This book is a significant contribution to scholarship in the philosophy of mind.  The principal thesis is that the psychological realm cannot be explored and delineated by using purely naturalistic scientific methodology and terminology.  Dan O' Brien has constructed a clear, stimulating and interesting exposition which deserves careful contemplation.  This work should be considered essential reading for both proponents and opponents of naturalistic interpretations of mind.

A Critique of Naturalistic Philosophies of Mind attempts to affirm and develop the arguments proposed by John McDowell in his influential Mind and World (Harvard University Press: Cambridge Mass. 1994).  In this work, McDowell argues against attempts to understand mental relations in terms of the law-like structure of nature.  He groups all such attempts together under the heading of 'bald naturalism'.  Bald naturalism, simply defined, is the attempt to naturalize the mind.  In other words, proponents of this theory believe that it is possible to provide a scientific description of our minded interaction with our environment.  O' Brien concurs with McDowell, and develops many of his insights in arguing that such a task cannot be achieved.

In the first part of the book, the author delineates the bald naturalist's position, differentiating two species of the theory which are distinguished by their acceptance or denial of folk psychology.  He begins by considering the metaphysical grounding of bald naturalism.  Bald naturalists are convinced that knowledge of the world can only be gained through rigid empirical investigation and experimentation.  Hence, it is taken as an a priori that the only satisfactory account of the mind will be firmly rooted in facts that are scientifically verifiable.

In Chapters 3 and 4, O' Brien differentiates between what he calls 'crude' and 'sophisticated' bald naturalists.  Sophisticated bald naturalists believe that the science must be capable of describing our common conception of thinkers as those who hold beliefs and prepositional attitudes.  Crude bald naturalists however do not believe that our common-sense interpretation of the mental activities of other people needs to be considered in their program of naturalization.  They propose alternative naturalistic scientific terms to account for the processes of the mind, believing that this eliminates the need to include beliefs and prepositional attitudes in their conception.  In his extensive discussion of bald naturalism, the author considers the work of Quine, Churchland, Fodor and Papineau.  He ultimately proposes that it is the latter philosopher who offers the most attractive and convincing naturalization of the mind.

However, the second part of the book is devoted to arguing that no such naturalistic conception is sufficiently convincing or comprehensive.  In Chapter 5, he considers the problems associated with normativity.  O' Brien believes that there are thoughts that we should have, given our experience of the world, and that such thoughts are justified in the light of such experience.  This appears, in itself, to undermine bald naturalism.  The bald naturalist's project involves describing the mind in terms of empirical and causal relations; ignoring justificatory relations.  However, the author comes to the conclusion that there may still be the possibility of developing a bald naturalist account that has a degree of plausibility, in which the bald naturalist claims to offer a naturalized surrogate for the normative notion of justification.  It is a refutation of this claim that is the principal focus of this book.

The following two chapters are the locus of the core of O' Brien's critique.  This critique is grounded in his understanding of the process of interpretation.  He adopts what he calls the 'interpretational stance.'  This stance involves the belief that an exploration of the practice of interpretation has the capacity to reveal integral features of the mind, and that any satisfactory account of the mind must provide a description of how the practice of interpretation proceeds.  He argues that, if the methodology of bald naturalism is incapable of accounting for interpretation, it is inherently and irredeemably flawed and does not have the ability to comprehensively account for the mind.  The author criticizes the idea that interpretation is synonymous with translation, and proceeds to develop the notion that a fundamental element of interpretation is the capacity for empathic engagement with the thoughts of the individuals that we strive to interpret.

The latter idea is a key component of O' Brien's ultimate refutation, which is grounded in the argument that bald naturalists inevitably fail to account for the possible empathic understanding of particular unfamiliar conceptual schemes.  He is convinced that there are various varieties of rationality involved in the different conceptual schemes of distinct communities.  He argues, from this basis, that such species of rationality cannot be interpreted in isolation from a close engagement with the thinkers under consideration.  Thus, he believes, the practice of interpretation must be considered open-ended.  The bald naturalist fails to embrace this open-endedness, and so his account is insufficient, both in its explanation of interpretation and the mind.  Finally, the author turns his attention to McDowell's positive elucidation of how interpretation and the mind should be understood.  He develops and strengthens this conception, and in this way adds a significant contribution to modern philosophy of mind.

This book is a fascinating engagement with McDowell's philosophy, and adds insight and rigorous form to many of the ideas first introduced by him.  O' Brien has succeeded in introducing challenging thought-experiments and well formulated and convincing arguments.  His extensive knowledge of the philosophical background and context of his subject matter is evident throughout the book.  Not only does A Critique of Naturalistic Philosophies of Mind introduce new and innovative ideas, it also serves as a broad introduction and guide to many of the key questions in the philosophy of mind.  This book is a valuable addition to the literature of philosophy of mind, and poses many new challenges to any philosopher who is an advocate of bald naturalism.

© 2008 Richard H. Corrigan

Richard H. Corrigan (PhD) graduated from UCD in 2006.  He has written several books and numerous articles on philosophy of religion, politics and agency.  His is the Chief Editor of Philosophical Frontiers: A Journal of Emerging Thought.  richardcorrigan@philosophicalfrontiers.com.