In A Place for Consciousness, Gregg Rosenberg presents a detailed
examination of the link between consciousness and causation, arguing that it’s
through an examination of causation that the philosophical problems surrounding
consciousness can be tackled.

In part one of the book he argues
that physicalism, the view that mental facts are physical facts, is false and
leaves no place in the world for consciousness.  Rosenberg’s aim is to find a place for consciousness but to do so
in a way that fits with physical science. 
Using the physics of a simple digital world as a starting point,
Rosenberg argues that physics can’t account for the phenomenal properties of
consciousness.  As physics deals
exclusively with structure, there’s no possible foothold for content that will
be necessary for any account of conscious experience.  In his discussion of physicalism, Rosenberg presents various arguments
made against anti-physicalist positions and shows how his theory of Liberal Naturalism either defeats or
escapes these arguments.

Whilst reading this section I was
sometimes left unconvinced by Rosenberg’s arguments, not because of any fault
with the arguments themselves or the way they were presented, but simply
because the position he was adopting was contrary to some very deeply held
beliefs. I had the impression that the arguments were wrong, I just couldn’t
see how.  It was in the second section
of the book, where he tackles causation that I let go of those prejudices.

Rosenberg’s treatment of causation
in the second part of the book is original and he makes a convincing case for
his claim that consciousness is a product of the nature of causation. Rosenberg
argues that contemporary theories of causation, in their focus on the
effective, overlook the fact that causation has both effective and receptive
features. It’s in his examination of how entities are receptive to one another
that Rosenberg is able to find solutions to philosophical problems surrounding
consciousness in the intrinsic nature of causation. 

This is not really a book for a
general audience.  Rosenberg offers a
short tour through the work that skips the more technical chapters. This tour
is well worth taking. Chapters 4 and 9 are interesting overviews of
consciousness and causation respectively, outlining some of the current issues
and debate in these fields as well as some historical background.  However, the short tour misses out more than
half of the book and is not completely free of technicality. Given that it’s in
the rigorous technical arguments that this work is at its best, it seems a
shame to bypass them. 

Even someone with a background in
philosophy may found this hard going and a grounding in neuroscience, physics
or computer science would be an advantage if the reader is to get the most out
of this work.  For anyone with a
background in philosophy but who isn’t too comfortable with physics, it’s
probably worth taking the short tour before embarking on the book as a whole to
get an overview of the central arguments and a taste for the enthusiasm with
which Rosenberg approaches his subject. The work that’s needed to get to grips
with the material is worth the effort and there are frequent summaries and
definitions to keep the reader on the right track.  Rosenberg also lays out his intentions and arguments with clarity
so you know exactly what the argument in a particular section is and what place
it has in the general architecture of his theory.  The straightforward writing style makes comprehension easier
which is essential in a book where the arguments are so densely packed.

©
2005 Toni Tochel

Toni Tochel is a graduate of Glasgow University
where she gained a degree in philosophy. 
She is now studying for the B.Phil in philosophy at Oxford
University. 

Categories: Psychology, Philosophical