Ethics done
Right is not a monograph but a collection of (mainly previously published)
papers. These are brought closer together by an introduction which highlights
(and offers further defence for) the main methodological insight which they all
share, namely that we can and therefore should defend our normative and
practical ethical views (Millgram uses the term ‘theories’ but is open to the
possibility that what we end up with may be unsystematic, p.5) by first defending
an account of practical reasoning from which they may emerge. With the
exception of the first and last chapters most of the book only does this implicitly,
by rigorously applying the methodology to be defended to a number of moral
questions. Millgram does not defend any particular normative theory in the
process, though the fourth essay (‘Reasonably Virtuous’) looks to a future
where having deployed the ‘method of practical reasoning’ we may well find
ourselves developing new moral theories that need not fit our current
preconceptions.

The book’s
two-fold aim is thus to (i) show that all normative ethical theories presuppose
some kind of ‘theory’ of practical reasoning and (ii) to critically evaluate a
number of these views (including utilitarian, Kantian, Humean, and
particularist ones). Millgram succeeds on both counts, but also does so much
more, making important contributions to Hume and Mill exegesis along the way
(essays 6-8 and 2 respectively) that no scholar of either philosopher can
afford to miss. His revisionist ‘Was Hume a Humean?’ (Chapter Seven) in
particular, ought to be a staple in future anthologies of Hume scholarship,
alongside related papers by Christine Korsgaard and Jean Hampton. In this
controversial paper (first published in 1995) Millgram argues persuasively that
Hume is not, as commonly assumed, an instrumentalist about practical reasoning
but, rather, a kind of error theorist about it. This interpretation is
strengthened by an independent argument in Chapter Eight  (Hume on "Is"
and "Ought"’, originally published as ‘Hume on Practical Reasoning’
in 1997).

The popular
methodological alternative to practical reasoning is, of course, John Rawls’ method
of reflective equilibrium. In his introduction, Millgram produces the first
building blocks of an interesting case for why practical reasoning is
preferable to this, but it would have been nice to see him develop it more
fully (anticipating possible objections and so on) in a full-length essay. As
it stands, for a book that is dedicated ‘for (and against) John Rawls’, Ethics
done Right does not give reflective equilibrium the full attention it deserves.

Be that as it
may, this book remains loaded with thoughtful comments and arguments that will,
at the very least, be of interest to anyone interested in theoretical ethics,
not least of all those working on the nature of reasons for action. It would be
unsurprising, however, if it endured to become influential enough to mark the
beginning of a new school. Millgram convinces that the method of practical
reasoning requires serious attention by moral philosophers of all persuasions.
Only time will tell whether enough of them will listen.

©
2006 Constantine Sandis

Constantine
Sandis is a lecturer in philosophy at Oxford Brookes University, UK.

Categories: Ethics, Philosophical