What do you do with a new psychological construct?  Mathews et al. present us with the various
tests and trials a construct needs to pass before it can become scientifically
validated. Emotional Intelligence (EI), they argue, does not make the grade, at
least not in any of its current conceptualizations.

   Indeed
there appear to be major conceptual problems that EI must overcome if it is to
be clearly identifiable.  For one, the
authors reveal that the concept is not used consistently by its various
proponents. There is of course a general definition we can all agree on
(helpfully provided on the dust jacket):

The term ’emotional
intelligence’ refers to the ability to identify, express, and understand
emotions; to assimilate emotions into thought; and to regulate both positive
and negative emotions in oneself and in others.

   But
clearly more detail is required if EI is to be a measurable quality of the
human organism. Tracing the history of definitions given to the term, from its
first appearance in an unpublished doctoral dissertation by W.L. Payne (1986)
to its huge popularization by Daniel Goleman in his 1995 book Emotional
Intelligence Mathews et al. demonstrate how each conception has been
shaped to suit the different interests of its proponent.

   A related
issue is that it isn’t clear whether or not EI ever refers to anything not
already captured in existing personality measures. No doubt this is a serious
defect of any theory purporting to uncover a previously unmeasured human
quality, but need it follow from this that no construct combining already
existing measurable traits and abilities could ever prove to be useful? The
authors fail to provide us with an argument for why this is not so.  What they do show, however, is that there
are serious psychometric weaknesses with all published tests of EI.  Given that the tests in question are not
measuring anything accurately, it is impossible to determine just what
is being measured, let alone any correlations it might have with other
psychological processes.

   This leads
us to the second set of difficulties that EI faces, namely issues arising from
its limited theoretical basis.  Should
EI be placed within a biological, or a neurological (cognitive) framework? How
central are coping, adaptation, and personality theory to emotion?  Surely, no construct which cannot pass conceptualization
and measurement tests could possibly succeed when it comes to theory.
Nevertheless, the authors do their best to give the concept a chance,
concluding that the prospects for a coherent theory of EI supported by empirical
evidence are poor.

   The third
and final difficulty for EI is that of application.  Does EI add anything to existing clinical
psychology?  Can its recognition
contribute anything to an occupational environment?  If EI could prove to be useful for say, management theory (as Goleman
argues in his second book Working with
Emotional Intelligence), it might yet be able to recover from the authors’ conceptual and theoretical blows.  Unfortunately, the evidence for its
effectiveness in such areas turns out to be poor, and we are left thinking, not
only that a lot more work needs to be done if EI research is to become bona
fide, but that we should perhaps reassess the validity of other psychological
constructs (such as IQ, which the authors devote a critical chapter to) too.

   Emotional
Intelligence
is not only the most comprehensive review of all existing literature on the
topic, but also an insightful case study into what it takes for a new
psychological construct to be scientifically validated.  Mathews et al. guide the reader through
their critical approach of the pits and falls of psychological methodology with
a refreshing distance that is all but gone in modern psychological texts.  The book’s only obvious flaw is an inability
to successfully relate (in the few pages dedicated to this task) the authors’
thoughts and concerns to current philosophical debate. Perhaps it would have
been best to leave this for another volume.

©
2003 Constantine
Sandis

Constantine Sandis is currently completing his PhD
on The Things We Do and Why We Do Them at the University of Reading.  He also teaches in the Philosophy Department
there, as well as at Campbell Harris, London.

Categories: Philosophical, Psychology