Over the last two decades, the nature of the mind
has enjoyed an ever-increasing share of the philosophical literature. But the
enthusiasm has not been confined just to philosophy. Psychologists—who until
recently have shunned consciousness as a topic worthy of serious study—are
finally beginning to recognize the significance of the questions with which
philosophers have been struggling for years: What is the relationship between
mind and body? How can sentience be a by-product of what is essentially an
electrochemical engine? Will the intentional vocabulary of the propositional
attitudes—those couched in the language of beliefs, hopes, desires, fears,
intuitions, etc.—survive a mature theory of human cognition?

Even a brief survey of the proposed approaches to
these questions will show remarkable complexity and diversity of opinion, and
the archive continues to grow daily. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is a story
to be told here, for the suggested “solutions” often represent discernible
intellectual traditions and schools of thought, which, in turn, have their
genesis in unique social, scientific, and technological trends. William Lyons
in Matters of the Mind thoughtfully tells this story, recounting the
perspectival shifts that scholars have undergone in contemplating the nature of
mentality.

Starting with the historically persistent dogma that
posits a soul separate from the body, Lyons shows how this kind of theistic dualism
has been given its basic philosophical shape by the work of René Descartes. The
Cartesian “two worlds” view (the world of physical things and the world
of non-physical souls and thoughts) is now considered to be a
relic of an old, unsophisticated conception of the mind that is incompatible
with today’s more secular sentiments. True as this may be, it does not require
much imagination or insight to endlessly criticize, belittle, blame, or plain
bad-mouth an admittedly problematic hypothesis without taking the time to think
about its place in the history of ideas. Lyons does not make this
mistake. He remarks—quite correctly, I think—that “with something approaching
extreme perversity, Descartes is now best remembered through the fact that most
twentieth-century accounts of mind define themselves in opposition to what they
take to be Descartes’ account” (p. 4).

Along with logical positivism’s effort to reduce all
folk psychological idioms to statements of physics, this century’s most
conspicuous attempt to dispel Descartes’ two-world view came from the behaviorist
faction. Logical positivism regards the task of philosophy as
chiefly comprising the investigation of the logico-conceptual foundations of
the natural sciences; behaviorism is the school of psychology in which
an organism’s observable (re)actions are the primary topic of interest, and
learning new stimulus-response associations, whether by classical conditioning
or reinforcement principles, is deemed the most important kind of behavior to
scrutinize. Lyons discusses both doctrines in chapter two, but emphasizes behaviorism,
especially in regards to its rise and impact on psychology. Though behaviorism
is now every bit as defunct as Cartesian dualism—in part because it could not
explain one of the most salient aspects of thought, the fact that contentful
mental states are generally known to the subject who has them without appeal to
behaviorist or otherwise external evidence—Lyons nevertheless argues that much
has been gained by the movement. In particular, behaviorism introduced a more
objective standpoint into the way psychological inquiry is conducted, which
“was to become the norm of all future accounts of mind in both philosophy and
psychology” (p. 78).

The demise of behaviorism came at a time when
important advances were being made in the area of neurophysiology. Scientists
started to know more about how the brain functions, and their discoveries have
at least partly motivated various mind-body identity theories, which
equate either types or tokens of thoughts with specific brain states, and, a
little later, the more polemical attitude of eliminative materialism—the
view that, while folk psychological descriptions and explanations may be
practically indispensable, mentalistic categories do not actually denote anything
real. In chapter three, Lyons takes us through the rise and fall of such
positions, along with their similarities and differences, advantages and
shortcomings, effects and repercussions. 

Mind-body identity and eliminativist materialism
sprung from what was a scientific development: a surge in our understanding of
the central nervous system. The next epic in the history of philosophy of mind,
according to Lyons, is rooted in what was essentially a technological
milestone. We may date the advent of the computer age to the late seventies, at
roughly the same time when functionalism—a theory that uses the computer
metaphor to describe the mind as the brain’s software—started to
flourish in most North-American philosophy departments. Throughout the eighties
there was something of a battle between functionalism and eliminativism, with
the latter losing ground and the former becoming more established.
Functionalism remains popular today, but one significant problem for this
approach—reviewed by Lyons in chapter four—is an apparent inability to account
for the subjectivity of conscious experience. Lyons talks about the problem
of consciousness in chapter five, outlining the different, and often
inconsistent, points of view on offer. He concludes the book with a comment on
what he believes to be lessons learnt and lessons lost.            

Lyons does not propose or defend any new theses, and
this makes his book largely an expository one. But lest anyone supposes that
exposition leaves little room for originality, Matters of the Mind is
certainly evidence to the contrary. Perhaps the best feature of the book is its
parallel portrayal of the relevant themes in philosophy and psychology.
While the two disciplines differ in methodology and scope, they have many
points of contact and continue to manifest a symbiotic relationship of mutual
benefit. What Lyons does is identify the main connections and arrange them into
a coherent reconstruction of the forces that have shaped theories of mind over
the past five centuries. He does not assume any technical knowledge on the part
of his audience, but takes the time—sometimes in the main text, sometimes in
footnotes—to explain any philosophical or psychological concept that may be
unfamiliar to laity. Although this may prove distracting to the advanced
student, it makes the work much more accessible to the general public.

The reader will find many wonderful surprises in Matters
of the Mind. It starts with a “Chronology of Modern Philosophy of Mind,”
which lists all the main events that have contributed to the subject in recent
history, starting in 1890 with William James’ publication of Principles of
Psychology, and ending in 1999 with the inauguration of the “Soul Catcher
2025” project (aimed at developing an implantable computer chip capable of
recording the entire sum of a person’s visual experiences over a lifetime). The
reader will also find helpful illustrations, passages from newspaper articles,
diagrams, brief biographies, amusing anecdotes, and a virtual picture-gallery
of many prominent philosophers and psychologists. These different elements
combine to make a thoroughly enjoyable and informative volume. Matters of
the Mind is recommended for everyone, but especially the beginning student
who wants a bird’s-eye-view of the entire field.     

©
2002 Mazen Maurice Guirguis

Mazen
Maurice Guirguis, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Philosophy, University of
British Columbia

Categories: Philosophical

Tags: Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences, Psychology