Distinguished philosopher of language and historian of philosophy, Scott Soames presents in his latest book a collection of fifteen recent essays, three of them previously unpublished. Although most of these texts had originally been published separately and in different contexts, they all share a similar goal: to inquire on the origins, history, and actuality of analytic philosophy, still largely preponderant in English-speaking countries. This new volume can thus be seen as a continuation of Soames’ previous works, especially his Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century (2003, 2 vol.).         

The book, divided into three parts, covers a great variety of topics. Some articles are broad thematical presentations, on questions such as the nature of propositions or the methodology of early analytic philosophy. Others bear on specific historical points (Russell’s no-class theory, Kripke on possibility, Quine/Carnap on ontology and analyticity) or focus on major figures (Quine, David Lewis). The last section of the book engages with more contemporary subjects, as for instance the definition of natural kinds, or the question of vagueness in philosophy of law. From metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language to political philosophy, the range of problems considered by Soames is thus quite impressive.                        

Although the major part of the book is dedicated to historical essays, it should be noted that they always incorporate critical remarks, echoing Soames’ general advocacy of history of philosophy as a normative project, irreducible to any sort of descriptive narrative for its own sake. Indeed, the author does not hesitate to mark out what he considers to be the fundamental insights or defects of the theories under his scrutiny. He also generally makes clear what are the philosophical claims and options he favors: a good example would be his defense of a “cognitive” theory of propositions in the fourth essay. This aspect of Soames’ method should be noted, as it has generated some controversy amongst historians of philosophy in the past (see Soames 2006 for a summary of and replies to these attacks). The reader should thus be aware that in addition to the historical picture here provided, there are also -and admittedly- strong claims held by the author.                                               

Overall, this volume will prove useful for anybody curious about the history of analytic philosophy.  The texts bearing on more specific points (such as essays 8, 9, 11, 14, 15) will be of interest for specialists, but probably less so to the general reader looking for synthesis, as they sometimes get fairly technical. On the other hand, essays 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 are especially clear and introduce to some major questions in the analytic tradition. The first text is a must-read, being a great overview of how and why analytic philosophy progressively became dominant in the XXth century United States. Each of the articles also contains helpful bibliographical notices.                         

One could perhaps regret that Soames, though he takes care in his Introduction to outline the content of each essay, does not also provide a more holistic picture of what connects these different texts. From the title of the book, one could have anticipated lengthy developments on the definition of analytic philosophy, but this expectation is only met briefly in the first article, where it is characterized as such:

“Analytic philosophy is not a fixed body of substantive doctrine, a precise methodology, or a radical break with most traditional philosophy of the past -save for varieties of romanticism, theism, and absolute idealism.  Instead, it is a discrete historical tradition stemming from Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein and the logical positivists, characterized by respect for science and common sense, belief in the relevance of logic and language for philosophy, emphasis on precision and clarity in argumentation, suspicion of apriori metaphysics, and elevation of the goals of truth and knowledge over inspiration, moral uplift, and spiritual comfort–plus a dose of professional specialization” (p.7).

Soames certainly has some reasons to point out (following Hans-Johann Glock, 2008) that analytic philosophy is less a whole doctrine than a collection of positions linked by some network of family resemblances. But further discussion could have been useful. It is not altogether so obvious that analytic philosophy is not in some ways radically departing from the classical tradition. Nor that the respect for common sense, certainly important for moorean and ordinary-language philosophers, is one of its distinctive marks (just think of Lewis’ modal realism). Also, if speculative metaphysics was indeed dismissed by the Vienna Circle and its followers, the most recent “ontological turn” of analytic philosophy seems to complicate the matter. One could therefore have wished for a more detailed treatment of these meta-philosophical questions, quickly set aside by Soames in favour of more particular matters.                                     

That said, the book offers a good overview of the most important problems and controversies of analytic philosophy, especially those related to philosophy of language. One will also appreciate the author’s constant effort to propose critical remarks and to consider contemporary debates. Thus, if some essays will perhaps puzzle the non-specialist, Soames nonetheless provides us with a stimulating volume for those generally interested by the history and actuality of the analytic tradition. 

© 2014 Alexandre Declos

Alexandre Declos is a Ph.D. student at the University of Ottawa and Université Nancy-2. His research interests include contemporary metaphysics, epistemology, and analytic aesthetics. He specializes in the philosophy of Nelson Goodman.