The
intent of this book is to give the reader both a background in the history of
ethics from Plato and Aristotle to the present day as well as to show the
challenges to all ethical theories the ‘discovery of the unconscious’ now
poses.

At
issue principally is the rethinking of ethics to include unconscious dimensions
of the psyche without thereby absolving persons of all responsibility. If we
accept the fact of the unconscious, as Riker does, then does this not, he asks,
demolish all possible ethics?  This, in a sense, was both Nietzsche’s and
Freud’s question to traditional ethical theory based on intent and agency.

We
are responsible for what we intend, Riker says of traditional ethics and insofar
as we do not intend actions which are driven by a fundamentally unconscious
dimension, we would not then be responsible. For Riker this argument, while
powerful and needing to be addressed, does not provide a reasonable response we
can live with.

Instead,
Riker develops a theory of the mature self whereby our first ethical task, he
says, is to become acquainted with and delve into our own unconscious selves.
The source of evil deeds, he claims, following Scott Peck’s work in, The
People of the Lie, is our unconscious and driven selves and which is
for the most part diametrically opposed to our conscious intentions or anything
we would wish for or defend.

The
model for this new mature self which takes stock of itself at all levels, is
the Alcoholics Anonymous strategy of both turning one’s self over to a higher
power as well as taking a moral inventory of who one truly is by coming out of
denial and letting go of rationalizations and defenses for past behaviors and
attitudes. This rethinking of the self involves a synthesizing of Aristotle’s
notions of character and responsibility based on virtue as well as Freud’s
concept of the ego, id and superego each of which is revamped by Riker’s
analysis.

The
level of analysis here should be accessible to those without backgrounds in
either Greek philosophy or contemporary psychoanalytic theory since Riker takes
great pains to explain his terms and to provide good introductory summaries of
the theories he is addressing.

The
results of this text are disappointing, however, since the claims and expectations
for its conclusions are set so high. In the end we are charged with ‘amor fati’
—  loving one’s fate, accepting things we cannot change (in and about the
unconscious) and taking responsibility for changing those things about
ourselves that we can. The age old Serenity Prayer surfaces here to seemingly
close the analysis but it also begs the question that is asked at the outset
and that is how to deal with the unconscious in us and in others when it is
precisely this part of the human psyche that we do not and will not have total
control over. Making peace with one’s fate seems hardly a solution for ethics
and the charge to take responsibility rather than resign oneself to an
essentially tragic world. Riker does not do the latter but he does not in the
end come up with more than Aristotle’s virtue ethics cast in the light of the
mature self with some immature aspects. This is not to say that the project is
not needed at this time and that Riker has not pinpointed the dilemma that does
indeed face contemporary ethics and with it psychoanalytic theory and
therapeutic analyses. Ethics cannot become a variation on therapy and Riker
sees this clearly. He does not however get us beyond the problems that AA
itself never dealt with.

©
2002 Irene HarveyIrene Harvey, Department of Philosophy, Penn
State.

Categories: Psychoanalysis, Ethics

Tags: Psychoanalysis