Questions regarding the sources of
our own behavior and that of others are common in our lives. At times, we ask
ourselves questions that help us make sense of behavioral events in the
immediate social context that envelops our existence (why did he come to work
late?).  At other times, we ask questions that help us understand behavior in
the larger social context (why did people vote for a given political party
against their own economic interest?). Irrespective of the complexity of the
questions, our answers raise two issues: (1) How are they arrived at? This is
an issue that requires an examination of the cognitive processes involved in
judging behavior and of the information upon which these processes operate. (2)
Do the answers affect our social interactions? This is a problem that requires
an assessment of the observable consequences of acts of judgment that originate
in people’s minds. In How the Mind Explains Behavior, Bertram F. Malle
attempts to address both issues by undertaking the challenging task of
generating a conceptual framework for explanations of human behavior.  Even
though he forages through traditional concepts of attribution theory, he
ultimately constructs a truly novel conceptual structure for understanding
explanations of our behavior and that of others.  In the process, he brings
forth insights into such explanations that are unlikely to be found anywhere
else.

As an introduction to his stated
goal, the author portrays an interesting and, at times, controversial overview
of traditional attribution accounts (Chapter 1). He outlines their weaknesses
and shortcomings along with their strengths as theoretical frameworks for
understanding explanations of behavior. Of course, in his narrative, most of
the conventional knowledge of attribution processes held by social cognitive
researchers is characterized as somehow inadequate for the task of accounting
for behavioral explanations. Irrespective of whether readers agree with the
author’s narrative of this unquestionably wealthy area of social cognitive
knowledge, his razor-sharp style and deep knowledge of the subject matter make
his treatment of traditional attribution accounts thought-provoking.

While the author examines the
theoretical past of behavioral explanations, his disciplined narrative gives
out hints of the original theoretical framework that he is about to espouse and
embellish in the chapters to follow. It is in these chapters that readers will find
the truly creative vein of the author’s work.  Malle argues that behavioral
explanations, an important aspect of social cognition, play a crucial role in
our lives by conferring meaning on behavior, which would otherwise be mostly
reflexive and purposeless. His theory of behavioral explanations is based on
two tenets: (a) explanations of our behavior and that of others are part of our
theory of the mind (i.e., a conceptual framework that we use to explain actions
in our world); (b) these explanations are not only abstract thoughts inside our
heads but also verbal actions that help us manage social interactions.  As a
result, the author names his account of behavioral explanations folk-conceptual
and provides a careful examination of the interplay between one’s judgments
regarding the sources of behavioral events and changes in behavior resulting
from such judgments.

One of the chapters that might
catch readers’ attention is the one in which the author examines differences
between explanations of our actions and those used to account for other
individuals’ actions.  It is in this chapter that the author’s elegant and
scientifically oriented narrative comes to life the most, particularly when he
compares his folk-conceptual account with that of traditional attribution
theory.  Another chapter that is sure not to go unnoticed is the one in which
the author examines the concepts of intentionality and mental states, which
shape how we process behavioral information (including detecting, interpreting
and responding to actions). The chapter in which he examines the processes
involved in constructing explanations is likely to produce a similar reaction
from readers. Of course, the last chapter is no less remarkable for the author’s
willingness to outline the weaknesses of his own account and to suggest
research applications that encompass psychopathology and social relationships
(including political conflicts), which are research areas that can be of
interest to many scholars of psychological phenomena.  Naturally, nothing is
entirely perfect. Chapter 1, which provides a critical overview of traditional
accounts of attribution processes, is packed with information that some readers
may find difficult to follow. Not surprisingly, the author acknowledges this
problem and suggests that such readers wait to explore the chapter at a later
time. This advice may be counterproductive.  Indeed, it is clear that readers’
appreciation of the novelty and usefulness of the author’s theoretical account
is likely to be derived from the historical overview offered by chapter 1. This
is particularly true for readers with little knowledge of the study of "attribution"
processes and outcomes who may be prevented from fully appreciating the
arguments put forth by the author in favor of his folk-conceptual framework if
chapter 1 is not absorbed before all the others.

Malle’s book is truly a great read
for people who have some interest, albeit different expertise, in the area of
social cognition such as social psychologists and, in general, cognitive
scientists.  Readers are sure to find the "folk-conceptual" account
of behavioral explanations proposed by the author to be motivating grounds for
re-examining traditional conceptualizations of how the human mind can construct
a social world and change it too.  On the other hand, students interested in
cognition may find the book a rather captivating introduction to the events
that produce scientific knowledge in the area of social cognition.  Indeed, the
book illustrates rather plainly the sequence of events that originates from a
critical examination of well-established accounts of a given phenomenon and
then leads to a theoretical shift in thinking about that phenomenon.  All
readers will surely find the book filled with enjoyable examples of behavioral
explanations, which add substance to the author’s theoretical arguments rather
than serving as distractions. With the exception of Chapter 1, which can be
cryptic and cumbersome to neophytes, extensive knowledge of social cognition is
not required here to gain a basic understanding of the author’s critical
arguments. The narrative is entertaining, provocative, and, taken as a whole,
transparent, making the book an enjoyable read.

© 2005 Maura Pilotti

Maura Pilotti,
Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Dowling
College, New
York.

Categories: Psychology, Philosophical