctual or automatic, and if an action were mediated by conscious thought, then organisms with consciousness would tend to be slower to react; this, too, might endanger them.

Katsafanas provides a brief history of the concept of the unconscious, distinguishing two models of the unconscious. According to the first model, the unconscious underlies consciousness and the former provides material for the latter. He notes that while most readers may assume the unconscious first appeared with the writings of Sigmund Freud, there were others who were concerned with it prior to Freud, although, he claims, these thinkers were not always referring to the same exact thing with the term. Here, he refers to Eduard von Hartmann, Hermann von Helmholtz, and the Romantics. Hartmann, for example, employs the term ‘unconscious’ “to explain teleology by uniting representation and will”;