The book is a study of "practical
psychology," by which is meant professional practices, not academic
theories or experiments.  It is called a "social history" because it
concerns the interaction between these practices and the larger society.

 The main theme of the book is how
society has influenced psychology and vice versa.  The main thesis is that the
development of psychology has been determined not by the internal logic of an objective
and autonomous science but by the prejudices and preconceptions of the larger society
and by the ambitions of professional psychologists.  Specifically, say the
editors, the stupendous growth and current prosperity of twentieth century psychology
are attributable to the fact that psychologists have usually served as accomplices in the economic and political exploitation of the poor by the rich, blacks by
whites, colonists by imperialists, or women by men.   

 Though the editors do not describe
it as such, readers will recognize this reductive thesis as a contribution to
the Marxist program in the sociology of science. Its authors never offer either
to state or to evaluate the evidence for the merits of any psychological theory
or practice.  If their thesis is right, there is no need to do so€”because, in
the final analysis, logic and evidence cannot explain why a practice comes into
being or a theory is accepted.  Thus, it is alleged here, IQ tests were originally
developed as an aid to social stratification and are now rejected because they
perpetuate inequality; forget all those technical discussions of test validity. 

With this dismissive attitude, the book
focuses on (1) the causes of acceptance or rejection of psychological services
and ideas by the general public or by such institutions as the courts and (2)
the efforts by psychologists to displace physicians in providing these services
and ideas.  As you might suspect, the accounts that result from these single
minded and pre-ordained focuses are both markedly tendentious and highly selective. 

This is not to say that they are false.
As each of its chapters reminds us, most of what has been called psychology
lacks solid foundation.  So, its fruits have been, and continue to be, as much
products of wishful thinking as of fact and logic. 

Of course, since each of the book’s
chapters tries to cover too big a territory in too short a space, it makes this
point in the sketchiest of ways. Chapter 2 surveys the history of child rearing
and education from 1500, Chapter 3 madness and mental health from 1800, Chapter
4 work and organization from 1880, Chapter 5 culture and ethnicity from 1500,
Chapter 6 delinquency and the law from before 1800, and Chapter 7 social
organization from 1775.  The average length of these six chapters, including
notes, figures and photographs, is just thirty three pages.  So, the end results
are little more than chronologies of names and facts.  Despite their
superficiality, however, each chapter provides a reasonably accurate, if highly
selective, account of the events it describes. And despite the scarcity of analysis,
each contributes something to the larger picture.

That picture is a confusing one. 
Taken together the contributions to the present book make it clear that we
should doubt whether "psychology" is the name of one thing.  Among
the different things that go under this name are studies of consciousness,
measures of intelligence, assessments of temperament, treatments for the
insane, educational theories and pedagogical practices, programs for the
rehabilitation of criminals and delinquents, techniques of behavior
modification, human relations practices, advice for employers, etc. 
Furthermore, each of these is made up of motley bits of philosophy, ideology,
fantasy, prejudice, experiment, and professional practice.  If anything ties
all of these disparate enterprises and elements together, it is hard to
identify.  This fact provides the best evidence that psychology is indeed an
example what the authors and editors call a social construct, meaning that it
is not a natural kind.

So the book has merit–or anyhow
the chapters that constitute its body do.  Unfortunately, the same cannot be
said of the Introduction or the first chapter, which attempt to provide an
overview of the whole and to set out the categories€”individualism and social
control–that purportedly guide the accounts to follow.  Here the editors fly
at such a high level of philosophical abstraction, vague conceptualization, and
loose thought that you risk intellectual asphyxiation trying to read them in
the thin air.  Fortunately, the preliminaries are not essential to the rest of
the book.  In fact, they have little to do with it.  So, they can safely be
ignored.  

My recommendation to you is to ignore
them.  Instead, read the Epilogue, which is briefer, clearer, and more to the
point.  Then go straight to the body of the work, picking out the topics that
interest you.  They will afford you much to think about.

© 2004 Max Hocutt

Max Hocutt
Ph.D., Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, The University of Alabama; author of Grounded
Ethics: The Empirical Bases of Normative Judgment (Transaction,
2000); formerly
editor of Behavior and Philosophy.

Categories: Psychology