This book introduces the reader to the life-long work of Nicholas Maxwell on the metaphysics of science and its implications for the broader issues relating to academic enterprise and global problems threatening humanity. The book has three parts.

In part 1, a solution to the mind-body problem or more generally the human world/physical universe problem is proposed. The problem is this: physics describes the world as fundamentally composed from particles and fields whereas we experience a totally different world of perceptual qualities such as colors, sounds and smells. So, it seems there is a kind of clash between the physical description of the world and the common sense description of the world as we experience it. Which description is true? Maxwell answer is: both. He justifies this response in the following way. Physics describes the causally efficacious aspect of things i.e. those properties of things that at any instant necessarily determine what happens in the next instant. And for this necessary connection between successive states of affairs to hold, we have to resort to an essentialisitic interpretation of the relevant physical theories. That is, the supposed entities of the physical theory have dispositional or necessitating physical properties and the laws of the theory express the dispositional character of these properties. Thus, the physical laws are analytic statements. According to this picture, physics describes those properties and only those that are relevant for the prediction of successive events. And this predictive task of physics does not require the description of perceptual qualities of the kind we experience. Physics is designed to avoid reference to the experiential aspects of things because they are so incredibly complex that including them in the physical theory would destroy its explanatory power completely. Therefore, physics has nothing to say about the experiential and its silence about perceptual qualities in no way denies their existence. Of course, physics could discover the physical correlates of perceptual qualities. But, physics has nothing to do with the experiential itself. The upshot of the argument is that the physical description of things does not clash with the common sense description in terms of perceptual qualities because physics and common sense describe two different aspects of things. Maxwell calls his view on the mind-body problem experiential physicalism.

Maxwell hints that his experiential physicalism already solves the hard problem of consciousness. It is wrong to wonder why physical science tells us nothing about why brain processes give rise to consciousness; because physical science is designed to ignore qualia or raw feels of our conscious experience. Physics does not need to refer to qualia in order to carry out its predictive and explanatory tasks.

Part 2 contains the heart of the book. Here, a new conception of science and its aim is presented namely Aim-Oriented Empiricism (AOE). According to AOE, physics presupposes a problematic metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe: it is such that all disunified theories are false. The universe is such that some kind of underlying unity exists in nature. Therefore, only unified theories are accepted in physics while endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals are available. But, what does it mean to say that a theory is unified? A physical theory is unified if its content, what it says about the physical entities to which it applies, remains the same through its domain of application.

Now, the crucial point is that physics inevitably involves metaphysical presuppositions. However, according to AOE, the current metaphysical presupposition of physics is problematic namely that the universe is such that there is an underlying unity in nature. So, how physics should go about improving this problematic metaphysical assumption of underlying unity? Maxell proposed solution is to adopt and implement AOE. The basic idea here is that the metaphysical assumption of underlying unity should be represented in the form of a hierarchy of assumptions. As we go up this hierarchy, the assumptions become less substantial and so more likely to be true and required by science and pursuit of knowledge. However, low down the hierarchy lie more substantial assumptions which could be subjected to critical assessment and improvement. How all this hierarchical framework goes to improve the underlying metaphysical assumptions of physics? Maxwell answer to this fundamental question of the book could be found in p. 99:

‘Those metaphysical assumptions, low down in the hierarchy, are chosen which stimulate, or are associated with, the most empirically progressive research programmes in physics, or hold out the greatest hope of that. In these ways, the hierarchical framework of AOE facilitates improvement in metaphysical theses that are accepted low down in the hierarchy, but are most likely to be false. As theoretical knowledge in physics improves, metaphysical presuppositions improve, and even lead the way. There is something like positive feedback between improving metaphysical assumptions and associated methods, and improving theoretical knowledge in physics. As we improve our scientific knowledge and understanding about the universe, we correspondingly improve the nature of science itself. We improve methods for the improvement of knowledge’.

This is the new conception of science which Maxwell puts forward in the framework of AOE and he believes has revolutionary implications for science and philosophy of science. Maxwell lists 20 such revolutionary implications which it is not possible to go into details for reasons of space. Here, we focus on the implications of AOE for research on the metaphysics of science. The most important implication, according to Maxwell, is that if AOE is true then the way we understand science and the way we do it have to be changed. From this new point of view, science is not an enterprise solely based on evidence but involves metaphysical assumptions and articles of faith. However, the crucial point is that science accepts them undogmatically, critically and rationally. The second important implication of AOE for the metaphysics of science is that the researchers in this field should strive to develop new improved assumptions in the hierarchical framework of AOE and subject them to critical assessment. In this way, it is possible to contribute both to physics and philosophy.  

In part 3, the broader implications of AOE for academic inquiry as a whole are considered. According to Maxwell, our academic practice is based on a structurally irrational conception of inquiry called knowledge-inquiry which is ultimately inherited from the Enlightenment. Knowledge-inquiry puts all the emphasis of academic inquiry on solving the problems of knowledge and disastrously ignores the problems of living including the grave global problems threatening humanity’s future like nuclear weapons and climate change. Therefore, although knowledge-inquiry has resulted in modern scientific and technological achievements it is nevertheless grossly irrational when judged from the standpoint of helping to promote the human welfare. Since the structure of our academic institutions is built upon this gross irrationality it has given rise to our global problems and furthermore could not learn how to resolve them.

So, what is the solution to this problem? Maxwell believes that the solution is to turn to a new kind of inquiry called wisdom-inquiry and change the aim and structure of our academic practice accordingly. In wisdom-inquiry in contrast to knowledge-inquiry, the emphasis is on articulating and solving our fundamental problems of living. This could be achieved only through a dramatic change in the structure of our academic institutions. Helping to promote human welfare should take center-stage in all aspects of academic practice. 

Throughout the book, Maxwell complains that his views and findings in the metaphysics of science have been ignored by philosophers. I think Maxwell’s views deserve more attention and his contributions should be recognized by philosophical community. Overall, I recommend the book to anyone interested in the recent debates in the metaphysics of science and Maxwell’s take on these issues.

© 2019 Ali Barzegar

Ali Barzegar, PhD Candidate, Department of Philosophy, Sharif University of Technology