Market prices and crimes rates have a lot common: you never really
know when, how and why they are going up or down, but this knowledge would be
highly beneficial for humankind. How is it that we do not have control on
economies and crimes while we can send robots on Mars and produce nuclear
energy? Why can we cure malaria but cannot eliminate terrorism, war, crime,
rape and poverty? According to Lee McIntyre, we are ignorant of the true causes
of human behavior, just as people of the Dark Ages (roughly from the fifth to
the eleventh century, although McIntyre consider that the whole Middle Ages
deserve to be called "dark") were ignorant of the true causes of
natural disasters. Their ignorance was largely the product of ideology, and so
do ours. However, Renaissance science, based on experimentation, mathematics,
and the research of scientific laws, helped overcome this obscurantism. Now
that natural science and technology gave us the means to understand and control
nature, why cannot we do the same with human behavior? Are natural and social
disasters of a different nature?

In a previous book (McIntyre, 1996), the author already
addressed the question of the possibility of a genuine science of behavior,
that is, a science whose descriptions, explanations and predictions are
mediated by laws (a "nomological science"). He showed how different
objections to such a science are unfounded, ideological and refutable. In his
new book, however, he widens the scope of his enterprise (and readership) and
investigates the cause and consequences of social science’ failure to achieve
empirical and practical success. Briefly, we are afraid of the truth about us
and lack the courage to learn and change things. Thus, social science deal with
abstract or irrelevant problems, avoid finding solutions to social disasters
and argue for a different kind of rationality (social science are
"interpretative", "special", etc.). We live in a new Dark
Ages, haunted with irrational beliefs about our societies and ourselves.
Religious and political ideologies plague our scientific practices. What we need
now is an understanding of the causal forces behind human behaviors. As
Francisco Goya’s painting reminds us, "The sleep of reason produces
monsters."

In Chapter 1 ("Diagnosing the Human Condition"),
the dramatic consequences of our lack or knowledge are presented. Post-soviet
Russia’s hyperinflation, the lack of explanation for the fall of US major
crimes in the 90’s and Muslims’ "ethnic cleansing" by Bosnian Serbs
are three examples of social-scientific blind spot. A genuinely scientific approach
of human behavior should help us avoiding such catastrophes. It could sound
utopist, but, McIntyre suggests, think of how humans of the Dark Ages would
understand today’s technology. Satellites, computers and airplanes would seem
rather impossible.

Chapter 2 ("A Science of Human Behavior") argues
that the solution to these problems is science. A scientific approach could
shed light on the causes of human actions. Contemporary social science are,
according to McIntyre, "ridiculously unrigorous" (p.17): we are unable
to accurately predict, explain and control social phenomena. We have a lot of
theories, a few facts, and no successful practical applications. Emphasis
should be put on testability and falsifiability, not on the fit between
theories and facts. Why is it that Aristotle physics is no longer taught, while
his politics is still considered as a benchmark in social science? (p.22). The
author then reviews classical arguments against the possibility of a science of
human behavior, and show how they do not hold.

McIntyre explains, in Chapter 3 ("Resistance to
Knowledge") why so many scholars are reluctant to this scientific
endeavor: the fear of learning things we do not want to know about us. All
social or psychological questions should be given an empirical treatment,
whether we like or not what we may discover. Sexual orientation, gender, gun
control, and death penalty, for instance, should be discussed as empirical
questions. Natural science test and refute theories without concerns for
religious and political ideologies and we can see the success of this attitude
everywhere. There is no good reason why social science cannot adopt this
attitude and free policy-making from intuitions and emotions.

Chapter 4 ("A Lesson from the History of Science")
illustrates what natural science can teach us. Galileo’s heliocentrism and Darwin’s natural selection are two milestones in the history of scientific struggle
against ideology. Instead of relying on intuition, ideology and authority,
Galileo and Darwin focused on facts and empirical evidence. Moreover, it was
not only the scientific rigor of heliocentrism and natural selection that
should inspire social science, but also the intellectual courage of their
proponents. This "courage in the face of the forces of resistance to
knowledge give heart to those who wish to pursue a genuine science of human
behavior" (p.78). 

In the final chapter, ("What Is to be Done?"),
McIntyre summarizes the main problems of social science and suggests solutions.
The first one is awareness to ideological bias in social science. Another is
learning from natural science and its history. We must be ready to think that
social problems may have a solution and that this solution will come from
empirical research. We should cultivate an experimental and a scientific
attitude, and be ready to refute theories and abandon ideology. More
importantly, we should never forget that the ultimate goal of social science is
to create a better world. McIntyre gives an example of a successful application
of scientific theory to social problem: the fall of murder rate in New York City in the 90’s. Based on previous experiments and tested theories, anti-crime
policies reduced murders substantially (from 2245 in 1990 to 673 in 2000), even
if one take into account the national fall in criminality during the same
period. A better world is possible, but only if we use our best resources.

Dark Ages is a well-written and stimulating book. The
author presents carefully his arguments and shows how ideological bias may have
dramatic consequences. It explains clearly the dangers of anti-scientific and
anti-naturalistic thinking, so common in today’s social science and humanities.
My only criticism is that, in the last chapters, the author tends to state the
same ideas in different forms. Maybe more examples would have been more
interesting than reiterating the same points.

McIntyre’s book is explicitly addressed to a wide audience.
Social scientists, politicians, policy-makers or any citizen will benefit
(intellectually and practically) from reading it. While it is suited for a
general readership, it could be also interesting for philosophers of science
who appreciated other critical essays in social science such as McIntyre
previous books, or Rosenberg (1992) and Hausman (1992) essays on economics.

 

Hausman,
D. M. (1992). The inexact and separate science of economics. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

McIntyre,
L. C. (1996). Laws and explanation in the social science : Defending a
science of human behavior. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Rosenberg,
A. (1992). Economics : Mathematical politics or science of diminishing
returns? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

 

Note: The introduction of the book can be freely
downloaded on the publisher’s site

 

©
2007 Benoit Hardy-Vallée

 

Benoit Hardy-Vallée, PhD, Department of
Philosophy, University of Waterloo (Canada). The author is a philosopher of
science interested in cognitive science, biology and economics.

Categories: Philosophical